Suchergebnisse

This article examines Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-XI/2013 following the simultaneous elections of 2019. The object is the correctness of the utilisation of realism as a theory of adjudication by the Court in deciding the constitutionality of Law Number 42 of 2008. It can be concluded that, the Court's decision is false, i.e. it fails to strengthen presidential in Indonesia, as expected by the Court, according to coattail effect theory. Hence, responding to this failure, this article suggests a caveat that the utilisation of realism should anticipate its fallibility. Therefore, responding to the issue to be more general, this article also suggests a proposal for a constitutional amendment to restructure the judicial review mechanism in accordance with the Canadian model known as, conceptually, judicial review with legislative finality. The recommendation aims to anticipate judicial error in constitutional interpretation as shown by the Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-XI/2013.

The legal issue to be discussed in this article is the involvement of the Constitutional Court in adjudicating issues concerning the relationship between national – local government in general, and the distribution of power to the local government in particular. To be more specific, this article will criticise by delivering a casenote over the Constitutional Court decisions, i.e. Decision Number 87/PUU-XIII/2015, Decision Number 137/PUU-XIII/2015, Decision Number 30/PUU-XIV/2016 and Decision Number 56/PUU-XIV/2016. The casenote will notify the need to a deeper conceptual understanding of the differences between unitary State and federalism principles and its implication in giving prescriptions. This is a response to the Constitutional Court's judicial opinion which tends weightier to federalism, instead of unitary State principle. According to this situation, it is recommended that the Constitutional Court should not review the constitutionality of laws which contain the legal issues concerning the relationship between national – local government in general, and the distribution of power to the local government in particular. This article uses conceptual and comparative approaches.

This study discusses the constitutionality of presidential candidacy threshold, particularly related to the principle of presidentialism. This study argues that the threshold is unconstitutional because it does not reflect the principle of presidentialism. The principle emphasizes executive and legislative prescriptions that should be independent of each other. Supporting the current threshold, the Constitutional Court proposes a rationale that the threshold aims to strengthen presidentialism in Indonesia. The current threshold is believed can give the elected president adequate political support in parliament. In fact, the idea is not factually and juridically correct. An elected president can govern effectively without significant institutional obstacle, although the President does not gain support of majority political power in the parliament. On that basis, it is necessary to amend Article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution so that the implementation of presidential system can be more consistent. Political parties should not be given monopolistic power to bear the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The system should also accommodate the possibility of independent presidential and vice-presidential candidates, separating the line of political parties. Such constitutional provisions are expected to annul the presidential nomination threshold.Ambang Batas Pencalonan Presiden dan Penegasan Presidensialisme di IndonesiaAbstrakArtikel ini mendiskusikan isu hukum apakah ambang batas pencalonan presiden konstitusional, khususnya dikaitkan dengan asas presidensialisme. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa ambang batas pencalonan presiden inkonstitusional karena tidak mencerminkan asas presidensialisme yang mengandung preskripsi eksekutif dan legislatif saling tidak bergantung. Alasan Mahkamah Konstitusi bahwa ambang batas pencalonan presiden konstitusional dalam rangka penguatan presidensialisme di Indonesia, supaya presiden terpilih nantinya mendapatkan dukungan politik yang memadai di parlemen, tidak tepat baik secara faktual maupun secara yuridis. Walau tidak didukung oleh kekuatan politik mayoritas di parlemen, sesuai asas presidensialisme, hal itu bukan hambatan institusional bagi presiden untuk tetap dapat memerintah secara efektif. Atas dasar itu perlu dilakukan perubahan terhadap Pasal 6A ayat (2) UUD 1945 supaya penerapan asas presidensialisme dapat lebih konsisten. Partai politik seyogianya tidak lagi diberikan kekuasaan yang monopolistik sebagai pengusung pasangan calon presiden dan wakil presiden, termasuk dengan mengakomodasi kemungkinan pasangan calon presiden dan wakil presiden di luar jalur partai politik. Dengan ketentuan konstitusional yang demikian maka eksistensi ambang batas pencalonan presiden akan gugur dengan sendirinya.Kata kunci: ambang batas pencalonan presiden, konstitusionalitas, presidensialisme.DOI: https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v7n3.a4

This article expresses the author's view to disagree with the existence of the KPK and its supporting Constitutional Theory. This article is based on classical model of the trias politica theory and suggests that the existence of executive bodies should conform with the prescription of unitary executive theory. According to the unitary executive theory, the president should have the power to appoint and remove any executive official exclusively. This norm is based on the status of the president as the Chief Executive. According to this notion, the KPK, as independent agency, is unconstitutional. In line with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, qualifying the KPK as executive, our abnormal constitutional order, with the existence of the KPK, should be normalized in accordance with the unitary executive theory.

Judicial interpretation of the right to be free from discrimination is a central issue in the practice of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation by the MKRI. This article tries to describe and systematize this practice and then to restate the legal principles as it is stated by the MKRI into its case law. This article finds that, as a matter of principle, the MKRI adopts two main tests i.e. strict scrutiny and rational basis test to determine whether a legislation is contrary to the principle of non-discrimination

MKRI is a new governmental body which was established under the Third Amendment of the UUD NRI 1945. This article examines its proper function which underlies its jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of legislation. According to the issue, this article argues that MKRI should be treated as a human rights court whenever it undertakes its jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of legislation. The function of the MKRI as a human rights court justifies its existence and also prescribes principles for its operation. It means that in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation the MKRI should enhance the protection of human rights through its judicial policy and constitutional interpretation.

