Suchergebnisse

In this chapter we outline the nature of the tariff-cutting rules and exceptions under consideration in the Doha Round and their implications for market access. Because they are very different in their details, we outline the agricultural proposals first and then those for nonagricultural market access. We focus on the December 2008 proposals that were under discussion when the negotiations collapsed and have not subsequently been modified, although negotiators could choose an alternative starting point if the negotiations were renegotiated. We consider the political costs of securing agreement under proportional tariff cuts and the key tariff-cutting approaches in the latest Doha proposals. ; PR ; IFPRI1; A Ensuring Sustainable food production; C Improving markets and trade; D Transforming Agriculture; CRP2 ; MTID; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

In this paper, we provide an overview of the agricultural trade negotiations within the current World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and we show that including agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda talks is important both economically and politically, although the political resistance to reform is particularly strong in this sector. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; Theme 2; Subtheme 2.1; GRP2 ; MTID

The aim of this paper is to assess of the impact of the European Union's trade preferences on global trade, focusing on several methodological issues that are relevant to the trade-creating impact of these preferences. Using highly disaggregated eight-digit data in a theoretically grounded gravity model framework, we define an explicit measure of preferential tariff margins computed on alternative definitions based on a comparison between bilateral applied tariffs and two different reference levels: the most favored nation duty and a constant elasticity of substitution price aggregator. From the methodological point of view, we show that assessing the impact of these policies can be very sensitive to the definition of the preferential tariff margin. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; CRP2; C.1 Macroeconomics, trade and non-agricultural policies ; MTID; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

This article provides a detailed analysis of the trade-related aspects of economic partnership agreement (EPA) negotiations for the six Africa–Caribbean–Pacific (ACP) negotiation groups including ECOWAS, CEMAC+, COMESA, SADC, CARIFORUM and Pacific. We use a partial equilibrium model—focusing on the demand side—at the HS6 level (covering 5,113 HS6 products). Two lists of sensitive products are constructed: focusing on the agricultural sectors and tariff revenue preservation. For the European Union (EU), EPAs must translate into 90% fully liberalised bilateral trade to be World Trade Organisation compatible. We use this criterion to simulate EPAs for each negotiating regional block. ACP exports to the EU are forecast to be 10% higher with EPAs, than under the generalised system of preference 'Everything But Arms' option. ACP countries, especially African ones, are forecast to lose an average of 71% of tariff revenues on EU imports in the long run. Imports from other regions of the world will continue to provide tariff revenues. Thus, if we compute tariff revenue losses on total ACP imports, losses are only 25% on average over the long run and as low as 19% if the product lists are optimised. The final impact depends on the importance of tariffs in government revenue and on potential compensatory effects. However, this long-term and less visible effect will depend mainly on the capacity of each ACP country to reorganise its fiscal base. ; ISI; IFPRI3 ; MTID ; PR

To what extent would a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), along the lines of the modalities in the Revised Draft Modalities paper of May 19, 2008, require further changes in the Common Agricultural Policy? Will those changes be made easier by corresponding disciplines on the domestic programs of other countries? How much increased market access is likely to be generated as a result of cuts in tariffs that would be required of the EU? Can the EU expect to expand its own exports of agricultural products as a result of the tariff cuts of others? Will the termination of the EU's use of export subsidies to balance its internal market have any significant impact on price levels and on world market conditions? And to what extent will the modification of the export policies of competitors help the EU to move away from export subsidies? What other issues will the EU insist on as it moves towards a package that is acceptable to Member States? This paper attempts to address these issues, as a way of exploring the domestic and international implications of a Modalities agreement. The first section of the paper gives some background information on the nature of the CAP as it relates to the disciplines introduced in the URAA. This section is useful to give some perspective on the potential impact of the DDA as it relates to the recent development of the CAP. A second section reviews briefly the main "offensive" and "defensive" positions of the EU, so as to be able to evaluate the extent to which the modalities draft addresses these issues. This perspective is relevant to the political reactions that will determine the acceptability of the Modalities. The next three sections discuss in more detail the implications of the domestic support, market access and export competition modalities, and give an interpretation of the WTO disciplines as a constraint on future policy developments. A final section attempts an overall assessment of the impacts of the suggested modalities on the EU and on its negotiating interests. -- from authors' abstract ; Non-PR ; IFPRI2; GRP2; Globalization, retail food industries, and trade; Markets and Trade ; MTID

