Suchergebnisse

Education based thinking and behaving? Towards and identity perspective for studying education differentials in public opinion and political participation Abstract Ever since scholars started studying public opinion and political behaviour, they have reported substantial educational differences. Much debate remains however, about how to interpret these differences. Recently a number of scholars in a variety of terms and theoretical reasoning have proposed interpretations that suggest education has become a source of (inter) group processes. Against that background, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, we reflect on this stream of thought arguing that it provides a starting point for the development of a new approach for studying educational differentials. One that is centred around the proposition that the central and highly institutionalized nature of education in contemporary societies paves the way for education-based (inter-) group behaviour and thinking. Starting from this, secondly, we attempt to take stock of existing research, propose a research agenda, and provide data that illustrates a starting point for the research we propose.

In debates about migration in Western countries, citizens' concerns about immigrant groups often go hand in hand with concerns about the decline of society as a whole. Societal discontent, however, is a distinct concept and may have its own relations with immigration attitudes, over and above the role of perceived immigrant threat. In a survey of a representative sample of Dutch people (N = 1239), we disentangled societal discontent from intergroup threat with respect to their relationship with different kinds of action intentions regarding refugees (both pro and anti) and intentions regarding the government. Unsurprisingly, societal discontent predicted support for anti-government protest (which was strikingly high). More importantly, societal discontent independently predicted both pro-refugee and anti-refugee action intentions, over and above intergroup threat. These associations were moderated by intergroup threat: only when refugees were experienced as a threat did discontent predict anti-refugee action intentions. On the other hand, societal discontent predicted more pro-refugee action intentions, but only when people experienced refugees as an enrichment. Thus, despite populist rhetoric, societal discontent is not always tied to anti-immigrant actions. This suggests that refugee sentiments and societal discontent are not exchangeable: societal discontent plays an important role in reactions to immigration.

In debates about migration in Western countries, citizens' concerns about immigrant groups often go hand in hand with concerns about the decline of society as a whole. Societal discontent, however, is a distinct concept and may have its own relations with immigration attitudes, over and above the role of perceived immigrant threat. In a survey of a representative sample of Dutch people (N = 1239), we disentangled societal discontent from intergroup threat with respect to their relationship with different kinds of action intentions regarding refugees (both pro and anti) and intentions regarding the government. Unsurprisingly, societal discontent predicted support for anti-government protest (which was strikingly high). More importantly, societal discontent independently predicted both pro-refugee and anti-refugee action intentions, over and above intergroup threat. These associations were moderated by intergroup threat: only when refugees were experienced as a threat did discontent predict anti-refugee action intentions. On the other hand, societal discontent predicted more pro-refugee action intentions, but only when people experienced refugees as an enrichment. Thus, despite populist rhetoric, societal discontent is not always tied to anti-immigrant actions. This suggests that refugee sentiments and societal discontent are not exchangeable: societal discontent plays an important role in reactions to immigration.

Despite the increasing attention paid by psychologists to social class, we argue here that insufficient attention has been paid to the ways, in which socio-ecological factors shape both which dimensions of social class are used by individuals to compare themselves with others, and the outcomes of these comparisons. We illustrate our argument by reviewing recent research on the ways in which different facets of socioeconomic status shape social and political attitudes, and on the ways in which inequalities in educational outcomes stem from comparisons made in specific social contexts. We conclude that by studying the psychological impact of social class differences through the lens of a socio-ecological approach, it becomes more evident that this impact varies as a function of both the dimension of social class involved, and local social ecologies.

Despite the increasing attention paid by psychologists to social class, we argue here that insufficient attention has been paid to the ways, in which socio-ecological factors shape both which dimensions of social class are used by individuals to compare themselves with others, and the outcomes of these comparisons. We illustrate our argument by reviewing recent research on the ways in which different facets of socioeconomic status shape social and political attitudes, and on the ways in which inequalities in educational outcomes stem from comparisons made in specific social contexts. We conclude that by studying the psychological impact of social class differences through the lens of a socio-ecological approach, it becomes more evident that this impact varies as a function of both the dimension of social class involved, and local social ecologies.

