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This thesis project consists of a comparative work on three different military megaprojects regarding Network Centric Warfare, in three different countries: the United States, France and Sweden. The aim of the comparison is to find similarities and differences with respect to why, and if, the projects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the military megaprojects were ambitious and a great deal of the involved technology was not yet developed at the time and the technical requirements were incongruous. For the comparative study a narrative case study methodology has been employed, structuring and analysing the different military megaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of the military megaprojects reproducing the internal and external dynamics of two of the three projects. One project, the French one, has been reproduced up to its present stage because it is planned to continue to the 2030s. The result of the comparison between the military megaprojects has shown that such vast projects can be managed like normal vast development projects. On the other hand, these kinds of vast projects are comprehensively complex. Such projects do also involve ideas leading to project developments of already known and unknown obstacles before and during the mega project not possible to manage and results in project and development failure. ; Cette thèse est une étude comparative de trois méga-projets militaires menés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède, dans le domaine du network centric warfare ou guerre réseaucentrique. L'objectif de cette étude est d'observer les similitudes et différences dans le développement et la gestion de ces projets, de comprendre les raisons de certains choix stratégiques puis d'évaluer l'ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Ces programmes étaient particulièrement ambitieux puisqu'une grande partie de la technologie répondant à ces besoins n'existait pas encore et certains impératifs techniques étaient proprement incompatibles.L'étude de cas et ...

This thesis project consists of a comparative work on three different military megaprojects regarding Network Centric Warfare, in three different countries: the United States, France and Sweden. The aim of the comparison is to find similarities and differences with respect to why, and if, the projects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the military megaprojects were ambitious and a great deal of the involved technology was not yet developed at the time and the technical requirements were incongruous. For the comparative study a narrative case study methodology has been employed, structuring and analysing the different military megaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of the military megaprojects reproducing the internal and external dynamics of two of the three projects. One project, the French one, has been reproduced up to its present stage because it is planned to continue to the 2030s. The result of the comparison between the military megaprojects has shown that such vast projects can be managed like normal vast development projects. On the other hand, these kinds of vast projects are comprehensively complex. Such projects do also involve ideas leading to project developments of already known and unknown obstacles before and during the mega project not possible to manage and results in project and development failure. ; Cette thèse est une étude comparative de trois méga-projets militaires menés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède, dans le domaine du network centric warfare ou guerre réseaucentrique. L'objectif de cette étude est d'observer les similitudes et différences dans le développement et la gestion de ces projets, de comprendre les raisons de certains choix stratégiques puis d'évaluer l'ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Ces programmes étaient particulièrement ambitieux puisqu'une grande partie de la technologie répondant à ces besoins n'existait pas encore et certains impératifs techniques étaient proprement incompatibles.L'étude de cas et ...

This thesis project consists of a comparative work on three different military megaprojects regarding Network Centric Warfare, in three different countries: the United States, France and Sweden. The aim of the comparison is to find similarities and differences with respect to why, and if, the projects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the military megaprojects were ambitious and a great deal of the involved technology was not yet developed at the time and the technical requirements were incongruous. For the comparative study a narrative case study methodology has been employed, structuring and analysing the different military megaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of the military megaprojects reproducing the internal and external dynamics of two of the three projects. One project, the French one, has been reproduced up to its present stage because it is planned to continue to the 2030s. The result of the comparison between the military megaprojects has shown that such vast projects can be managed like normal vast development projects. On the other hand, these kinds of vast projects are comprehensively complex. Such projects do also involve ideas leading to project developments of already known and unknown obstacles before and during the mega project not possible to manage and results in project and development failure. ; Cette thèse est une étude comparative de trois méga-projets militaires menés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède, dans le domaine du network centric warfare ou guerre réseaucentrique. L'objectif de cette étude est d'observer les similitudes et différences dans le développement et la gestion de ces projets, de comprendre les raisons de certains choix stratégiques puis d'évaluer l'ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Ces programmes étaient particulièrement ambitieux puisqu'une grande partie de la technologie répondant à ces besoins n'existait pas encore et certains impératifs techniques étaient proprement incompatibles.L'étude de cas et ...

