Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Foundations of the United Front -- United Front as mass activism --United Front within the congress -- Congress as United Front -- Conflict about unity -- "Unity in action" and the "fighting alliance" -- Twilight of the United Front -- The "pioneers of unity".

AbstractThis paper considers the extent to which Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army (INA) contributed to India's liberation from British imperialism. The fundamental issue examined is why leaders of the Indian National Congress appropriated the INA legacy, contrary to two decades of non-violent struggle and regardless of the incompatibility of Bose's ideology and strategic vision. Drawing on published sources that chart policy decisions and illustrate the attitudes of leading actors in the formulation of Congress policy, this paper hypothesizes that Congress leaders defended INA prisoners-of-war and questions why the Congress apparently abandoned its long-established principles for immediate political gains, only to re-prioritize anew India's national interests once the public excitement over the INA had quietened. It illustrates that the Congress's overt and zealous defence of the INA was intended to harness public opinion behind an all-India issue rooted in sentimentalism and patriotism. The paper concludes that such support was crucial to the Congress's post-war electioneering campaign and was designed to counter the Muslim League's equally emotive electoral messages.

This essay relates the Indian National Congress's struggle against British imperialism to the global politics of the mid-1930s. While contextualizing the Congress's anti-colonialism as a world view intending to combat imperial systems of exploitation, this article postulates that the foreign policy of the post-colonial Indian state originated in the Congress's anti-imperialism and anti-fascism of the 1930s. Drawing on published sources that chart policy decisions and illustrate the attitudes of leading actors in the formulation of official policy, this article hypothesizes that the principles generated by inter-war exigencies proved to be incompatible ideologies for the construction of India's post-colonial foreign policy.