Suchergebnisse

It is widely believed that the lack of bipartisanship between the executive and legislative branches in the United States is deleterious to policy making. However, a divided government is perhaps more productive than a unified government because it can facilitate electoral gains for the minority party. Policy created by a divided government can be seen as the collaborative outcome of the majority and minority parties, but that of a unified government is perceived as the exclusive work of the majority party. Further, successful policy making on the part of the unified government could have the effect of compromising the minority party's brand. Thus, the minority party has more incentive to negotiate with the majority party and participate in policy making in a divided government. To the extent that party brand name assumes greater importance in elections in a polarized political system, a divided government could be more conducive to policy making than a unified government.

It is widely believed that "fire alarm" oversight (i.e., reactive oversight that responds to the complaints of interest groups) rather than "police patrol" oversight (i.e., precautionary congressional surveillance), better promotes the performance of government agencies by efficiently reducing bureaucratic moral hazard. However, fire alarm oversight can lead to bureaucrats being falsely accused by interest groups who provide biased information to members of Congress of failure to properly implement a policy, thereby causing an unnecessary administrative delay in public management. This article suggests a formal model that compares fire alarm and police patrol oversight and examines the development of congressional oversight mechanisms in the United States.

In the context of regulatory decisions, the political conflict between executive and legislative branches has been significant. The relative ideological stances and power resources of federal agencies and Congress determines regulation outcomes. In particular, when agencies earn sufficient political support from policy stakeholders by relying on procedural justice, they are able to secure the regulatory outcomes they desire without congressional intervention. Because legislators are highly concerned about their reelection prospects, policy stakeholders` political support is an important power resource for agencies. Legislators are likely to embrace regulatory decisions made by agencies supported by policy stakeholders even if they disregard congressional preferences. This article provides evidence for this proposition by reviewing media concentration regulation policies of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.

This article examines the effect of participatory governance on policy performance in the United States, which is shaped by external and internal factors related to transaction cost. Externally, if transaction-cost-related policy conditions are uncertain-thereby increasing transaction cost-the effect of participatory governance on policy performance is less positive. Internally, noninstitutionalized participatory governance methods (e.g., public meetings) are less effective than institutionalized ones in improving policy performance (e.g., advisory committees). In addition, these internal and external factors affect the choice of participatory governance methods by government agencies: agencies are more likely to employ institutionalized participatory governance methods under low-transaction-cost policy conditions.

Many public administration studies have argued that agency network activity brings about important policy benefits such as informational advantages and stakeholder support. Given the proposition, agency network activity would positively affect congressional delegation because policymaking authority tends to be delegated to the agencies that can achieve appropriate policy outcomes. This hypothesis is examined by several regression tests using data from U.S. federal agencies. Statistical results indicate that the agencies with significant network ties are likely to yield more appropriate public policies and have greater statutory discretion.

AbstractKorean political parties have been organizationally unstable for decades, even after 1987 when a democratic transition from authoritarian military-based politics was achieved. Many studies have argued that the instability has been caused by the Confucian culture of Korean politics. This paper suggests a different view of the political phenomenon: Korean party instability has been due to the 'cue-chasing behaviors' of self-interested politicians, rather than Confucian morality. This study examines the proposition with a historical exploration of Korean political parties between 1987 and 2012.

If there is no expert but bureaucracy in a policy area, expertise may be sufficient for an agency to acquire its discretion. However, it is hard for an agency as an expert to have monopolistic status in any policy area, due to the growth of interest groups. Delegation in recent decades depends not only on its expertise, but also on the other bureaucratic capability to affect the behaviors of the outside experts. Even the most expert agencies cannot maintain their discretionary authorities without sufficient political capacities to affect the behaviors of interest groups. In particular, "brokerage capacity" that allows agencies to link interest groups and to resolve their interest conflicts, has become important in bureaucratic discretion. By mediating conflicts of interest and minimizing unnecessary contingencies, agencies are able to reduce interest groups' incentives to provide information to the legislature, thereby indirectly affecting legislators' decisions on delegation and oversight.

Although several legislative gridlock models have produced different results in terms of legislative gridlock under divided government, these studies have neglected contingent party pressures. This paper suggests an alternative contingent party pressure model. The main result of this model is that legislative gridlock is affected by the interactions of issue salience and government types. High issue salience increases legislative gridlock under unified government and, in contrast, decreases under divided government. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]