The quality-complementarity hypothesis: theory and evidence from Colombia
In: Discussion paper series 7119
In: Development economics
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In: Discussion paper series 7119
In: Development economics
In: Journal of development economics, Band 80, Heft 2, S. 444-477
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 80, Heft 2, S. 444-477
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Desarrollo y sociedad, Heft 42, S. 43-79
ISSN: 1900-7760, 0120-3584
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 2, S. 501-507
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Economic Development and Cultural Change, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 335-358
ISSN: 1539-2988
In: NBER Working Paper No. w14418
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In: Integration & trade: I & T, Band 11, Heft 27, S. 105-135
ISSN: 1027-5703
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 3932
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In: Laurier Business and Economics Department of Economics Working Paper Series No. 2008-02 EC
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w13855
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8034
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Working paper
We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity relative to legal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely intensification of policing and increment of sanctions, and crime is nonmonotonic. Beyond a threshold, increases in expected punishment induce organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads too higher rather than lower crime.
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Working paper