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In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 64, Heft 5, S. 530-536
ISSN: 1467-9485
AbstractWe consider a conduct parameter model where firms price discriminate based on the consumers' willingness to pay. For any conduct, the average price is invariant to the extent of price discrimination. Moreover, when the number of prices goes to infinity, there is a linear relationship between market power, measured by conduct, and range of offered prices. Hence, when the firms face competition, some of the high valuation customers are charged below their valuations, which contrasts with perfect price discrimination results for a monopoly.
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Working paper
In: Economics letters, Band 117, Heft 1, S. 53-56
ISSN: 0165-1765
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 55, Heft 2, S. 255-257
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 255-258
In: FRL-D-23-00851
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In: EL54438
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In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 564-578
ISSN: 1744-1382
AbstractWe examine the effect of corruption control on efficiency and its implications for efficiency spillovers by a stochastic frontier model. Our dataset covers 102 countries from 1996 to 2014. We find a positive relationship between corruption control and efficiency. If neighboring countries have difficulty in handling corruption, the country would be negatively affected by its neighbors' corruption through efficiency spillovers. We then compare the efficiency differences across countries for three time periods: 1996–2002, 2002–2008, and 2008–2014. On average, technical efficiencies slightly increased in the second period compared to the first period. In the third period, the efficiencies declined, particularly in China.
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 489-510
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Working paper
In: The Manchester School, Band 84, Heft 4, S. 482-505
ISSN: 1467-9957
We analyze a two‐stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage, firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium, the firms focus more on the high‐valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one‐stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity‐weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to the established results in the literature for one‐stage games.
In: FINANA-D-23-00546
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