Search results

Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases as district magnitude increases in OLPR systems, while it tends to decrease as magnitude increases in CLPR systems. Indeed, when district magnitude is [Formula: see text], the two systems are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between OLPR and CLPR weakens when electoral volatility is low, such that neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political economy, the paper's results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart's (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism (Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank-ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies 1995; 14(4): 417–439).

This article examines the relationship among a country's democratic experience, its level of economic development, and the prevalence of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability. In contrast to the commonly accepted wisdom that clientelistic politics will decrease monotonically as a country's economy develops and its democracy consolidates, the authors argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that clientelism tends in fact to increase as a country moves from low to intermediate levels of democracy and development. They also uncover preliminary evidence that a history of regime instability may have independent consequences on the prevalence of one or the other linkage mechanism. Finally, the results suggest that a country's level of economic development and exposure to the international economy are more consistent predictors of programmatic effort and coherence than are measures of a country's regime type. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article examines the relationship among a country's democratic experience, its level of economic development, and the prevalence of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability. In contrast to the commonly accepted wisdom that clientelistic politics will decrease monotonically as a country's economy develops and its democracy consolidates, the authors argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that clientelism tends in fact to increase as a country moves from low to intermediate levels of democracy and development. They also uncover preliminary evidence that a history of regime instability may have independent consequences on the prevalence of one or the other linkage mechanism. Finally, the results suggest that a country's level of economic development and exposure to the international economy are more consistent predictors of programmatic effort and coherence than are measures of a country's regime type.

This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status quo parties in the party system. This relationship weakens, and eventually disappears, as politicians' emphasis on "office-seeking" motivations increases relative to their interest in public policy. We test these predictions with both aggregate electoral data in contemporary Europe and a data set on legislative volatility in Turkey, uncovering support for the argument that party system fragmentation should positively affect the likelihood of entry when policy-seeking motivations are relevant, but not otherwise.