Suchergebnisse

AbstractThere are several aspects to reviewing the role of punishment in ensuring greater respect for international humanitarian law. First, there is the question of improving compliance with the law, second, the focus on the punishment itself and, third, the characteristics of the perpetrators. The situation of armed groups is dealt with separately. The article also examines transitional justice as an accompanying measure and the problem of how to take care of the victims. Finally, suggestions are presented which could help the parties concerned in the establishment of a system of sanctions capable of having a lasting influence on the conduct of weapon bearers so as to obtain greater respect for international humanitarian law.

There are several aspects to reviewing the role of punishment in ensuring greater respect for international humanitarian law. First, there is the question of improving compliance with the law, second, the focus on the punishment itself and, third, the characteristics of the perpetrators. The situation of armed groups is dealt with separately. The article also examines transitional justice as an accompanying measure and the problem of how to take care of the victims. Finally, suggestions are presented which could help the parties concerned in the establishment of a system of sanctions capable of having a lasting influence on the conduct of weapon bearers so as to obtain greater respect for international humanitarian law. Adapted from the source document.

This article looks at the role of humanitarian organizations in the context of judicial procedures in a global environment which was modified by the establishment of international criminal courts. It shows the struggles and tensions that humanitarian organizations face when, on the one hand, they bring assistance and protection to victims of armed conflicts and other situations of violence and, on the other hand, they contribute to the fight against impunity in cases of grave violations of international humanitarian law. The author suggests some elements of an operational framework which should contribute to the achievement of these difficult-to-reconcile objectives.

Les Tribunaux pénaux internationaux, créés par le Conseil de sécurité en 1993' et 1994, sont en voie de démontrer que la répression internationale des violations graves du droit international humanitaire n'est plus un concept relevant de la seule théorie. Vingt et un accusés et suspects ont été transférés au siège du Tribunal d'Arusha; deux jugements portant condamnation ont été prononcés par le Tribunal de La Haye. Non seulement ces Tribunaux ont-ils compétence pour poursuivre et juger des personnes présumées responsables de violations graves du droit international humanitaire, mais encore doivent-ils le faire, au regard de leur Statut respectif, en veillant à ce que les normes internationalement reconnues touchant les droits de l'accusé soient pleinement respectées à toutes les phases de l'instance.

Los Tribunales Penales Internacionales, instituidos por el Consejo de Seguridad en 1993 y 1994, están a punto de demostrar que la represión internacional de las violaciones graves del derecho internacional humanitario ha dejado de ser un concepto meramente teórico. Veintiún acusados y sospechosos han sido transferidos a la sede del Tribunal de Arusha, y el Tribunal de La Haya ha dictado dos fallos condenatorios. Estos Tribunales no sólo tienen competencia para perseguir y enjuiciar a los presuntos responsables de violaciones graves del derecho internacional humanitario, sino que, de conformidad con los respectivos Estatutos, deben hacerlo velando por que las normas internacionalmente reconocidas relativas a los derechos del acusado sean plenamente respetadas en todas las fases de las diligencias incoadas.En el artículo 20 de los Estatutos del Tribunal para Ruanda y en el artículo 21 de los Estatutos del Tribunal para ex Yugoslavia, que reproducen el contenido de las disposiciones del artículo 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, seenumeran pormenorizadamente los derechos de que puede beneficiarse la persona acusada.

The two International Criminal Tribunals set up by the United Nations Security Council in 19931 and 19942 are in the process of demonstrating that international repression of serious violations of international humanitarian law is no longer a purely theoretical concept. A total of 21 persons charged with or suspected of committing such breaches have been transferred to the seat of the Arusha Tribunal, and two judgments sentencing the defendants to prison terms have been handed down by the Hague Tribunal. The two Tribunals are competent to hear cases against persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law, but in so doing they are also required, under their respective Statutes, to ensure that the internationally recognized rules relating to the rights of the accused are fully respected at all stages of the proceedings. Article 20 of the Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda and Article 21 of that of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, modelled on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, enumerate in detail the rights that must be accorded to every accused person.

AbstractWhile it is widely accepted that punishing the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law is an important instrument in improving compliance with the law, little research has been done into the obligations on armed groups to impose sanctions and their possibilities for doing so. This article discusses characteristics of armed groups that influence their willingness and ability to comply with international humanitarian law and to punish those of their members who commit violations. It takes a holistic approach to these sanctions, and analyses the different methods of punishing members of armed groups, including disciplinary sanctions, penal sanctions imposed by the state and penal sanctions imposed by the group itself.

While it is widely accepted that punishing the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law is an important instrument in improving compliance with the law, little research has been done into the obligations on armed groups to impose sanctions and their possibilities for doing so. This article discusses characteristics of armed groups that influence their willingness and ability to comply with international humanitarian law and to punish those of their members who commit violations. It takes a holistic approach to these sanctions, and analyses the different methods of punishing members of armed groups, including disciplinary sanctions, penal sanctions imposed by the state and penal sanctions imposed by the group itself. Adapted from the source document.

Any body or institution dealing with the missing persons issue will interact in one way or another with transitional justice proceedings, if only to examine the possibility of sharing relevant information gathered. The question becomes even more acute when international tribunals intervene in the national context where transitional justice mechanisms are operating. The authors look at the ways in which transitional justice mechanisms may support the right of families to know the fate of their relatives, and how work to resolve the missing persons issue can be reconciled with an effective fight against impunity.

AbstractThis article examines the different types of mechanisms which can contribute to addressing the issue of the missing, including providing answers on the fate and whereabouts of missing persons. It looks in detail at one approach that the authors have observed in the field. It argues that an approach based on humanitarian objectives which does not look into who is responsible for the disappearance, with proper management of confidential information, could be a powerful instrument for searching for and collecting relevant information on the missing in certain contexts. The article also proposes avenues for further research, with a view to enhancing the global capacity to provide meaningful answers for the missing and their families.