This thesis project consists of a comparative work on three different military megaprojects regarding Network Centric Warfare, in three different countries: the United States, France and Sweden. The aim of the comparison is to find similarities and differences with respect to why, and if, the projects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the military megaprojects were ambitious and a great deal of the involved technology was not yet developed at the time and the technical requirements were incongruous. For the comparative study a narrative case study methodology has been employed, structuring and analysing the different military megaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of the military megaprojects reproducing the internal and external dynamics of two of the three projects. One project, the French one, has been reproduced up to its present stage because it is planned to continue to the 2030s. The result of the comparison between the military megaprojects has shown that such vast projects can be managed like normal vast development projects. On the other hand, these kinds of vast projects are comprehensively complex. Such projects do also involve ideas leading to project developments of already known and unknown obstacles before and during the mega project not possible to manage and results in project and development failure. ; Cette thèse est une étude comparative de trois méga-projets militaires menés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède, dans le domaine du network centric warfare ou guerre réseaucentrique. L'objectif de cette étude est d'observer les similitudes et différences dans le développement et la gestion de ces projets, de comprendre les raisons de certains choix stratégiques puis d'évaluer l'ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Ces programmes étaient particulièrement ambitieux puisqu'une grande partie de la technologie répondant à ces besoins n'existait pas encore et certains impératifs techniques étaient proprement incompatibles.L'étude de cas et ...

This thesis project consists of a comparative work on three different military megaprojects regarding Network Centric Warfare, in three different countries: the United States, France and Sweden. The aim of the comparison is to find similarities and differences with respect to why, and if, the projects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the military megaprojects were ambitious and a great deal of the involved technology was not yet developed at the time and the technical requirements were incongruous. For the comparative study a narrative case study methodology has been employed, structuring and analysing the different military megaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of the military megaprojects reproducing the internal and external dynamics of two of the three projects. One project, the French one, has been reproduced up to its present stage because it is planned to continue to the 2030s. The result of the comparison between the military megaprojects has shown that such vast projects can be managed like normal vast development projects. On the other hand, these kinds of vast projects are comprehensively complex. Such projects do also involve ideas leading to project developments of already known and unknown obstacles before and during the mega project not possible to manage and results in project and development failure. ; Cette thèse est une étude comparative de trois méga-projets militaires menés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède, dans le domaine du network centric warfare ou guerre réseaucentrique. L'objectif de cette étude est d'observer les similitudes et différences dans le développement et la gestion de ces projets, de comprendre les raisons de certains choix stratégiques puis d'évaluer l'ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Ces programmes étaient particulièrement ambitieux puisqu'une grande partie de la technologie répondant à ces besoins n'existait pas encore et certains impératifs techniques étaient proprement incompatibles.L'étude de cas et ...

