How is "public finance" organized in China? Is China's public finance system different from that of other countries? Can we detect features which link today's system to the past? Public finance refers to more than annual state budgets and constitutional procedures. It includes foreign debt, state monopolies or monetary policies, all of which played a crucial role in China's public finance during the last hundred years. A purely legislative definition obscures the fact that changes in public finance have contributed to the collapse of political regimes such as Imperial China (1911), Republican China (1927), and KMT-China (1945), as well engendered regime changes in 1949, 1961 and 1978. From a more comprehensive economic perspective public finance in China encompasses institutions, organizations and policies.
The Chinese economy has developed rapidly despite two major constraints: ill-functioning markets and a socialist past, both of which caused an environment of unenforceable contracts. In this situation the need to pool resources and to govern relational risk was paramount to the development of a private sector. While modern organisation (transaction cost-) theory can explain why and to which extent entrepreneurship in China is based on collective agents, an analysis of the (local) political market is needed to explain why China's villages provide the much needed (and valuable) public goods in form of property rights protection and contractual security. Decentralisation and jurisdictional competition facilitate the writing of a new "common law" as well as the "discovery" of new forms of collective action.
We start our exploration of China's institutional change by asking what the China experience can tell us about institutional economics and organization theory. We point to under-researched areas such as the formation of firms and the interplay between firms and local politics. Our findings support the dynamic capability approach which concentrates on activities rather than on pre-defined groups and models institution building as a co-operative game between the local business community and local government agencies. We find that the analysis of firms has to set in before they are formed by entrepreneurs and networks and we identify political management as a core competence of these two groups. While this contradicts the conventional view of clientelism or principle agent relations as institutional building blocks, we don't propose competing models. Instead, we suggest focusing on a dynamic process in which the role of players can change. Faced with the spontaneous emergence of institutions, our concept of institutional architecture captures the fact that the two models can co-exist side by side and that, once the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions is given up, there can be a transition from local patron-client relations to local business-state coordination.
We advance a conceptual frame for explaining economic transformation in China that combines a dynamic and a comparative perspective by taking the analysis of Fiscal Federalism one step further. Using insights from the comparative business systems literature we show that devolution of power at the beginning of the reform process introduced local autonomy, which stimulated a diversity of local regulatory regimes. As the central political leadership is no longer the sole supplier of institutional change, local governments become equal contributors to the formation of local business systems. Yet, local governments only partially define emerging local business systems. Local governance at the enterprise level is defined by the interaction between political and economic entrepreneurship, or, phrased in institutional terms, local business systems emerge from the interplay between the formal architecture of local autonomy and the informal institution of networking. In a comparative perspective this interaction, and its underlying driving forces for co-operation, namely: procedural uncertainty, relational risk and institutional change, will lead to diversity in outcomes. In a dynamic perspective both market competition and networking will ensure further competition between business systems, while political unification, imitation or scale economies will ask for convergence of local business systems beyond the local nexus.
The paper offers a frame for investigating the extent to which decentralisation, and subsequent locally chosen institutions shape private organisational and institutional innovation. To include the numerous locally based "economic regimes" matters as the resulting business system reflects political institution setting and private organisational innovation. Such a frame is a necessary first step for empirical studies attempting to explain the heterogeneity of China's business systems, the emergence of hybrid organisations, and last but none the least, the different growth rates that can be observed across China.
To address the problem why China, as a communist country, moves in the opposite direction when the public sector has undergoing a continuous growth in most Western economies since the World War I, we offer a new approach that the de facto fiscal decentralization curtails government size in transition China according to Leviathan theory. Meanwhile, by combining time series and cross-section regression analysis and various variables used by previous empirical studies, this paper tests the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion at national and provincial level, respectively, based on the new data set of China. Our empirical results not only explain Chinese shrinking government size, but also lend support to Leviathan hypothesis, especially, under the condition of absence of traditional democratic electoral constraint.
(Last revised version December 2005) To address the problem why China, as a communist country, moves in the opposite direction when the public sector has undergoing a continuous growth in most Western economies since the World War II, we offer a new approach that the de facto fiscal decentralization curtails government size in transition China in addition to conventional explanations. Meanwhile, by analyzing panel data and various variables used by previous empirical studies, this paper tests the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion at central-provincial and provincial-local level. Our empirical results not only explain Chinese shrinking government size, but also lend support to Leviathan hypothesis, especially, under the condition of the absence of traditional democratic electoral constraint.
