Suchergebnisse

First, starting from a text Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 on the aftermath of May 1968 in France ("May 68 Did Not Take Place"), this article tries to analyze in what way this diagnosis – made in the middle of the 1980s, when what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding both in America and in Europe – can apply to our current political situation. Secondly, this analysis shows that maybe the very conditions of social critique and social engagement are endangered today more than yesterday, because of the new patterns of social restraint embodied by the evolution of communication (especially television). Thirdly, the author asks the question: therefore, under which conditions social critique and engagement are now possible? ; Naj pre po la zim od tek sta ko ji su De lez i Ga ta ri na pi sa li 1984. go di ne o po sle di ca ma maj skih do ga đa ja 1968. u Fran cu skoj ("Maj '68 se ni je do go dio"), da bih u svom pri lo gu po ku šao da ana li zi ram na ko ji na čin se nji ho va di jag no za – iz ve de na sre dinom osam de se tih u vre me raz vo ja sa da uobi ča je nog neo li be ra li zma u Ame ri ci i Evro pi – mo že pri me ni ti na na šu tre nut nu po li tič ku si tu a ci ju. Dru go, ta ana li za uka zu je da su mo žda upra vo da nas vi še ne go ikad ugro že ni uslo vi dru štve ne kriti ke i dru štve nog an ga žma na s raz vo jem no vih obra za ca dru štve ne pri nu de sa drža ne u evo lu ci ji ko mu ni ka ci ja (po seb no te le vi zi je). Tre će, sto ga se pi tam, pod ko jim uslo vi ma su dru štve na kri ti ka i an ga žman da nas uop šte mo gu ći?

International audience ; First, starting from a text Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 on the aftermath of May 1968 in France ("May 68 Did Not Take Place"), this article tries to analyze in what way this diagnosis-made in the middle of the 1980s, when what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding both in America and in Europe-can apply to our current political situation. Secondly, this analysis shows that maybe the very conditions of social critique and social engagement are endangered today more than yesterday, because of the new patterns of social restraint embodied by the evolution of communication (especially television). Thirdly, the author asks the question: therefore, under which conditions social critique and engagement are now possible?

International audience ; First, starting from a text Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 on the aftermath of May 1968 in France ("May 68 Did Not Take Place"), this article tries to analyze in what way this diagnosis-made in the middle of the 1980s, when what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding both in America and in Europe-can apply to our current political situation. Secondly, this analysis shows that maybe the very conditions of social critique and social engagement are endangered today more than yesterday, because of the new patterns of social restraint embodied by the evolution of communication (especially television). Thirdly, the author asks the question: therefore, under which conditions social critique and engagement are now possible?

International audience ; First, starting from a text Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 on the aftermath of May 1968 in France ("May 68 Did Not Take Place"), this article tries to analyze in what way this diagnosis-made in the middle of the 1980s, when what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding both in America and in Europe-can apply to our current political situation. Secondly, this analysis shows that maybe the very conditions of social critique and social engagement are endangered today more than yesterday, because of the new patterns of social restraint embodied by the evolution of communication (especially television). Thirdly, the author asks the question: therefore, under which conditions social critique and engagement are now possible?

nema

First, starting from a text Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 on the
aftermath of May 1968 in France (?May 68 Did Not Take Place?), this article
tries to analyze in what way this diagnosis - made in the middle of the
1980s, when what is now commonly called neo-liberalism was unfolding both in
America and in Europe - can apply to our current political situation.
Secondly, this analysis shows that maybe the very conditions of social
critique and social engagement are endangered today more than yesterday,
because of the new patterns of social restraint embodied by the evolution of
communication (especially television). Thirdly, the author asks the question:
therefore, under which conditions social critique and engagement are now
possible?

