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Abstract
How does frontline corruption influence individuals' decisions to emigrate? Existing research has found that perceptions of grand political corruption promote emigration, particularly among the highly educated. In this article, we shift the focus to the role of frontline corruption in driving emigration decisions and distinguish between the effects of the payment of bribes to frontline bureaucrats and those of nepotism in public employment. Using data from the Balkan Barometer for the period 2018–21, we find that both bribe-paying experiences and perceived public-sector nepotism are important emigration drivers. Our findings also reveal that the more highly educated an individual is, the greater the influence of perceived nepotism on the emigration decision. However, the influence of first-hand experiences with bribery is larger and remains similar across education categories. Our analysis emphasizes the need to disaggregate the varied manifestations of corruption when examining the determinants of (high-skilled) emigration. This article contributes to our understanding of the drivers of emigration in the Western Balkans and the wider corruption–migration nexus.

How does the receipt of remittances shape recipients' attitudes towards taxation? We argue that remittances are likely to reduce support for the fiscal contract of taxes in exchange for public services because recipients rely less on the national economy and the state for their well-being. Remittance recipients can use the money sent by friends or family overseas to obtain public services in the private market instead of, or in addition to, tax-funded welfare services. In doing so, remittance recipients become detached from the national political community and develop a transactional relationship with the state whereby they pay licence fees, taxes and bribes to protect investment goods procured with remittances, making them less willing to support general taxation and more likely to approve of tax evasion and avoidance. We find strong support for our theory in analysis of survey data from Africa and Latin America. Our article contributes to knowledge of the micro-foundations of the fiscal contract and the political-economic effects of emigration and remittances on migrants' homelands.

ABSTRACTHigh levels of crime are a key driver of emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean. But can emigration change public opinion about how best to respond to crime? Focusing on the political economy of remittances—the money migrants send to their families and communities—this study argues that emigration can increase support for violent responses to crime. Migrants' families often spend remittances on investment goods, which makes them more vulnerable to crime and more supportive of violence to protect themselves. An analysis of AmericasBarometer data finds that remittance recipients are more likely both to fear crime and to be victims of crime than nonrecipients. They are also more approving of vigilantism, more tolerant of police bending the law to apprehend criminals, and more supportive of deploying the military in crime fighting. These findings contribute to our knowledge of the consequences of international migration for political development in migrant-sending countries.

How does emigration affect tax preferences in migrant-sending countries? Experiencing public services in a high tax-capacity destination may reduce support for tax increases by throwing fiscal failure at home into stark relief (the socialization hypothesis). Alternatively, migrants' exclusion from certain public services may increase desire to fund these services in migrant origin countries (the exclusion hypothesis). We test these competing hypotheses with an online survey experiment in Mexico and explore variation in US healthcare access on fiscal policy preferences of migrant households. Migrant households, especially those with returned migrant members, are more supportive of taxation when tax revenue is earmarked for healthcare, a service to which many Mexican immigrants in the US lack access. It is migrants' exclusion from, rather than their socialization into, the fiscal contract in destination countries that influences fiscal policy preferences in their countries of origin.

This section analyzes government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay. The articles address the pandemic's evolution and emergency policy construction in these countries, emphasizing the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between presidents, congresses, bureaucracies, and subnational governments. The articles point to factors that contributed to varying degrees of governance of the crisis, from presidential leadership to government action's structural limits. In particular, studies allow for a more exhaustive assessment of presidents' responses, ranging from presidential inaction, populist rhetoric, and politically costly decision-making. ; Esta sección analiza las respuestas gubernamentales a la pandemia de COVID-19 en cinco países de América Latina: Argentina, Brasil, Perú, México y Uruguay. Los artículos abordan la evolución de la pandemia y la construcción de políticas de emergencia en estos países, con énfasis en las dinámicas de cooperación y conflicto entre presidentes, congresos, burocracias y gobiernos subnacionales. En conjunto, los artículos apuntan a factores que contribuyeron a diversos grados de gobernanza de la crisis, desde el liderazgo presidencial hasta los límites estructurales de la acción gubernamental. En particular, los estudios permiten una evaluación más exhaustiva de las respuestas de los presidentes, que varían entre la inacción presidencial, la retórica populista y la toma de decisiones políticamente costosa.