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The geopolitical evolution represents a permanent process. It is mostly influenced by the geopolitical condition, in which the geopolitical relations and processes are evolving. The understanding of geopolitical evolution is impossible without the critical review and even rejection of the dominant geopolitical visions. There are various theoretical perspectives that reject the dominant geopolitical visions and discourses as well as geopolitical practices of the political elites. Those theoretical perspectives are known as: critical geopolitics, anti-geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics, feminist geopolitics, radical geopolitics. There are also various comprehensions of relationship between these theoretical perspectives, although it is clear that each of them is overlapped with others, and all of them are overlapped with critical geopolitics, differing in the focus of study and the identification of new moments, and at the same time being similar by their deflection from the dominant geopolitical vision and practices, to which they react in different ways: by criticizing, by putting resistance or offering alternatives. In this paper, the research focus is mostly on anti-geopolitics, a radical geopolitical vision that puts into question the relations of exploitation and dominance. Anti-geopolitics also represents a theoretical perspective that poses the most serious challenge to the dominant ways of representing the World. The proponents of anti-geopolitics focus their research on the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles, as well as on the social movements and networks that offer a resistance to globalization and geo-economic logic that are advocated and practiced by the political-economic elites of states and multinational corporations and intergovernmental institutions, especially the financial ones. The paper also brings a brief review of the key aspects of other theoretical perspectives that represent a more or less radical deflection from the dominant geopolitical visions. Adapted from the source document.

The number of sovereign states has more than quadrupled since 1939. Meanwhile, there are about 50 small political units in the World in some form of dependency, and for that reason, possible candidates for new and small, independent states. Most of these units are not located in geopolitically sensitive areas, so their independence would not destabilise the geopolitical balance of their regions. Parallel to the proliferation of new states are processes of integration, mainly economic, and mainly in Europe. These processes have evolved parallel with the tendencies towards independence in some European Union (EU) member states, whose high democratic standards have been tested as calls for independence have become more vociferous, even resulting in separatist movements and rebellions. This paper examines the prospects of calls for independence within the EU, with Catalonia and Scotland as the most prominent examples, serving as tests for democratic institutions of both the EU and its member states. ; peer-reviewed

This paper studies the relevance of political stability on foreign direct investment (FDI) and the relevance of FDI on economic growth, in three panels. The first panel contains 11 very small economies; the second contains five well-developed and politically stable economies with highly positive FDI net inflows, while the third is a panel with economies that are prone to political violence or targeted by the terrorist attacks. We employ a Granger causality test and implement a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework within the panel setting. In order to test the sensitivity of the results and avoid robust errors, we employ an ARDL model for each of the countries within every panel. Based upon our results, we conclude that there is a long-term relationship between political stability and FDI for the panel of small economies, while we find no empiric evidence of such a relationship for both panels of larger and more developed economies. Similarly to the original hypothesis of Lucas (1990), we find that FDI outflows tend to go towards politically less stable countries. On the other hand, the empiric methodology employed did not find such conclusive evidence in the panels of politically more developed countries or in the small economies that this paper observes.

After the breakup of the USSR, and the several rounds of Post-Cold War enlargements of the Western integrations, once large space of newly independent and geopolitically uncontrolled European post-communist states, located between the EU, NATO and Russia, contracts geopolitically and 'wanders' strategically. The three states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, located on Russia's western borders share about three thousand kilometers of borders with the EU and NATO, and about two thousand and five hundred kilometers with Russia, which implicates that they are prone to the geopolitical influences from their surroundings. This Interspace of the three states lies inside the strategic triangle comprised of: 1) Russia - geopolitically and militarily powerful state as well as a giant considering its energy reserves, which makes her relatively strong 'hard' power as well as a significant 'soft' power; 2) the EU - economic giant on the global level that is not unified enough; has domestic problems and is partially dependent on Russia when it comes to energy, a civilian power without 'hard' power that in its foreign relations relies on policies based on financial assistance, assurance, and attractiveness; 3) NATO, led by the USA - the most powerful military-political-security 'hard' power that exists today; it does not have the kind of influence on Europe and the Post-Soviet space that it had in the 90-ies. However, as a consequence of subordination of the Interspace that lasted for a couple of centuries, the common characteristics intrinsic to this space occur: ambiguous identities; deficits in the democratic practices; complicated, prolonged and incomplete transition; economic decline, demographic problems - all of which favor a strategic 'adoption' of the Interspace by the Kremlin, a former imperial master. At the same time, a relative marginalization of the Interspace is evident regarding the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration. After the unsuccessful attempts of 'pulling out' Kiev, Kishinev, and the South Caucasian Tbilisi from this Russian sphere of influence, the states positioned in the Interspace, together with Russia, comprise a regional security complex, a stabilized geopolitical 'Russosphere' that is a key part of the Kremlin's attempts for Eurasian reintegration under Russia's leadership. Adapted from the source document.