The central research question this report addresses is whether and if so to what extent the ECHR and the ECtHR case law served to enhance the protection in Turkey of human rights in general and minority rights in particular. In doing so, the critical role the EU accession process has played in this regard by exerting external political pressure on the Turkish Government will be evaluated as a major positive variable. The report assesses the nature of claims raised by minorities and minority rights advocates. It seeks to offer an initial analysis of the efforts by authorities to implement the ECtHR case law through general and individual measures
Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations between the PKK and the government, the crux of Turkey's Kurdish issue remains the structural inequalities against the Kurds, which are deeply rooted in an anti-democratic politico-legal regime. Certainly, Turkey has come a long way in acknowledging the Kurdish issue and taking steps to address the Kurds' demands for equality and the rule of law. Once banned from speaking their language, Kurds can now use it to attain a university education. The Kurdish region is no longer governed by a state of emergency, nor are Kurdish civilians disappearing under detention. There is no doubt that the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union have played an indispensable role in this transition. However, European institutions' engagement in the Kurdish issue has not always been coherent, while their impact on Turkey's policies has been limited, and at times negative, particularly in the post-9/11 context. Their uncritical oversight has facilitated Turkey's reluctance to undertake structural reforms to bring an end to the selective prosecution of Kurdish politicians, the criminalisation of non-violent advocacy of enhanced rights for the Kurds, the armament of civilians in the Kurdish region and the impunity of state officials who commit human rights violations. Recent developments in Turkey have shown, once again, that a genuine democratic transition will only be possible with the coherent, continuous and critical engagement of European institutions in the Kurdish issue. (SWP Research Paper)
The word most frequently uttered by Greece and Turkey with regard to their Muslim1 and non-Muslim minorities, respectively, is most probably 'reciprocity.' For more than half a century, in both countries, virtually all administrations,irrespective of their political leanings and ideological base, resorted to the good old 'reciprocity argument' to legitimize their laws, policies, and practices restricting the minority rights of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Both states have for decades justified their policies on the basis of a theory that argues that Article 45 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne provided the legal basis for reciprocity. Deliberately distorting a crystal-clear provision, which simply confers parallel obligations on Greece and Turkey for the protection of the Muslim and non-Muslim minorities, respectively, both states have for decades held their own citizens hostage, pitting them against each other in the name of defeating the other in foreign policy. Disregarding the objections of international lawyers and institutions that the reciprocity principle does not apply to human rights treaties and that states cannot condition the protection of the fundamental rights of their citizens on the policies of other states, both Greece and Turkey have successfully manipulated their national public opinion into believing in the legitimacy of treating minorities as lesser citizens. This report analyzes the implications of reciprocity policies on the day-to-day lives of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities in Greece and Turkey, specifically their impact on the community foundations2 belonging to these minorities. With a specific focus on the property and self-management issues of Muslim and non-Muslim community foundations in Greece and Turkey, the report situates the issue in its historical context and trace the evolution of the 'community foundation issue' from Lausanne to the present day. Drawing similarities and differences between the laws, policies, and practices of Greek and Turkish states vis-à-vis their minority foundations, the report critically assesses the progress made to this day as well as identify the outstanding issues.
On 29 September 2006, the Van Governorship in Turkey disclosed the "Van Province Action Plan for Service Delivery to Internally Displaced Persons" (the Van Action Plan or the Plan). Prepared with the technical support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and owned by the governorship, the Action Plan outlines the basic principles on which future services for internally displaced persons (IDPs) during their integration, resettlement or return processes will be based. Van was selected as a pilot province for the development of a plan of action as part of the cooperation between the Government of Turkey and the UNDP on the issue of displacement. This cooperation was initiated in the wake of the 2002 mission by Francis Deng, then Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons (RSG) in Turkey. This report is an assessment of the Van Action Plan, in the spirit of RSG Kälin's call to the civil society. The report evaluates the effectiveness of the preparatory work undertaken by the UNDP and the governorship during the drafting of the Action Plan as well as the content and ongoing implementation of the Plan. It argues that The Action Plan does not address certain issues that pertain to national-level politics and policies concerning the Kurdish question, issues which have a direct bearing on the choices open to IDPs. Issues such as cessation of the armed conflict, abolishment of the provisional village guard system and the clearing of landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs), all of which would positively influence the safety of returns to original rural homes, are ignored in the Plan.
