Suchergebnisse

THIS ARTICLE CONTRIBUTES TO THE "BUREAUCRATIC-CENTERED IMAGE OF GOVERNANCE" RESEARCH PROGRAM ADVOCATED BY HILL (1991). IT EXAMINES POLITICAL THOUGH ABOUT BUREAUCRACY DURING AMERICA'S FORMATIVE PERIOD, MAKING THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT THAT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT THE FOUNDERS IS WRONG: WHAT IS NOW CALLED BUREAUCRACY WAS QUITE IMPORTANT TO THEIR THINKING. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA WITHIN WHICH THEY ANALYZED BUREAUCRACY WAS RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESENT SCHEMA. THIS DIFFERENCE ILLUMINATES IMPORTANT ATTRIBUTES OF CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE POWER OF BUREAUCRACY. THESE THEMES ARE EXPLORED BY EXAMINING THREE WORKS COMPRISING THE CANON OF THE REPUBLICAN SYNTHESIS, A RECENT INTERPRETATION OF REVOLUTIONARY AND IMMEDIATE POSTREVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL THOUGHT.

Discusses a test using US state data for the FY77-FY82 period. Little support is found for the expectation that reliance on illusion tools influences revenue yield. (Abstract amended)

Assesses whether state and state-local revenue systems are more or less equitable, responsive to economic changes, complex, and centralized than they were prior to 1978 by examining state and state-local revenue systems from 1977 to 1982. (Original abstract--Amended)

THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PROPOSITION THAT POLITICIANS MANIPULATE FISCAL POLICY FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IS LARGELY UNTESTED. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, SUCH MANIPULATION IS ONLY ASSUMED TO OCCUR ON THE BASIS OF OBSERVED MOVEMENTS IN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT. AND THE FEW DIRECT TESTS OF THE MANIPULATION HYPOTHESIS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY LIMITED CONSIDERATION OF THE FULL POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE, INADEQUATE CONTROL FOR NONPOLITICAL STABLIZATION POLICY, AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS. THIS PAPER CONSTRUCTS SEVERAL MODELS OF POLITICAL FISCAL POLICY, INCORPORATES THEM INTO A SIMPLE MODEL OF KEYNESIAN STABILIZATION POLICY, AND TESTS THE COMBINED MODELS USING U.S. BUDGET SURPLUS /DEFICIT DATA THE RESULTS PROVIDE LITTLE SUPPORT FOR EITHER THE ELECTORAL MOTIVATION OR PARTISAN DIFFERENCES INTERPRETATIONS OF THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS FOR THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE LITERATURE, LONG-TERM ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, AND DEFICIT-DIRECTED PROPOSALS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ARE DISCUSSED.

THIS PAPER APPLIES PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS TO PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT ADMINISTRATION, A LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE WITH POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS QUITE UNLIKE THOSE COMMONLY EXAMINED, TO ASSESS THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE MODEL AND THE GENERALIZABILITY OF ITS USUAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.