Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: Trust and International Relations -- CHAPTER 1 Introduction -- Defining Trust -- Trust and International Relations -- Methodology -- A Road Map -- Conclusion -- CHAPTER 2 Trust and the Security Dilemma -- The Security Dilemma Game -- Introducing Uncertainty -- Equilibria with Uncertainty -- Achieving Cooperation -- The Effects of Cooperation and Noncooperation -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- PART II: Fear and the Origins of the Cold War -- CHAPTER 3 The Spiral of Fear -- The Spiral Model -- The Spiral Game -- Equilibria in the Spiral Game -- Defection and Fear -- The External Observer's Perspective -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- CHAPTER 4 The Origins of Mistrust: 1945-50 -- Explaining the Origins of the Cold War -- Setting the Stage: Motivations and Beliefs in 1945 -- The Fate of Poland -- Bulgaria and Romania -- The Iranian Crisis -- The Turkish Crisis -- The Truman Doctrine -- Hungary and Czechoslovakia -- The Korean War -- Conclusion -- PART III: European Cooperation and the Rebirth of Germany -- CHAPTER 5 Trust, Hegemony, and Cooperation -- Multilateral Cooperation -- The Multilateral Trust Game -- Equilibria in the Game -- The Payoffs and Cooperation -- Geography and Mistrust -- Hegemony and Cooperation -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- CHAPTER 6 European Cooperation and Germany, 1945-55 -- Explaining European Cooperation -- The Road to Bizonia -- The Origins of the Western Bloc: 1947 -- The Brussels Pact and the London Accords -- The Birth of NATO and West Germany -- German Rearmament -- The Death of the EDC and the NATO Solution -- The Perspectives Revisited -- Conclusion -- PART IV: Reassurance and the End of the Cold War -- CHAPTER 7 Reassurance -- Reassurance in International Relations -- The Reassurance Game