Against the background of an ever-growing body of literature that documents educational differentials in different forms of political participation, scholars have started to study whether education itself becomes the object of intergroup behavior. Informed by social identity theory and self-categorization theory, we examine whether making educational categories and the associated status differences salient affects people's prospective political participation. Two large survey experiments carried out in samples from Flanders (Belgium; N = 1,097) and the United States (N = 629) were used to assess categorization effects of education on people's willingness to participate in deliberative political-participation initiatives. In general, our results indicated that rendering educational categories salient increased educational differentials in prospective political participation in a way that is disadvantageous to the less educated. We elaborate on the implications of our findings.

Against the background of an ever‐growing body of literature that documents educational differentials in different forms of political participation, scholars have started to study whether education itself becomes the object of intergroup behavior. Informed by social identity theory and self‐categorization theory, we examine whether making educational categories and the associated status differences salient affects people's prospective political participation. Two large survey experiments carried out in samples from Flanders (Belgium; N = 1,097) and the United States (N = 629) were used to assess categorization effects of education on people's willingness to participate in deliberative political‐participation initiatives. In general, our results indicated that rendering educational categories salient increased educational differentials in prospective political participation in a way that is disadvantageous to the less educated. We elaborate on the implications of our findings.

Level of education is a predictor of a range of important outcomes, such as political interest and cynicism, social trust, health, well-being, and intergroup attitudes. We address a gap in the literature by analyzing the strength and stability of the education effect associated with this diverse range of outcomes across three surveys covering the period 1986–2011, including novel latent growth analyses of the stability of the education effect within the same individuals over time. Our analyses of the British Social Attitudes Survey, British Household Panel Survey, and International Social Survey Programme indicated that the education effect was robust across these outcomes and relatively stable over time, with higher education levels being associated with higher trust and political interest, better health and well-being, and with less political cynicism and less negative intergroup attitudes. The education effect was strongest when associated with political outcomes and attitudes towards immigrants, whereas it was weakest when associated with health and well-being. Most of the education effect appears to be due to the beneficial consequences of having a university education. Our results demonstrate that this beneficial education effect is also manifested in within-individual changes, with the education effect tending to become stronger as individuals age.

In spite of their subtle nature, subliminal cues of group devaluation can have profound effects on members of targeted groups. Across three studies, we examine factors that allow people to counteract subliminal cues of group devaluation. We do this in the context of Spanish–German intergroup relations following the 2008 financial crisis. Throughout the crisis, narratives in politics and the media have drawn on national stereotypes to legitimize the economic situation in Spain. We argue that this represents a threat to our Spanish participants and that exposure to subliminal cues that reflect this threat will trigger responses that counteract this threat. Indeed, results showed that when subliminal associations legitimize the disadvantage faced by the group, our Spanish participants reversed the subliminal associations to which they were exposed. These findings show that Spanish participants are able to counteract the devaluation of their national in-group, even when that devaluation occurs outside of conscious awareness.

Across four studies, we examine multiple identities in the context of gender and propose that women's attitudes toward gender group membership are governed by two largely orthogonal dimensions of gender identity: identification with women and identification with feminists. We argue that identification with women reflects attitudes toward the content society gives to group membership: what does it mean to be a woman in terms of group characteristics, interests and values? Identification with feminists, on the other hand, is a politicized identity dimension reflecting attitudes toward the social position of the group: what does it mean to be a woman in terms of disadvantage, inequality, and relative status? We examine the utility of this multiple identity approach in four studies. Study 1 showed that identification with women reflects attitudes toward group characteristics, such as femininity and self-stereotyping, while identification with feminists reflects attitudes toward the group's social position, such as perceived sexism. The two dimensions are shown to be largely independent, and as such provide support for the multiple identity approach. In Studies 2-4, we examine the utility of this multiple identity approach in predicting qualitative differences in gender attitudes. Results show that specific combinations of identification with women and feminists predicted attitudes toward collective action and gender stereotypes. Higher identification with feminists led to endorsement of radical collective action (Study 2) and critical attitudes toward gender stereotypes (Studies 3-4), especially at lower levels of identification with women. The different combinations of high vs. low identification with women and feminists can be thought of as reflecting four theoretical identity "types." A woman can be (1) strongly identified with neither women nor feminists ("low identifier"), (2) strongly identified with women but less so with feminists ("traditional identifier"), (3) strongly identified with both women and ...