The report aims to analyze and explain the actors and processes of media policy making in Turkey; the substance and implementation of such policies; the legal framework governing media content; the ownership structure of the media; the working conditions of journalists; and the emerging social efforts to combat discrimination and hate speech in the media. IT argues that the prospects for media independence and freedom in Turkey appear extremely weak. In a sector driven by corporate interests, nepotism and clientelist relations, the media owners do not have the incentive to provide truthful and critical news coverage. The historical weakness of trade unions in Turkey, the high level of unemployment among journalists, the high turnover rate in the sector and the deep divisions among journalists due to ideological differences make it very difficult for media employees to engage in a unified struggle against their employers. The lack of a strong pro-democracy social movement, the ideological conservatism of the judiciary, the institutional weakness of the parliament and the lack of democracy within political parties render the government –and future governments– too powerful vis-à-vis the society and the media. On the other hand, the inability and the unwillingness of the media to regulate itself, as well as the authoritarian and punitive nature of state regulation, has mobilized the civil society to monitor the media's compliance with universal principles and professional ethical codes and to combat discrimination and hate speech in the media.
This report is an attempt to understand the relationship between media and democracy in Turkey. Towards that end, it situates the media in its political and historical context. It argues that Turkey's media structure falls under the "Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralistic Model" developed by Hallin and Mancini due to the very low level of newspaper circulation, the tradition of advocacy journalism, the structure of media ownership, the absence of an autonomous profession immune to pressure from politicians, interest groups, state institutions, the army and the judiciary and the extremely low level of unionization in the media which leads to high levels of labour exploitation. The report argues that despite relative progress achieved in the EU accession process, Turkey continues to fall far below the goal of harmonizing its legal framework with the EU's acquis communitaire, mainly due to the prevalent political culture and the historical origins of state-media relations in Turkey.
Turkey's 'minority problem,' which is contemporary with the Republic, has been among the fundamental political issues of the country since 1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. Non-Muslim Turkish citizens were given minority status, and gained a series of individual and collective rights, under the Treaty of Lausanne. These rights were not implied by this minority status or based on prerogatives, but were based on the principle of equality with Muslim citizens. However, the Turkish state has systematically violated its obligations under the Treaty, negating the legal protection its non-Muslim citizens are entitled to. This report provides an historical account of the real estate ownership problem experienced by non-Muslim foundations in Turkey since the Ottoman period, and to situate the current situation in Turkey's EU accession process.
Despite Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's emphasis to the contrary, the "democratisation package" announced on September 30 was expected to be more than just another bundle of EU-induced reforms. The much-awaited package came nearly a year after the initiation of informal peace talks between the government and Abdullah Öcalan – the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU and the US – and six months after Öcalan made a historic call to his fighters to end the armed struggle. The package was anticipated as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's response to Öcalan's three-stage road map for peace. Yet, rather than legislative changes for a political settlement on the Kurdish question, Erdoğan announced a generic harmonisation package, a move which has put into question his government's commitment to the peace process. The fragility of the cease fire between the PKK and the Turkish military and the urgency of radical reforms to prevent a deadlock in the peace process render the AKP's piecemeal approach to democratisation too costly at this point in time. With the EU's opening of negotiations on Chapter 22 on regional policy, which pertains to decentralisation in governance and is thus relevant for a political solution to the Kurdish question, there is a real and urgent need for European policy makers to be involved in the peace process in Turkey.
