Suchergebnisse

Hyperschallwaffen können sich mit extremer Geschwindigkeit in der Erdatmosphäre fortbewegen und auf einer unvorhersehbaren Flugbahn manövrieren. Sie sind auch überbewertet. Dieses Kapitel erklärt, wie drei Trends – unbegründete Behauptungen über die Wirksamkeit von Hyperschallwaffen in der Entwicklung, politisierter technologischer Wettbewerb und ein wachsendes Spektrum von Raketenbedrohungen – unser Verständnis der militärischen Fähigkeit von Hyperschall verdunkeln. Der Hype um Hyperschallwaffenprogramme ist gefährlicher als die Hyperschalltechnologie selbst. ; Hypersonic weapons can travel at extreme speeds in the earth's atmosphere and maneuver along an unpredictable trajectory. They are also overhyped. This chapter explains how three trends – unsubstantiated claims about the effectiveness of hypersonic weapons in development, politicized technological competition, and a widening spectrum of missile threats – obscure our understanding of the hypersonic military capability. The hype about hypersonic weapon programs is more dangerous than hypersonic technology itself. ; ISSN:1664-0667

This report provides the critical insights that national governments and defense companies need in order to navigate the European military drone landscape and offers a guide to their strategic planning and investment. Observing the international proliferation of military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), also known as drones, the report puts together a comprehensive overview of military drones in Europe to conceptualize the diffusion of UAV technology and the competition dynamics on the European defense market. This political-strategic comparative analysis identifies and qualitatively assesses the key developments in the European military drone landscape. The report puts forward that despite the continuing proliferation of military drones in Europe, significant differences in military drone capabilities persist among European countries. Importantly, no European indigenous advanced drone has achieved full operational capability yet. In this respect, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), each via its own institutional logic, act as facilitators of the military technology diffusion through various enabling, funding, and networking mechanisms. The commercial sector further animates the European defense market in the category of smaller UAVs. The next-generation UAV technology driven by the increasing level of autonomy and the concepts of manned-unmanned teaming and swarming, together with the development of counterdrone systems, will characterize the future drone race on the European defense market. The report proceeds in three steps. First, it maps the military drone capabilities in selected seventeen European countries with respect to all three main classes of drones: advanced, tactical, and small. The resulting drone clubs are based on countries' procurement strategies and defense cooperation patterns. Second, the report adds an institutional layer to the analysis. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both NATO and the EU in terms of existing institutional channels central to the development of UAV capability, especially in the context of the emerging EU-wide regulatory framework and its growing role in the defense and security domain. Third, the concluding analysis of future trends in the military UAV technology further elaborates on drone warfare and defense cooperation in Europe.

Drawing on a Foucauldian philosophy of thought, this article proposes the concept of co-relational power, substantively understood as non-zero sum (positive) power – i. e. the power of one actor is not detrimental to the power of another actor, but it is instead a sum of cooperative interactions between actors. We argue that, in a context of competitive multipolarity, international collaborative security organisations, such as NATO and the EU, seek to adapt and to develop progressive and evolutionary grand strategies that can remain stable over time. Our analysis shows that both NATO and the EU are faced with geopolitical dilemmas while they seek to adapt to the new international order and constellation of threats. The main contribution of this article is that it produces new knowledge about the conceptual underpinnings and practical implications of a concept of non-zero sum (positive) concept of co-relational power, that can help understand how collaborative security organisations can become stabilising and re-enforcing pillars in the international rules-based order ('building blocks of order') without entering the spiral of great power competition but instead pursuing strategies that are progressive for a stable international development.