Suchergebnisse

The editors of this special issue asked Todd LaPorte to reflect on the issues that emerge from the discussions in this special issue and, more in general, from the discussions that have proliferated in the wake of recent crises and disasters. In his contribution, Professor LaPorte contemplates what political leaders can do to prepare for catastrophic surprises. A crucial initiative, he argues, would be the initiation of a public discussion about the level of distress that a society is willing to accept in the pursuit of efficient, reliable critical infrastructures.

The events of September 11, 2001, have raised troubling questions regarding the reliability and security of American commercial air travel. This article applies the concepts and logic of high–reliability organizations to airport security operations. Contemporary decision theory is built on the logic of limited or buffered rationability and is based on the study of error–tolerant organizations. The concept of high–reliability organizations is based on the study of nearly error–free operations. For commercial air travel to be highly secure, there must be very high levels of technical competence and sustained performance; regular training; structure redundancy; collegial, decentralized authority patterns; processes that reward error discovery and correction; adequate and reliable funding; high mission valence; reliable and timely information; and protection from external interference in operations. These concepts are used to inform early–stage issues being faced by both local airports and the newly established Transportation Security Administration.

Field research conducted by the High Reliability Organization (HRO) Project at the U of California, Berkeley, is drawn on to examine the challenges of this type of experimental organization. Primarily utilized by organizations that operate hazardous high technology intensive systems, HROs are designed to avoid services operation failures. Operating challenges involve managing complex, demanding technologies, making sure to avoid major failures that could cripple & perhaps destroy the organization, & maintenance of the capacity for meeting periods of peak demand & production whenever they occur. It is concluded that without an improved theoretical understanding & changes in conventional organizational wisdom, there are likely to be unexpected, subtle, & unpredictable consequences from the introduction of powerful & demanding new technical systems into complex HROs of scale. 103 References. H. L. Stidger