In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 138, Heft 4, S. 590-591
Ukraine defied expectations by withstanding a full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, demonstrating the resilience of both local and national institutions. This was a striking contrast with 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and backed separatist revolts in the east of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian response had been weak and divided. Since then, Ukraine has strengthened its institutions by building political legitimacy and the capacity of its armed forces, cultivating national unity, and obtaining more international support.
Four years after the Euromaidan Revolution, the oligarchs are firmly back in control, squelching reforms and resorting to repression to stifle civil society.
Abstract: Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych's misrule, the popular reaction against it, and the manner of his downfall disrupted the very foundations of Ukraine's still nascent and defective state. While in office, Yanukovych's greed for power and wealth proved devastating to both him and his country. In order to grasp the reasons for the destructive effect of Yanukovych's presidency, one needs to look at the way in which he reconfigured Ukraine's political regime and the strategies that he adopted to maintain power.
Do warring sides in asymmetric conflicts always know what type of violence they use against civilians? This article relies on the case study of an anti-Soviet insurgency in Western Ukraine between 1944 and 1953 in order to demonstrate how selective violence used by insurgents can become indiscriminate under the influence of a counterinsurgency strategy rather than their conscious choice. It challenges two major theories of coercive violence that refer to exogenous factors to explain shifts in the character of violence and shows how insurgents may recognize such a shift only once they see its counterproductive effects. Using recently declassified documents, this article demonstrates how the insurgents' decision to engage in a violent campaign against Soviet-led collectivization gradually turned the rural base of insurgency against them. Apart from shedding a new light on the Soviet-Ukrainian conflict in the late 1940s, the article has broader implications for the studies of insurgency campaigns and the reasons for civilian defection to the incumbent side. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright the American Council of Learned Societies.]