China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China's fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China's emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents.
This paper offers a new data set and window to empirically test Leviathan theory in the sense of China's transition economy. By combining time series and cross-section regression analysis and various variables used by previous empirical studies, we test the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion at national and provincial level, respectively. Our empirical results lend support to Leviathan hypothesis, especially, under the condition of absence of traditional democratic electoral constraint.
The development of entrepreneurship and a private business sector in China pose various challenges to analysis. On the one hand, neo-classically based New Institutional Economics aims to find evidence that long-term investment and long-term commitment in and around firms can not be expected without deeply entrenched and state guaranteed private property rights. On the other hand, empirical studies within the China field concentrate on the political processes, in particular the interaction between the central state and local governments, at the danger of neglecting market forces, economic interests, and economic problems at stake. The empirical study on which the following is based took a different path by using a set of framing assumptions.
Moral outrage was the response of the Chinese press, when Cheng Kejie, one of the country's highest officials, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) and former Governor of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, was arrested on grounds of corruption on 25 April 2000. Cheng's arrest came amidst a spate of serious corruption cases that reached into the top echelons of China's state leadership (China Aktuell 2000). His case attracted wide public attention in national and international Chinese media because of his high office, the number of officials implicated, and the involvement of his lover Li Ping (dubbed the 'Jiang Qing of Guangxi' by the Hong Kong and overseas Chinese press) (Ming Pao 2000), daughter-in-law of his predecessor in the position of Governor of Guangxi, and for years the most influential woman in Guangxi. This was not just a case of a local official embezzling public funds, but a story of love and greed of a popular political leader, who had achieved much for his province. This was also not the story of an anonymous mistress, but of an ambitious, intelligent and attractive woman using the position of first her father-in-law then her lover to systematically and on a long-term basis exploit the powers vested in the office of provincial governor. The accusation against them focused on three crimes: appropriation and sale of real estate development and construction rights, sale of publicly subsidized goods at market prices and promotion of trusted allies into official positions of power. While the personal details of his deeds and his final execution in September 2000 fascinated the Chinese and Hong Kong press, his case also demonstrates how corruption works in China today (Hendrischke 2001).
It seldom happens that new firms, new industries, and new business systems need to be developed simultaneously. This, however, is the situation in transition economies such as China. Irrespective of product and technology used, incentives and governance structures need to be formulated that give business endeavours an organisational form. The survivability of firms depends further on the ability to start and maintain long-term business relations between contracting parties, while only a broad consensus within the community of entrepreneurs and firms on the procedures that co-ordinate business relations and sanctions transgression promises a decline in transaction costs sufficiently enough to trigger off the quick expansion of markets.
The speed by which China has moved towards a market economy has not been accompanied by a similar development of its judiciary system. Since the early 1990s, foundational national legislation with a direct effect on firms, such as laws dealing with contract, investment, liability and insolvency have be
Bearing the legacy from central-planned system, the tax system in local China still lacks transparency and, in many cases, the liabilities of firms, especially those with extensive influences, are subject to negotiation despite the new tax-reform 1994. Applying Hirschman's Exit-Voice theory, we construct a game model of interplay between firm and local government, in terms of exit and voice for preferential tax treatments, thereby revealing dynamics of these two options under rational entrepreneurship of economizing transaction cost. Suggested by the model, exit not only induces firm to opt for voice, it also underpins firm's voice that forces local government to compromise. Particularly, when holding private information of exit cost, firm is able to mimic behaviors of those with high mobility so as to boost the effectiveness of voice. The empirical cases fully illustrate such rational entrepreneurship of exit plus voice to profit from local preferential policy.
China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax regime compatible with a market economy. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which national legislation attempts to accompany economic transformation. Based on an empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China's fiscal federalism cannot be analysed. This paper argues that China's emerging tax regime depends on the institutional design that shapes the interaction between firms (as major tax payers at the local level), local government agencies, and the national tax administration.
