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The paper strives to determine the impact of fiscal variables on factors determining the dynamics of public debt in European Union countries. Based on the literature, the dynamics of public debt are determined by changes of three elements: the primary balance, interest-rate-growth-differential and the change of government assets. Therefore, it seems reasonable to estimate the dynamics of these three values to find the variables crucial for limiting the growth of public debt. Three groups of dynamic panel regressions were estimated based on the one-step Generalized Method of Moments. The data was collected for the 1995-2015 period for 27 EU countries. Dependent variables included: primary balance, interest-rate-growth-differential and change of government assets. Independent variables consisted of: interest payable to GDP ratio, unemployment rate, squared unemployment rate, FDI stock to GDP, net FDI inflow to GDP, general government expenditures to GDP, share of social security expenditures and openness of the economy measured by the ratio of export and import to GDP. On the basis of statistical data, three components of debt changes were distinguished, and estimations of the dynamic panel regressions were applied to find the impact of independent variables. According to the basic models, the primary balance is lower for: countries with higher unemployment, greater FDI stock and higher general government expenditures.

Artykuł obejmuje przegląd wniosków z analiz ekonomicznych dotyczących klauzuli przeciwko unikaniu opodatkowania. Wskazano w nim w szczególności takie zagadnienia, jak: sensowność regulacji opartej na standardach zamiast na regułach, rolę systemu prawa w jakim klauzula jest wykorzystywana oraz słabości, które wiążą się z wykorzystywaniem klauzuli wpraktyce. W dalszej części opisano wyniki nielicznych badań o charakterze ilościowym, które koncentrowały się na: sposobie doboru przesłanek przez sądy przy ocenie zasadności zastosowania klauzuli przeciw unikaniu opodatkowania, oraz na wpływie tego typu regulacji na inwestycje i tworzenie spółek zależnych w innych krajach. Artykuł kończy analiza czynników sprzyjających wprowadzeniu tej klauzuli do systemu podatkowego danego państwa.

Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the voting behaviour of European Parliament members on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal and economic characteristics of their respective countries. We are concerned about the political and economy factors behind policy and decision making of CCCTB in European Parliament. The analysis is conducted with Logit model identifying factors affecting the voting consultation decision of the Parliament of the European Union in 2018. Particularly, we investigate the impact of four components taken from tax benefit index proposed by W. Orłowski. We have found that economic factors alone are responsible the voting behaviour of the European Union deputies, not their personal characteristics.

Instrumenty fiskalne mogą wpływać nie tylko na dzietność, ale także na ilość czasu spędzanego przez rodziców z dziećmi. To z kolei ma pośredni wpływ na akumulację kapitału ludzkiego w społeczeństwie. W niniejszej pracy, za pomocą modelu ekonomicznego, określono wpływ czynników fiskalnych na czas poświęcany dzieciom. Wnioski opierają się na analizie symulacyjnej statyki porównawczej modelu maksymalizacji użyteczności, skalibrowanego dla danych rzeczywistych. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują na odmienną reakcję rodzin z dwójką dzieci w porównaniu z rodzinami posiadającymi tylko jedno dziecko w przypadku dopłat do liczby dzieci. Oznacza to, że niektóre instrumenty fiskalne mogą oddziaływać w odmienny sposób na różne rodzaje rodzin, utrudniając realizację założonych celów polityki społecznej. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują, że instrumenty fiskalne zwiększające zamożność rodzin, zwiększają również ilość czasu poświęcanego dzieciom.

peer-reviewed ; The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection. ; ACCEPTED ; peer-reviewed

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ ineconomic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.