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This paper shows that, in production economies, the generalized serial social choice functions defined by Shenker (1992) are securely implementable (in the sense of Saijo et al., 2007) and that they include the well-known fixed path social choice functions.

The transition from government to governance demands that numerous stakeholders participate in the policymaking and call for a strategy that could effectively help the process. Stakeholders' engagement is extensively used in all types of public organisations, giving different stakeholders the chance to have a say in how decisions are made. The public policy process has also accepted and embraced this principle as a method, both formal and informal, for policy formation, monitoring and evaluation, owing to the interconnected interests of the two domains and the stakeholders' expanding involvement in the process. This has enabled better alignment of public policy with the needs and aspirations of society. Stakeholders' participation has also become an important phenomenon in recent years in India. The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, the conceptualisation of Students' and Teachers' Holistic Advancement through Quality Education (SARTHAQ) and the National Curriculum Framework are the results of massive stakeholders' participation and a bottom-up approach. Involving stakeholders in the formulation of educational policies increases the quality of the educational system. This kind of wide and intensive consultation process and development of policies through a bottom-up approach ensures that diverse views are taken into consideration and citizens are significant contributors in the entire process. This essentially shows that collaboration and responsibility-sharing among stakeholders are key to achieving educational goals.

We analyze a two‐stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage, firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium, the firms focus more on the high‐valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one‐stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity‐weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to the established results in the literature for one‐stage games.