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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: Trust and International Relations -- CHAPTER 1 Introduction -- Defining Trust -- Trust and International Relations -- Methodology -- A Road Map -- Conclusion -- CHAPTER 2 Trust and the Security Dilemma -- The Security Dilemma Game -- Introducing Uncertainty -- Equilibria with Uncertainty -- Achieving Cooperation -- The Effects of Cooperation and Noncooperation -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- PART II: Fear and the Origins of the Cold War -- CHAPTER 3 The Spiral of Fear -- The Spiral Model -- The Spiral Game -- Equilibria in the Spiral Game -- Defection and Fear -- The External Observer's Perspective -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- CHAPTER 4 The Origins of Mistrust: 1945-50 -- Explaining the Origins of the Cold War -- Setting the Stage: Motivations and Beliefs in 1945 -- The Fate of Poland -- Bulgaria and Romania -- The Iranian Crisis -- The Turkish Crisis -- The Truman Doctrine -- Hungary and Czechoslovakia -- The Korean War -- Conclusion -- PART III: European Cooperation and the Rebirth of Germany -- CHAPTER 5 Trust, Hegemony, and Cooperation -- Multilateral Cooperation -- The Multilateral Trust Game -- Equilibria in the Game -- The Payoffs and Cooperation -- Geography and Mistrust -- Hegemony and Cooperation -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- CHAPTER 6 European Cooperation and Germany, 1945-55 -- Explaining European Cooperation -- The Road to Bizonia -- The Origins of the Western Bloc: 1947 -- The Brussels Pact and the London Accords -- The Birth of NATO and West Germany -- German Rearmament -- The Death of the EDC and the NATO Solution -- The Perspectives Revisited -- Conclusion -- PART IV: Reassurance and the End of the Cold War -- CHAPTER 7 Reassurance -- Reassurance in International Relations -- The Reassurance Game

Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, this is the first textbook on international relations theory to take a specifically game-theoretic approach to the subject, and provide the material needed for students to understand the subject thoroughly, from its basic foundations to more complex models. International relations theory is presented and analysed using simple games, which allow students to grasp the concepts and mechanisms involved with the rationalist approach without the distraction of complicated mathematics. Chapter exercises reinforce key concepts and guide students to extend the models discussed. Drawing examples from international security, international political economy, and environmental negotiations, this introductory textbook examines a broad array of topics in international relations courses, including state preferences, normal form games, bargaining, uncertainty and communication, multilateral cooperation, and the impact of domestic politics.

AbstractThe Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 killed more than 400,000 civilians. Could a limited intervention motivated by humanitarian concerns have reduced the death toll at an acceptable cost to the intervenors? I distinguish between two approaches to intervention: penalizing atrocities, by raising the cost and lowering the benefit of killing civilians; and fostering a balance of power, to convince the two sides that they cannot win on the battlefield and so must negotiate an end to the war. I show, using a game-theoretic model, that fostering a balance of power causes the government to commit more atrocities and prolongs the war. Penalizing atrocities, while it increases the likelihood of war, can reduce the expected level of atrocities. The model helps account for the failure of US efforts to promote negotiations by aiding Syrian rebels, and the success of efforts to deter Syrian chemical weapons use through threats and limited strikes.

AbstractAlexander Wendt claims that quantum physics explains deep mysteries about human consciousness and offers a radical new understanding of human behavior and social interaction. However, the claims rest on flawed interpretations of quantum theory, fringe literatures and metaphorical, almost mystical uses of quantum concepts and buzzwords. He fails to provide any account of human conflict, and defends an almost theological view of the importance of humanity in the universe that is incompatible with a scientific perspective.

Students of international summit diplomacy argue that personal, face-to-face interaction between national leaders is an important factor in building trust between states. The generation of personal impressions is held to be a nonrational process driven by instinct, psychology, or the structure of the brain. However, actors may still respond to these impressions rationally. I present a model of how leaders should respond to their impressions at summits. Some implications are that attending summits may be reassuring if they are costly and trustworthy types can get good impressions of each other and then cooperate, but that mistaken impressions can also form that can lead to exploitation of trustworthy types by untrustworthy types. I illustrate the model with reference to the summits in Singapore and Hanoi between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

The attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 was the result of a perception of relative decline on the part of American conservatives and their simultaneous radicalization. Relative decline and radicalization are both potent causes of violence. When a formerly dominant group is in decline, it may fear that in the future it will lack the bargaining power to maintain the status quo, and so resort to violence to prevent decline, or lock in present advantages. Radicalization increases the perceived stakes of power transitions; if the opponent is dangerous, all means are justified in preventing their accession to power. Conservative radicalization was driven by partisan polarization, media polarization, the emergence of social media and associated conspiracy theories, and the formation of armed right-wing groups. The structural conditions generating the attack are unlikely to ameliorate, so the potential for political violence will remain.

An emerging literature on civil and international conflict management is developing and testing insights from formal theories of conflict. Third parties may attempt to prevent or resolve conflict by providing material incentives or by providing or filtering information. Material incentives are the province of states, for the most part, while weaker third parties can provide information. There is considerable debate over whether threats of third-party intervention actually deter conflict, provoke conflict, have no effect, or have nonmonotonic effects oil the likelihood of conflict. Providing information via mediation is seen as effective in preventing conflict, but questions remain about precisely how it works and about the appropriate characteristics of the mediator, such as whether mediators should be biased or unbiased. Adapted from the source document.