Suchergebnisse

The paper presents the etymology and interpretation of a personal name, twtyxs MLK', found on the coins of the Khwarezmian kings.

AbstractThe "Ancient Letters" is a conventional term applied to a group of Sogdian paper documents (five letters and a number of fragments) found by Aurel Stein in 1907, in the remains of a watch-tower on the Chinese frontier wall. The letters were written, most likely, in the first decades of the 4th century A.D. The "Ancient Letters" are the earliest Sogdian handwritten texts and the oldest available paper documents.The author presents the translations of the first and third letters dictated by a woman named Mēwnāi (lit. "tiger cub"), whose husband Nanaidāt (lit. "Created by goddess Nanai") had left her in Tun-huang.

AbstractThe article deals with the Parthian lexical elements of East Iranian (Sogdian) origin in the Armenian language. The author gives a general outline of the problem and provides several new identifications.

Principle shortcomings of Russian and foreign practice of realizing large investment projects are analyzed in the article. The reasons for systematic underestimating risks and overestimating advantages of such projects that determine their inefficiency are revealed. The necessity of investment decisions project presentation and evaluation of their efficiency is proved. The state of Russian methodic base for evaluating investment efficiency is considered. Stereotype economic and methodic delusions of investment projecting practice that lead to serious mistakes are shown.

This paper offers a simple theory of inefficiently lax financial regulation arising as an outcome of a democratic political process. Lax financial regulation encourages some banks to issue risky residential mortgages. In the event of an adverse aggregate housing shock, these banks fail. When banks do not fully internalize the losses from such failure (due to limited liability), they offer mortgages at less than actuarially fair interest rates. This opens the door to home ownership for young, low net-worth individuals. In turn, the additional demand from these new home-buyers drives up house prices. This leads to a non-trivial distribution of gains and losses from lax regulation among households. On the one hand, renters and individuals with large non-housing wealth suffer from the fragility of the banking system. On the other hand, some young, low net-worth households are able to get a mortgage and buy a house, and current (old) home-owners benefit from the increase in the price of their houses. When these latter two groups, who benefit from the lax regulation, constitute a majority of the voting population, then regulatory failure can be an outcome of the democratic political process.