Deleuze will not wait until he had completed his works to frame and formulate
a theory on the relation between philosophy and science. The first
articulations of this question are already present as early as the 1950s and
1960s in the studies on Bergson and Nietzsche, and then in Difference and
repetition as well as in The Logic of Sense. It is also true that this
question will be specifically developed in 1991 in What Is Philosophy? But
throughout his work, the main thrust would proceed. This issue, it seems,
comprises three main aspects: in the first place, in a polemic against the
neo-Kantian epistemological legacy, it primarily consists in denying the
critical definition of philosophy as being a ?reflection on scientific
knowledge? to replace it by a conception drawn from Bergson?s expressionist
ontology that places science and philosophy on both sides of the being;
secondly, in an attempt to restore the concept of dialectics, it consists in
making the dialectics of ideas the communal sphere of both science and
philosophy; thirdly, aiming to specify every form of thinking, it consists in
shaping how each expresses its ideas or its problems with its own signs.
These three aspects, it seems, can frame the overall conception Deleuze
formed of the link between science and philosophy. We shall successively
analyze them, exclusively considering the first period of Deleuze?s work,
which is to say the pre-guattarian publications.

La philosophie politique contemporaine est marquée par un retour du questionnement sur la violence « sauvage » et « impolitique », abordée non plus comme origine archaïque de la violence politique (passage de la nature à la culture, du pré-symbolique au symbolique) mais comme violence extrême véhiculée par le développement du capitalisme néolibéral (retour de la nature dans la culture, de l'asymbolique dans le symbolique). Dans cet article, nous montrons que, d'après Bourdieu, les formes extrêmes de violence provoquées par le néolibéralisme actuel entraînent un risque d'effondrement des structures anthropologiques : ces formes de violence franchissent en effet un seuil impolitique, qui dissout les structures sociales objectives et les dispositions subjectives de perception, de pensée et d'action. En ce sens, nous suggérons que c'est précisément le danger d'un retour du refoulé impolitique qui permet d'expliquer le tropisme de Bourdieu vers l'État (national ou transnational), conçu comme le dernier rempart contre une violence extrême impossible à convertir dans une quelconque pratique sociale, et sa préférence ambiguë pour la violence d'État, perçue comme un moindre mal par rapport à la violence capitaliste. ; Peer reviewed

Dans cet article, nous avons ressaisi ce que nous estimons être l'enjeu final de l'œuvre deleuzienne : le rapport paradoxal que la philosophie entretient avec les formations sociales qui la conditionnent historiquement. Ce rapport est paradoxal, car il est à la fois de dépendance et d'excès : de dépendance (précepte matérialiste), car la pensée philosophique suppose des conditions sociohistoriques particulières pour pouvoir apparaître et s'épanouir (ainsi, les rapports d'association et de rivalité dans la cité grecque ou les rapports capitalistes dans l'Europe moderne) ; d'excès cependant (précepte spiritualiste), car la pensée philosophique n'est pas le reflet des conditions matérielles et idéologiques qui constituent le milieu favorable à son exercice, mais déborde les limites imposées par ce milieu social (l'histoire de la philosophie n'est pas une histoire des mentalités). Nous croyons que Deleuze et Guattari fournissent ainsi dans Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ? la raison du rapport essentiellement conflictuel que le philosophe entretient, au moins virtuellement, à la cité ou à l'État qui l'accueille, aux membres qui les peuplent et aux opinions qui leur correspondent (comme l'avaient montré en leur temps Platon dans l'Apologie de Socrate, Spinoza dans le chapitre XX du Traité théologico-politique, Nietzsche dans la Troisième considération inactuelle, ou encore Foucault dans ses derniers cours au Collège de France). Nous montrons que c'est du point de vue de ce rapport de dépendance et d'excès, suivant lequel la pensée philosophique naît et se nourrit de la société des amis (grecque ou capitaliste) pour viser des fins qui la dépassent, que l'on doit considérer la puissance politique de la philosophie dans l'histoire. Dans cet article, nous avons ainsi proposé une première esquisse de ce qui constitue l'horizon général de notre projet de recherche sur Deleuze : la convergence, à la fin des années 1980, du questionnement sur la nature de la pensée philosophique entamé dans les années 1950-1960 et de la philosophie politique élaborée avec Guattari dans les années 1970. ; Peer reviewed