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On September 5, 2012 the inaugural meeting of the European Parliamentary Working Group on Risk (WGR) took place in the European Parliament in Brussels. It is chaired by Mrs. Julie Girling (U.K. Conservative), Member of the European Parliament (MEP), and involves some 10–12 other MEPs representing a wide array of European political parties from across the EU member state countries, including Sweden, the Netherlands, and Hungary. The WGR is supported by a small secretariat reporting directly to Julie Girling MEP. In this background article of WGR, I discuss the background to why WGR was set up, the remit of the committee, and some of its possible future plans. I do this very much in a personal capacity, having suggested the formation of the committee in the first place and persuaded Mrs. Girling to chair it.

This article begins with a review of the regulation of chemicals in Sweden over the past 30 years, focusing particularly on the 1997 Government Environmental Quality Bill, which called for a toxic‐free society by the year 2020. The second part of the article analyzes why Sweden has taken this route. The third and final section discusses Sweden's present role in formulating present EU chemical regulation, such as the recent EU Chemical White Paper, and hypothesizes future impacts of Swedish chemical regulations on the EU itself.

This report has highlighted some of the unique features of the UK's risk management policy. These are largely the products of its historic development: public inquiries came about following Enclosure of agricultural land, the consensual style of regulation has its roots in 19th century England, and the ALARP principle is based on the 'best practical means' principle first put forward in 1842. Along with other aspects of the UK regulatory system these processes have been the main influences on UK energy risk management. However, the role of the EU in determining the UK's regulatory system is steadily increasing and it is likely that, in the medium-term, several of these approaches will decline in importance or disappear all together. In view of this development it is nevertheless important that the positive aspects of the UK process are not lost and that the negative aspects are not repeated by other countries seeking to rationalise their approaches to managing energy risks.

Nanotechnologies operate at atomic, molecular, and macromolecular scales, at scales where matter behaves differently than at larger scales and quantum effects can dominate. Nanotechnologies have captured the imagination of science fiction writers as science, engineering, and industry have leapt to the challenge of harnessing them. Applications are proliferating. In contrast, despite recent progress the regulatory landscape is not yet coherent, and public awareness of nanotechnology remains low. This has led risk researchers and critics of current nanotechnology risk communication efforts to call for proactive strategies that do more than address facts, that include and go beyond the public participation stipulated by some government acts. A redoubling of nanotechnology risk communication efforts could enable consumer choice and informed public discourse about regulation and public investments in science and safety.

European and U.S. regulatory policies have changed considerably over the past 30 years. In Europe, since the mid‐1980s, consumer and environmental regulation has become more politically salient and regulations have by and large become stricter. On the other hand, in the United States consumer and environmental issues have become less salient and contentious, and regulations have not become (comparatively) stricter. This apparent "flip‐flop" of regulatory systems has not been analyzed in much detail to date. This perspective is an attempt to analyze some examples in which it has occurred and identifies one possible cause—namely, credibility.Commentary Ortwin Renn, p.406Commentary David Slater, p.410Commentary Michael D. Rogers, p.412

This perspective piece uses the theories and ideas of risk communication to shed light on the reasons why the proposed dumping of Brent Spar in the U.K. offshore waters caused such an international uproar. We postulate that the Brent Spar crisis is a classic example of risk communication gone wrong. Had the sinking of the storage buoy not been amplified by the media and the environmental group Greenpeace, and had not the U.K. Government nor Shell come across as distrustful it would probably have taken place without any public notice. We examine some of the main reasons why Greenpeace succeeded in its risk communication and Shell/the U.K. Government failed. We conclude with a discussion concerning some of the risk communication lessons learned from this crisis.