Level of formal education is an important divide in contemporary societies; it is positively related to health, well-being, and social attitudes such as tolerance for minorities and interest in politics. We investigated whether education-based identification is a common underlying factor of these education effects. Indeed, education-based identification was stronger among the higher educated, especially for identification aspects that encompass education-based group esteem (i.e., the belief that one's educational group is worthy and that others think so, too). Furthermore, while group esteem had beneficial effects across educational levels, aspects of identification that were unrelated to group esteem had positive effects for the higher educated but not for the less educated. Thus, the less educated do not benefit from the psychologically nourishing effect of identification that exists for other groups. The stigma and responsibility related to low education could be a common explanation for a wide range of outcomes.

The authors would like to thank Ma.ka Telga and Alvaro Rodriguez-Lopez for help with data collection. The work reported here was supported by Grant no. PSI2016-79971-P from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (AEI/FEDER, UE; awarded to Soledad de Lemus), as well as by the Endowed Chair of Russell Spears at the University of Groningen. ; In spite of their subtle nature, subliminal cues of group devaluation can have profound effects on members of targeted groups. Across three studies, we examine factors that allow people to counteract subliminal cues of group devaluation. We do this in the context of Spanish-German intergroup relations following the 2008 financial crisis. Throughout the crisis, narratives in politics and the media have drawn on national stereotypes to legitimize the economic situation in Spain. We argue that this represents a threat to our Spanish participants and that exposure to subliminal cues that reflect this threat will trigger responses that counteract this threat. Indeed, results showed that when subliminal associations legitimize the disadvantage faced by the group, our Spanish participants reversed the subliminal associations to which they were exposed. These findings show that Spanish participants are able to counteract the devaluation of their national in-group, even when that devaluation occurs outside of conscious awareness. ; Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (AEI/FEDER, UE) PSI2016-79971-P ; Endowed Chair of Russell Spears at the University of Groningen

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01019/full#supplementary-material ; Across four studies, we examine multiple identities in the context of gender and propose that women's attitudes toward gender group membership are governed by two largely orthogonal dimensions of gender identity: identification with women and identification with feminists. We argue that identification with women reflects attitudes toward the content society gives to group membership: what does it mean to be a woman in terms of group characteristics, interests and values? Identification with feminists, on the other hand, is a politicized identity dimension reflecting attitudes toward the social position of the group: what does it mean to be a woman in terms of disadvantage, inequality, and relative status? We examine the utility of this multiple identity approach in four studies. Study 1 showed that identification with women reflects attitudes toward group characteristics, such as femininity and self-stereotyping, while identification with feminists reflects attitudes toward the group's social position, such as perceived sexism. The two dimensions are shown to be largely independent, and as such provide support for the multiple identity approach. In Studies 2–4, we examine the utility of this multiple identity approach in predicting qualitative differences in gender attitudes. Results show that specific combinations of identification with women and feminists predicted attitudes toward collective action and gender stereotypes. Higher identification with feminists led to endorsement of radical collective action (Study 2) and critical attitudes toward gender stereotypes (Studies 3–4), especially at lower levels of identification with women. The different combinations of high vs. low identification with women and feminists can be thought of as reflecting four theoretical identity "types." A woman can be (1) strongly identified with neither women nor feminists ("low identifier"), (2) strongly identified with women but less so with feminists ("traditional identifier"), (3) strongly identified with both women and feminists ("dual identifier"), or (4) strongly identified with feminists but less so with women ("distinctive feminist"). In sum, by considering identification with women and identification with feminists as multiple identities we aim to show how the multiple identity approach predicts distinct attitudes to gender issues and offer a new perspective on gender identity. ; This work was supported by Grant no. PSI2016-79971-P from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (AEI/FEDER, UE) awarded to SdL.

Level of formal education is an important divide in contemporary societies; it is positively related to health, well-being, and social attitudes such as tolerance for minorities and interest in politics. We investigated whether education-based identification is a common underlying factor of these education effects. Indeed, education-based identification was stronger among the higher educated, especially for identification aspects that encompass education-based group esteem (i.e., the belief that one's educational group is worthy and that others think so, too). Furthermore, while group esteem had beneficial effects across educational levels, aspects of identification that were unrelated to group esteem had positive effects for the higher educated but not for the less educated. Thus, the less educated do not benefit from the psychologically nourishing effect of identification that exists for other groups. The stigma and responsibility related to low education could be a common explanation for a wide range of outcomes.