This thesis project consists of acomparative work on three different militarymegaprojects regarding Network CentricWarfare, in three different countries: theUnited States, France and Sweden. The aim ofthe comparison is to find similarities anddifferences with respect to why, and if, theprojects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the militarymegaprojects were ambitious and a great dealof the involved technology was not yetdeveloped at the time and the technicalrequirements were incongruous. For thecomparative study a narrative case studymethodology has been employed, structuringand analysing the different militarymegaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of themilitary megaprojects reproducing the internaland external dynamics of two of the threeprojects. One project, the French one, has beenreproduced up to its present stage because it isplanned to continue to the 2030s. The result ofthe comparison between the militarymegaprojects has shown that such vast projectscan be managed like normal vast developmentprojects. On the other hand, these kinds of vastprojects are comprehensively complex. Suchprojects do also involve ideas leading to projectdevelopments of already known and unknownobstacles before and during the mega projectnot possible to manage and results in projectand development failure ; Cette thèse est une étudecomparative de trois méga-projets militairesmenés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède,dans le domaine du network centric warfare ouguerre réseaucentrique. L'objectif de cetteétude est d'observer les similitudes etdifférences dans le développement et la gestionde ces projets, de comprendre les raisons decertains choix stratégiques puis d'évaluerl'ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Cesprogrammes étaient particulièrementambitieux puisqu'une grande partie de latechnologie répondant à ces besoins n'existaitpas encore et certains impératifs techniquesétaient proprement incompatibles. L'étude decas et la comparaison des méga projets sontprésentées sous une forme narrative.Le résultat en est la description des trois mégaprojets militaires reproduisant les dynamiquesinternes et externes à l'oeuvre pour deux destrois projets. Le projet français a été décritjusqu'à l'étape de développement actuel, ledéploiement du projet étant prévu jusqu'aumilieu des années 2030. Cette comparaison desméga projets militaires a montré que le type demanagement appliqué à ces vastes programmesn'est pas différent de ceux mis en oeuvre dansle cadre de projets de moindre envergure. Celadit, les méga-projets restent extrêmementcomplexes et ce type de développement doittenir compte de différents obstacles, déjàconnus ou non durant les différentes phases dedéploiement, lesquels se trouvant être danscertains cas impossibles à contrôler ; Disputationen genomfördes uppkopplat på distans enligt franska regler med jury.

AbstractAbstract ‐ It is our impression that Gordon Pask's writings cover fundamentals for large parts of the widely expanding fields of Cybernetics and Systems Theory. Thereby, and by his lecturing activities, he has become a unique figure in maintaining a kind of unity of the field of Cybernetics, well in accord with Wiener's view ("control and communication in the animal and the machine"; cf[26]). And that, with fresh ideas, sometimes very personal, sometimes very general, and always very interesting.In this subjective review of a fragment of Pask's writings, notably within cybernetics, we will, in part, try to account for some of his earlier insights into how we judge the behaviour of an artefact (machine) in relation to that of a living organism (animal). And, partly, for his later‐conceived conversation theory. Some problems revealed in the latter theory, like how we‐in‐a‐conversation can represent a real behaviour, may well connect back to Pask's earlier studies into the problem whether we can produce artefacts (including thought models) of our behaviours as living beings.

Summary Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective. In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios. The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility: potentially significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain. The following technologies were assessed to have the potential for significant military utility: Rapid field identification of harmful microorganisms Hypersonic propulsion The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility: Non-line-of-sight imaging Artificial intelligence for military decision support The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility: Structural energy storage Triboelectric nanogenerators No technology was found to have negligible military utility. The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies' present state and likely future development. The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, 'the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios' has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013. Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts' presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies' potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned. The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios. Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies. ; Teknisk prognos