Europe has been a primary actor in Turkey's democratization process and for the Kurdish political struggle carried out simultaneously by the PKK and civilian actors since the late 1980s. The European Union and the European Court of Human Rights have had an indispensable role in raising awareness and documenting the plight of the Kurds on the one hand and inducing Turkey to embark on political reform on the other. Since the mid-2000s, however, the dynamics between Europe, the Turkish government and the Kurdish political movement have drastically changed, diminishing the role, legitimacy and significance of European institutions in Turkey and forcing the Turkish state and the Kurds to develop a "home grown" solution to the conflict. While the "peace process" launched by the government in late 2012 raises hopes for a peaceful settlement, the mismatch between the parties' expectations render it extremely fragile.
This report provides an extensive mapping of the strategic litigation of minorities in Turkey before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the substance and implementation of the EctHR's judgments in these cases and the overall impact these judgments have had on human rights protection in Turkey. While the ECtHR case law played an indispensable role in bringing to light the egregious human rights record of the Turkish Government in late 1980s and early 1990s, the report demonstrates, the relative change in government policies came with the emergence of the EU as an actor in Turkish politics. On the other hand, while forcing the government to start cooperating with the ECtHR, the EU process has not resulted in structural changes in Turkey's legal regime and politics.
At the invitation of the Turkish government, the Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons Francis Deng undertook a fact finding mission to Turkey in 2002. Deng summed up his findings and recommendations in a report submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights. This report, co-published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundations (TESEV) provides a comprehensive assessment of the Turkish government's implementation of Deng's recommendations on the basis of empirical data derived from field research conducted in provinces populated with Kurdish displaced. The report concludes that while some progress has been made in the official recognition of the problem of conflict-induced displacement, the adoption of a law to partially compensate the material losses of the displaced, there are significant outstanding issues concerning the right to return, property rights (including the right to restitution or compensation), the social and economic integration of the displaced, and finally the establishment of truth and justice concerning the gross human rights abuses committed by security forces against the Kurdish displaced in the 1990s.
Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations between the PKK and the government, the crux of Turkey's Kurdish issue remains the structural inequalities against the Kurds, which are deeply rooted in an anti-democratic politico-legal regime.
Certainly, Turkey has come a long way in acknowledging the Kurdish issue and taking steps to address the Kurds' demands for equality and the rule of law. Once banned from speaking their language, Kurds can now use it to attain a university education. The Kurdish region is no longer governed by a state of emergency, nor are Kurdish civilians disappearing under detention. There is no doubt that the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union have played an indispensable role in this transition.
However, European institutions' engagement in the Kurdish issue has not always been coherent, while their impact on Turkey's policies has been limited, and at times negative, particularly in the post-9/11 context. Their uncritical oversight has facilitated Turkey's reluctance to undertake structural reforms to bring an end to the selective prosecution of Kurdish politicians, the criminalisation of non-violent advocacy of enhanced rights for the Kurds, the armament of civilians in the Kurdish region and the impunity of state officials who commit human rights violations.
Recent developments in Turkey have shown, once again, that a genuine democratic transition will only be possible with the coherent, continuous and critical engagement of European institutions in the Kurdish issue.
Viele hatten weitaus mehr von dem »Demokratiepaket« erwartet, das der türkische Premierminister Recep Tayyip Erdogan am 30. September angekündigt hatte. Schließlich wurde es fast ein Jahr nach Aufnahme der informellen Friedensgespräche beschlossen, die die Regierung mit Abdullah Öcalan führt, dem inhaftierten Führer der Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans (PKK). Doch anstelle von Reformen zur Lösung der Kurdenfrage stellte Erdogan lediglich allgemeine Maßnahmen in Aussicht, die dazu dienen sollen, türkische Gesetze mit dem Acquis der Europäischen Union (EU) zu harmonisieren. Mit der formalen Öffnung von Kapitel 22 im Rahmen der Verhandlungen über den Beitritt der Türkei zur EU ist auch die europäische Politik gefordert, Einfluss auf den Friedensprozess zu nehmen. Denn dieses Kapitel betrifft die Regionalpolitik, die eng mit der Frage der Dezentralisierung zusammenhängt. (Autorenreferat)
