Suchergebnisse

Principal-agent models -- Structure of the principal-agent problem -- Solving the agent's problem -- Solving the principal's problem -- Best for whom? : efficiency and distribution -- Extensions: uncertainty, risk aversion and multiple tasks -- Noisy performance measures and optimal monitoring -- Evidence on employee motivation -- Empirical methods in personnel economics -- Performance pay at safelite glass : higher productivity, pay and profits -- Some "non-classical" motivators -- Reciprocity at work : gift exchange, implicit contracts, and trust -- Pigeons and pecks : incentives and income effects -- Employee selection and training -- Choosing qualifications -- Risky versus safe workers -- Recruitment : selecting individual workers -- Setting pay levels -- Training -- Competition in the workplace-- the economics of relative rewards -- A simple model of tournaments -- Some caveats: sabotage, collusion, and risk-taking in tournaments -- Unfair and uneven tournaments -- Who wants to compete? selection into tournaments -- Teams -- Incentives in teams and the free-rider problem -- Team production in practice -- Complementarity, substitutability and ability differences in teams -- Choosing teams: self-selection and team assignmen