Suchergebnisse

SummaryThis paper assesses the relative impact of work for money or work for passion on Norwegian artists by examining artists' labor supply. Our contribution is twofold. The first is to test the work‐preference model and the second is to investigate the impact of arts grants on artists' labor supply. The empirical specification draws two distinctions: between arts and non‐arts income and between labor and non‐labor income. Non‐labor income is divided into three different sources: (1) spouse's income, (2) income from financial assets and social benefits, and (3) arts grants and subsidies. Our contribution adds to the literature by estimating the significance of these various income sources on the time allocated to arts work, non‐arts work, and leisure. The results provide convincing evidence for the work‐preference model, and ad hoc evidence shows that art grants have a significant positive effect on the supply of arts hours. This finding supports arts policy and shows the impact of art grants on artists' motivation to work on their arts. The causality of wages on supply is demonstrated by estimating the effects of wage shocks (grants) on arts labor supply using fixed‐effect and difference‐in‐difference methods.

AbstractThis paper demonstrates how tax administrations can evaluate future compliance gains from risk‐based tax enforcement that audits all taxpayers above a risk threshold. Expanding tax enforcement in this setting means reducing the audit threshold. The compliance gains from such an expansion consist of a mechanical audit correction effect and a behavioural effect that reflects changes in self‐reporting in the subsequent years. We estimate this behavioural effect in a regression discontinuity analysis with the risk score as the forcing variable. We find that taxpayers at the margin had a significant reduction in self‐reported deductions in the next years' tax filing. The behavioural effect over a three‐year post‐audit period is estimated to be of a magnitude similar to that of the direct adjustment of the audit. This compliance effect does not change when we include the reporting of the spouse. We find that the risk score threshold that maximizes net public revenue from the audits is considerably below current practice.