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Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction Agency Design in American Politics -- I. Separation of Powers and the Design of Administrative Agencies -- 2. Moving from Insulation in Theory to Insulation in Reality -- 3. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design -- 4. Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative Influence -- 5. Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative and Legislative Influence -- 6. Political Insulation and Policy Durability -- Conclusion What the Politics of Agency Design Tells Us About American Politics -- Appendix A: Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set -- Appendix B: Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Event File -- Appendix C: Agency Data and the Possibility of Sample Selection Bias in Model Estimates -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Politicization in theory and practice -- The nature and history of the modern personnel system -- Why, when, and where do presidents politicize the bureaucracy? -- The pattern of politicization : a quantitative overview -- The pattern of politicization : a closer quantitative analysis -- Politicization and performance : the case of the Federal Emergency Management Agency -- Politicization and performance : the larger pattern -- Learning the lessons of politicization

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many questioned whether the large number of political appointees in the Federal Emergency Management Agency contributed to the agency's poor handling of the catastrophe, ultimately costing hundreds of lives and causing immeasurable pain and suffering. The Politics of Presidential Appointments examines in depth how and why presidents use political appointees and how their choices impact government performance--for better or worse. One way presidents can influence the permanent bureaucracy is by filling key posts with people who are sympathetic to their poli.

During a presidential election year, public attention naturally turns toward candidates and campaigns. The best prepared candidates, however, are thinking beyond voting day toward postelection planning. The task of transitioning to become president is enormous. On the personnel side, a new president will have to fill between 3,000 and 4,000 positions. In this article I review the current state of presidential personnel politics. I review the choices confronting presidents and how the personnel process is changing. I conclude by making suggestions for reforming the personnel system equally applicable to either party's candidate for the presidency in 2012.

This article reviews some recent advances in research on presidential appointments and personnel. I focus specifically on research analyzing changes in the institutional environment of presidential personnel, how presidents make decisions about whom to appoint, and the effects of presidential appointees on outputs. I explore what we know about how presidents have worked to change institutions surrounding presidential personnel by increasing the number of appointees and augmenting White House personnel operations. I examine how presidents decide what factors to value when choosing personnel. When do presidents value loyalty, competence, campaign support, or other characteristics of potential appointees? Finally, I examine the effects of appointees on outputs. What influence do appointees have over outputs and why do some have more influence than others? I describe the general trajectory of research in each area as well as seine emerging issues confronting scholars in the areas. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper I review the causes and consequences of key changes in the federal personnel system in the modern presidency. I first describe the contours of this system at the end of the Truman Administration and the problem the system created for presidents. I then detail three changes to this system that emerged in response to the insularity of the civil service at mid-century. I conclude by reviewing how changes in the personnel system influence presidential efforts to control and manage the administrative state. I note how the short-term incentives of presidents to get control can lead to long-term difficulties in controlling that state.

In this paper I review the causes and consequences of key changes in the federal personnel system in the modern presidency. I first describe the contours of this system at the end of the Truman Administration and the problem the system created for presidents. I then detail three changes to this system that emerged in response to the insularity of the civil service at mid-century. I conclude by reviewing how changes in the personnel system influence presidential efforts to control and manage the administrative state. I note how the short-term incentives of presidents to get control can lead to long-term difficulties in controlling that state. Adapted from the source document.

This paper argues that we should revisit the common assumptions in the administrative presidency literature about political appointments. Specifically, it contests the notions that presidential politicization of the executive branch is intended only to enhance political control of the bureaucracy and is successful at doing so. Instead, the author argues that politicization choices are driven by patronage concerns, and politicization of the bureaucracy ultimately can make it harder for presidents to control the bureaucracy. The paper illustrates how one might theorize more generally about patronage politics in the White House and the impact of appointments on performance.