AbstrakHubungan antara hukum dan keadilan seperti aliran sungai yang mengalir dari hulu ke hilir. Sesuai analogi ini, keadilan adalah isu inheren dalam pembentukan undang-undang (isu bagian hulu) dan ajudikasi (isu bagian hilir). Konsisten dengan ini, penulis meyakini bahwa undang-undang dan ajudikasi harus adil karena presumsi bahwa keadilan adalah nilai internal hukum. Kita harus mewaspadai posisi bebas-nilai positivis karena mengarah pada pemikiran yang bersifat reduksionis tentang hukum. Untuk menanggapi isu tersebut penulis mendukung pendapat yang mengklaim bahwa kita tidak dapat memisahkan hukum dan keadilan. Kita mengacu hanya pada hukum hanya karena hukum tersebut adil.AbstractThe relationship between law and justice is analogous to a river. Like a river stream, justice flows from the upstream to the downstream in the legal discourse. According to this analogy, justice is inherent issue in the rule-making (the upstream issue) and adjudication (the downstream issue). Consistent with this statement the author believes that legislation and adjudication should be just because the presumption that justice is the internal value of the law. We should be aware that a value-free standpoint proposed by the positivist would lead us to a reductionist thinking about law. In order to address this issue, the author therefore argues for the unity thesis that claims that we cannot separate law and justice. We invoke only to the law because a conviction that the law is just.

This article argues that the concept of right-based State and right-based constitution are substantively the basis or justification for constitutional review of legislation or laws. The constitutionality of laws is determined by the idea that human rights are supreme or superior over the legislature and its legal product. Therefore, the legislature should respect human rights in law-making. This article also rejects the view that hierarchy of laws is the only basis for constitutional review of legislation or laws because this view only explains it formally. This argument cannot be applied to Britain or Israel which does not have a formal constitution.

AbstractThe issue to be discussed in this article is the internalisation process of international human rights standards into domestic forum through the judicial review mechanism of the constitutionality of legislation by the MKRI. This article argues that MKRI should consider international human rights standards in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation based on Ch. XA of the UUD NRI 1945. The argument based on the prescription that the international human rights standard are binding on States and requiring them to conform their laws and their offcial behavior to the international norm.IntisariTulisan ini membahas isu proses internalisasi standar HAM internasional dalam forum domestik melalui mekanisme pengujian konstitusionalitas undang-undang oleh MKRI. Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa MKRI seyogianya mempertimbangkan standar HAM internasional dalam menguji konstitusionalitas undangundang berdasarkan Bab XA UUD NRI 1945. Argumen itu didasarkan pada preskripsi bahwa standar HAM internasional berlaku/mengikat kepada negara dan mensyaratkannya untuk menyesuaikan undangundang beserta tindakan pejabatnya dengan kaidah HAM internasional tersebut

The MKRI is a new governmental body which was established under the Third Amendment of the UUD NRI 1945. This article examines its proper function which underlies its jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of legislation. According to the issue, this article argues that the MKRI should be treated as a human rights court whenever it undertakes its jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of legislation. The function of the MKRI as a human rights court justifies its existence and also prescribes principles for its operation. It means that in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation the MKRI should enhance the protection of human rights through its judicial policy and constitutional interpretation.Keywords: MKRI, function, human rights court

This article argues for judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation or laws. This article opines that the judiciary is more favourable in discharging the function as the guardian of the constitution than other government bodies. According to Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary enjoys the jurisdiction of judicial review to declare the unconstitutionality of legislation or laws because "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is". Artikel ini membahas tentang pengujian yudisial konstitusionalitas undang-undang. Dalam artikel ini penulis berpendapat bahwa badan yudisial merupakan kandidat utama sebagai penjaga konstitusi ketimbang badan-badan pemerintahan yang lain. Pendapat ini didasarkan pada kasus Marbury v. Madison yang meyakini bahwa menentukan makna hukum adalah ranah dan tugas badan yudisial, termasuk dalam melakukan pengujian yudisial untuk menyatakan suatu undang-undang inkonstitusional.

This article criticizes the judicial review practice over trademarks infringement in Indonesia. This article argues that to be fair the court should consider the confusion effect to determine whether there is a trademarks infringement case in accordance with Art. 16.1 of the TRIPs Agreement. This article concludes that Indonesia needs to improve its legislation to meet the requirement of the TRIPs Agreement and to improve the judges quality in applying the Trademarks Law properly by considering its purpose which grants the trademark owner a protection of the trademark's identity and a protection against confusion against unauthorized use by third parties. Artikel ini mengkritisi praktik yudisial atas kasus pelanggaran merek di Indonesia. Atas dasar itu artikel ini berargumen bahwa supaya adil maka pengadilan seyogianya mempertimbangkan efek kebingungan untuk menentukan apakah ada pelanggaran merek sesuai Art. 16.1 TRIPs Agreement. Artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa Indonesia perlu memperbaiki legislasinya supaya sesuai tuntutan TRIPs Agreement dan meningkatkan kualitas hakimnya dalam menerapkan Hukum Merek secara memadai dengan mempertimbangkan aspek purposivenya untuk memberikan kepada pemilik merek perlindungan atas identitas mereknya itu sendiri dan perlindungan atas kebingungan yang ditimbulkan oleh penggunaan merek tanpa hak oleh pihak ketiga.

Tulisan ini hendak mengkaji pemanfaatan E-Government (Electronic Government) dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan daerah di Indonesia dengan menggunakan perspektif yuridis. berupa pengaturan yang sudah ada pada tingkat nasional atau pusat serta saran tindak bagi daerah dalam rangka mengimplementasikan E-Government, terutama pijakan awalnya berupa suatu kerangka hukum (legal framework). Tulisan ini merupakan penelitian hukum dengan menggunakan pendekatan teoretis-konseptual (conceptual approach) dan pendekatan perundang-undangan (statute approach).