Throughout the past years, substantial discussions have dealt with the factors associated with ethnic conflicts such as institutional designs, group dynamics and the influence of external peacemakers. However, one area remains largely uncovered: this is how the domestic politics of a nation state shape minority issues from the same ethnicity in another country. In this paper we discuss the dynamics of Hungarian politics relative to the Hungarian minority in Romania, and identify factors that resulted in exporting domestic political contention to another country. [Copyright 2007 The Regents of the University of California; published by Elsevier Ltd.]
When the concept of growth machine was created more than twenty years ago, it seemed unlikely that it would ever reach Eastern Europe. Now, about fifteen years after the beginning of the post‐socialist transformation, the growth machine is also part of urban politics in the former socialist countries. This article will try to fill a gap in growth machine research, examining this concept in a post‐socialist environment through the case of Hungary. The concept of growth machine is based on a powerful argument about a coalition promoting economic growth, and shows considerable flexibility around the Western world. Although in post‐socialist Eastern Europe the interlocked political and economic power accumulation is the same, there are significant differences both in terms of the composition and operation of the growth machine. The Hungarian example shows that the post‐socialist growth machine is strongly shaped by the socialist legacy of the region. Its operation is also influenced by the elite transformation after the collapse of socialism and the presence of powerful external actors, like the nation state or transnational investors. Moreover, the contemporary social context is very supportive, since the political and economic interests are closely connected and the counter‐movements are relatively weak. We develop a theoretical framework, supported by examples of urban development in two Hungarian cities that offer interesting differences in their political and economic environment.Lorsque le concept de machine de croissance a été créé il y a plus de vingt ans, on pouvait douter qu'il touche un jour l'Europe de l'Est. Aujourd'hui, environ quinze ans après le début de la transformation post‐socialiste, la machine de croissance y fait aussi partie de la politique urbaine. L'article tente de combler les lacunes dans la recherche sur la machine de croissance en étudiant ce concept dans l'environnement post‐socialiste au travers du cas de la Hongrie. Basé sur un argument décisif relatif à une coalition encourageant la croissance économique, le concept présente une souplesse considérable au sein du monde occidental. Même si, dans l'Europe de l'Est post‐socialiste, l'accumulation imbriquée de pouvoir politique et économique est semblable, d'importantes différences existent à la fois en termes de composition et de fonctionnement de la machine de croissance. L'exemple hongrois montre que la conformation de la machine de croissance post‐socialiste doit énormément à l'héritage socialiste de la région, De plus, son fonctionnement est influencé par la mutation des élites après l'effondrement du socialisme et par la présence de puissants acteurs extérieurs tels l'État‐nation et les investisseurs transnationaux. En outre, le contexte social contemporain est très favorable, puisque les intérêts politiques et économiques sont étroitement liés et les mouvements d'opposition relativement faibles. L'article élabore un cadre théorique, étayé par des cas d'aménagement urbain dans deux grandes villes hongroises présentant d'intéressantes différences dans leur environnement politique et économique.
AbstractThis article examines factors accounting for persisting regional inequality in Hungary during the regime change from socialism to a market economy in 1990. We examine the determinants of regional inequality through the lens of leading sector theory which has been used to explain why some ex‐socialist countries have done better than others during the transformation. In other words, we ask whether some regions of Hungary are doing better than others for the same reasons that some ex‐socialist countries have outperformed their counterparts. We use county level data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office to examine whether the quantity and types of foreign direct investment counties have received since 1990 are associated with regional inequality in per capita GDP. We find that foreign capitalists concentrate human‐capital‐intensive investment in already well performing locations because they have similar supply structures to their home economies. We also contend that no measure of institutional modernization is likely to make lagging regions attractive candidates for human‐capital‐intensive investments in the near future. Hence, regardless of the national state's efforts to target development to lagging areas, or the effectiveness of local institutions, lagging regions are likely to remain underdeveloped. We recommend that future field‐based research be conducted to examine the nexus between FDI, the nation state and localities. Unraveling interrelationships between these three political economy sites will expose the causal forces sustaining regional inequalities during post‐socialism.RésuméCet article analyse les facteurs qui expliquent l'inégalité persistante entre régions hongroises lors du passage du socialisme à une économie de marché en 1990. Nous examinons les déterminants de l'inégalité régionale à travers la théorie du secteur moteur qui a servi à expliquer pourquoi certains ex‐pays socialistes ont mieux réussi que d'autres pendant la transition. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à savoir si des régions de Hongrie font mieux que d'autres pour les mêmes raisons que certains ex‐pays socialistes ont eu de meilleurs résultats que leurs homologues. Nous utilisons des données départementales provenant du Bureau central hongrois de la statistique afin d'examiner si la quantité et les types d'investissement direct à l'étranger que les départements ont reçu depuis 1990 sont associés à une inégalité régionale en termes de PIB par habitant. Nous établissons ainsi que les capitalistes étrangers concentrent leur investissement à fort capital humain dans des sites qui présentent déjà de bons résultats, les structures d'approvisionnement étant similaires à celles de leur économie nationale. Nous soutenons également que, dans le court terme, aucune mesure de modernisation institutionnelle ne va sans doute transformer les régions en retard en candidates intéressantes pour des investissements à fort capital humain. En conséquence, quels que soient les efforts de l'État national en vue de développer spécifiquement les zones en décalage, ou l'efficacité des institutions locales, les régions en retard resteront sans doute moins développées. Nous conseillons d'entreprendre à l'avenir des études de terrain afin d'analyser le lien entre IDE, État national et régions. Démêler les relations entre ces trois centres de l'économie politique révélera les forces en cause dans la durabilité des inégalités régionales pendant l'après‐socialisme.
AbstractThis article seeks to identify factors associated with the formation and development of nonmetropolitan destinations for older in‐migration, thereby explaining why some U.S. counties are more likely than others to be nonmetro retirement destinations. We contend that most nonmetro retirement destinations are established and developed over time through a path‐dependent process. When amenities are commodified as recreation and tourism, migration streams tend to be established that ultimately produce sustained in‐migration of older persons to selected destination communities. We use data from a variety of official sources and a spatial statistics methodology to examine intercounty variability in net migration rates at ages 60–74. Our findings are consistent with the aforementioned path‐dependent development framework. Counties with a long history of population growth, previous experience attracting older in‐migrants, attractive natural amenities, and a developed recreation and tourism industry are those most likely to be retirement‐age migration destinations. In contrast, agricultural heartland and relatively large population size are associated with lower rates of older in‐migration. Older in‐migration should be seen as neither a panacea for strapped rural communities nor a "pensions and care issue." Older migrants can be "gray gold," but they can also pose challenges, such as possibly increased demand for public services as they age in place.
AbstractPopulation aging is being experienced by many rural communities in the United States, as evidenced by increases in the median age and the high incidence of natural population decrease. The implications of these changes in population structure for the daily lives of the residents in such communities have received little attention. We address this issue in this study by examining the relationship between population aging and the availability of service‐providing establishments in the rural United States between 1990 and 2010. Using data mainly from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we estimate a series of fixed‐effects regression models to identify the relationship between median age and establishment counts net of changes in overall population and other factors. We find a significant but nonlinear relationship between county median age and the total number of service‐providing establishments, and counts of most specific types of services. We find a positive effect of total population size across all of our models. This total population effect is consistent with that found in other research, but the independent effect of age structure that we observe represents a novel finding and suggests that age structure is a salient factor in local rural development and community well‐being.