Ten technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute have been reviewed by staff at the Department of Military-Technology at the Swedish National Defence College (Note that there probably are other technology areas, equally interesting, but not included in this study). The task given by FMV was to assess the military utility of the chosen technologies in a time frame from 2025 to 2030, from a SwAF viewpoint. The method used was first to make a summary of each forecast report. The technology was then put into one or more scenarios that are assessed to be the best in order to show possible utility as well as possibilities and drawbacks of the technology. Based on a SWOT-analysis, the contribution to SwAF capabilities and the cost in terms of acquisition, C2 footprint, logistic footprint, doctrine/TTP, training, facilities and R&D were assessed. Conclusions regarding the military utility of the technology were drawn. We introduce our definition of military utility as being activities that efficiently and with the lowest cost in terms of lives and materiel lead to fulfilment of the mission objectives. The technologies were grouped in three classes; technologies with a significant potential, with uncertain potential and with negligible potential. The following technologies were assessed to have a significant potential for military utility; Augmented Reality Nano air vehicles Solid State Laser weapons In the scenarios studied, Augmented Reality (AR) is assessed to have a positive impact on several SwAF capabilities, especially for C2 and intelligence. AR is a relatively mature technology, applicable in many different branches. There are examples where AR is already applied with great success, e.g. Head-Up-Displays, HUD. The technology has proven its value. However, there are well known drawbacks to the technology such as weaknesses regarding models, increased weight for dismounted soldiers, power consumption etc. There is also a risk that personnel will have problems solving their tasks when AR systems fail, not being used to fighting without supporting systems. Nano air vehicles (NAV's) have been assessed to contribute to a large range of capabilities, primarily intelligence. Their lifecycle cost has been assessed to be low, since development in this area is commercially driven, bringing down acquisition costs. Also, FAA has decided to allow NAV's in controlled air space from 2015, which is expected to lead to an increase in civilian use of NAV's. The technology is relatively mature even though there are obstacles concerning suitable materials, energy efficient propulsion systems as well as miniaturized microprocessors and software to control them. In the scenario studied, High Energy Solid State Lasers are assessed to have a positive impact on SwAF capabilities to engage targets on surface and in the air. The technology can be used to protect vessels on the surface and thereby increase survivability. The development of SSL in the given timeframe is expected to lower cost per shot and avoid the environmental problems with use of chemical lasers. Neighbouring military powers are expected to use laser weapons in the future, therefore SwAF should monitor the development of the laser weapons technology and develop and purchase adequate countermeasures. The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain potential for military utility; Metamaterial cloaking Electromagnetic gun Small satellites Ultra-violet communication Metamaterial cloaking, if realisable in the future, is assessed to be firstly implemented in the acoustic spectrum, since manufacturing of small structured cloaks for the shorter wavelengths in the optic and radar spectra is believed to be more difficult. Cloaking of submarines is primarily assessed to increase the survivability against torpedoes having active sonar. The use of cloaked mines could pose a deterring threat, even to advanced amphibious operations against Sweden. The technological development in this area should be closely monitored and compared to existing, maturing techniques for countermeasures and for the development of broad spectrum active torpedoes. The greatest concern is that cloaking will have negative impact on submarine manoeuvrability. The electro-thermal chemical (ETC) gun seems to be a first step towards a fully electrical gun such as the rail-gun or the coil-gun. The fully electrical guns have been a work in progress for some decades and there are still remaining challenges both concerning electrical power supply and design materials. When or if, they will be operational is difficult to say. The military utility of small satellites is disputed, despite an assessed contribution to several of the SwAF capabilities. The main reason for this is that there seems to be other alternatives which provide the desired capabilities, at a lower cost. Furthermore, the realisability and performance of small productionline manufactured nanosatellites is uncertain. However the scenario has shown that there are benefits to the military utility not met by other resources, e.g. the capability to perform surveillance and reconnaissance in operational areas globally without risking violation of the territorial integrity of other states or the lives of military personnel. Since there is a great interest in the technology area and several programmes are ongoing internationally the knowledgebase is assessed to be significantly better in a five year period. Also, the Swedish in depth study of space exploitation is soon to report. Ultra-violet communication has uncertain potential for military utility within the period, but the technology is assessed to have a positive impact on SwAF capability to maintain communications. The theoretical understanding of the area is low It is therefore uncertain if systems can be realized in the time frame. However, if commercial applications are developed, the prospect of military applications might change. In that case UV-communication could be a complement to RF- communication but is not foreseen to replace it. The following technologies were assessed to have negligible potential for military utility; Biomimetic unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) Automated behaviour Analysis Evolutionary Robotics Biomimetic UUV's could be used for covert surveillance and inconspicuous naval reconnaissance missions at sea or in amphibious missions. Even though the report focuses on fishlike propulsion, the military utility of UUV's is assessed to be mostly dependent on the development of advanced automation and learning systems. As of now, we assess other existing technologies as being preferable due to lower cost and less complexity. The performance of UUV's needed for SwAF capabilities are assessed to be far off into the future. Simpler UUV systems could however be used by potential adversaries for monitoring our own base areas and hence the development should be monitored from a protection point of view. Automated behaviour analysis may be of some relevance for increased security screening and surveillance. The primary military utility of the technology will however probably be for international activities and to a lesser extent for increased base security in Sweden. Generally the main applications for this kind of technology are assessed to be for civilian use in public spaces and close to high value areas like airports, important official buildings and other similar objects. Evolutionary Robotics, here restricted to the sub domain Advanced Robotics, has uncertain potential for military utility within the period. In the scenarios studied the technology is assessed to have a positive impact on a broad range of SwAF capabilities. The area is large and inconsistent comprising sub areas that are assessed to have significant potential, but also those that are believed to have negligible potential or where technological obstacles might retard the development. Our evaluation of the used method shows that there is a risk that the assessment is biased by the participating experts' presumptions and experiences from their own field of research. The scenarios that were chosen do not cover all possible aspects of the technology and their possible contribution to operational capabilities. It should be stressed that we have assessed the ten technologies' military utility in the presented scenarios, not the technology itself. The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition is believed to be good enough for this report, but could be further elaborated in the future. The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and the trade off that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used is believed to provide for a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies under study.

Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two internet based search reports from Recorded Future have been reviewed by staff at the Department of Military- Technology at the Swedish National Defence College (Note that there probably are other technology areas, equally interesting, but not included in this study). The task given by FMV was to assess the military utility of the chosen technologies in a time frame from 2025 to 2030, from a SwAF viewpoint. We assess the military utility of a certain technology, as its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios. The technologies were grouped in three classes; technologies with potentially significant, uncertain or negligible military utility. The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for significant military utility; Alternative fuels High altitude platforms Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Cyber Defence The forecasting and analysis technology described in the report "Future of Cyber Threats" if the tool is combined with advanced artificial intelligence algorithms The following technology was assessed to have uncertain military utility; The forecasting and analysis technology described in the report "Future of Cyber Threats" in its present form The following technology was assessed to have negligible military utility; Walking machines The method used was first to make a summary of each forecast report. The technology was then put into one or more scenarios that are assessed to be the best in order to show possible military utility as well as possibilities and drawbacks of the technologies. Based on a SWOT-analysis, the contribution to SwAF capabilities and the cost in terms of acquisition, C2 footprint, logistic footprint, doctrine/TTP, training, facilities and R&D were assessed. Conclusions regarding the military utility of the technology were drawn. Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that the assessment is biased by the participating experts' presumptions and experiences from their own field of research. The scenarios that were chosen do not cover all aspects of the technology and their possible contribution to operational capabilities. It should be stressed that we have assessed the six technologies' potential military utility within the presented scenarios, not the technology itself. The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition (the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios) has been slightly modified from the one used in the Technology Forecast 2012. It is believed to be good enough for this report, but could be further elaborated in the future. The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and the tradeoff that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used is believed to provide for a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies under study. This report provides executive summaries of the Fraunhofer and Recorded Future reports and helps the SwAF Headquarter to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios. Given the limited quantitative base (only 2 reports) for assessing the potential value of using the tool Temporal Analytics™ used by Recorded Future, our conclusion is nevertheless that the overall value of using the tool for technology forecasting is rather poor. Our assessment is that Recorded Future at present can't be used as an alternative to the Fraunhofer Institute. Overall, the quality of the Fraunhofer reports is considered to be balanced and of a high level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies. In the case of Recorded Future's technology forecast, the sources that are relevant for making military predictions are considered to be ill-suited for aggregation in the form the tool in focus, Temporal Analytics™, provides. The tool requires further development to fit military purposes. Further use of Recorded Future in the technology forecast process is therefore not recommended, at least not until the tool has been combined with advanced artificial intelligence algorithms. We propose that the Department of Military Technology at SNDC could be involved in the early phase of the Technology Forecast process giving support to FMV in choosing which technology areas that should be selected to be studied by the Fraunhofer Institute within the framework of the Technology Forecast project (Teknisk Prognos).