In response to the Ukraine-Russia crisis, as it was the case in previous crisis (e.g.COVID19 pandemic), some governments have implemented export restrictions and other trade policy measures to secure their food supply and protect inputs for their farmers. This behavior can increase global food prices, with consequences including the exacerbation of hunger and income losses for producers in exportrestricting countries. Intergovernmental organizations and other actors need current information on food trade policy to curb detrimental reactive policy and enable cooperation. To address this need, we provide the Food & Fertilizer Export Restriction Tracker, an extension of the previous work of food trade policy tracking done during COVID-19 pandemic. Gathering data from sources including the media, national governments, expert input, we provide up-to-date information on food trade policies implemented during the crisis and the likely magnitude of their effects. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry ; MTID

After 50 years of success, multilateral trade liberalization, conducted under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is in a deadlock, as illustrated by the impasse in which the Doha Round is for almost 20 years. Many explanations have been advanced. Let us quote three of them. First, there are many trading partners involved in the negotiation and their interests are too heterogeneous, such that there is no outcome benefiting all parties (Bouët and Laborde, 2010). Second the welfare gains expected from a new round of multilateral trade liberalization are small compared to the internal redistributive effects that it may imply (Rodrik, 1994). Third, there is asymmetric information not only between policymakers and the producers they want to protect from income variation, but also between trade negotiators at WTO about the political influence of domestic producers in each country. This double informational asymmetry gives birth to informational rents and makes difficult the implementation of free trade (Bouët, Laborde and Martimort, 2020). ; Non-PR ; IFPRI4; CRP2; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry ; MTID; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

An additional USD 10 billion is urgently needed to prevent millions more people from becoming food insecure as a result of COVID-19. USD 5 billion of this must come from donor governments as aid, with the rest provided by developing countries themselves. Without funding for social protection programs providing food or money to people in developing countries, decades of progress in tackling hunger could be wiped out by the end of this year, with longstanding consequences. ; IFPRI5; Ceres2030; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all ; MTID ; Non-PR

Export restrictions are trade measures that are permanently adopted by countries throughout the world.1 Piermartini (2004) noted that approximately one-third of World Trade Organization (WTO) members impose export duties. Examples are export taxes implemented by Indonesia on palm oil, by Madagascar on vanilla, coffee, pepper, and cloves, by Pakistan on raw cotton, by the Philippines on copra and coconut oil, by Indonesia on palm oil, and by the European Union on wheat (Bouët and Laborde 2010; OECD 2010). What are the effects of such policy measures? And why do governments restrict exports in times of food crisis? ; PR ; IFPRI1; A Ensuring Sustainable food production; C Improving markets and trade; D Transforming Agriculture; CRP2; COVID-19 Food Trade Policy Tracker ; MTID; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

In a context of rising protectionist rhetoric, this paper looks at the potential impact of trade wars initiated by a change in US trade policies. We show that such trade wars can hurt emerging countries and damage the global trading system without bringing gains for the United States. We use a static multicountry, multisector Armington trade model to evaluate 6 modalities of 3 potential trade wars—for a total of 18 scenarios—between the United States and China, between the United States and Mexico, and between the United States and both China and Mexico. We also determine and analyze the optimal noncooperative unilateral tariff that the US government can implement against all of its trading partners. In each case, we evaluate various forms of trade retaliation by the trading partner(s): the same level of import duty as the one imposed by the United States, a duty that minimizes welfare loss, a duty that minimizes terms-of-trade deterioration, a duty that generates the same amount of collected revenue, and finally, a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that there is no scenario in which the US government augments its domestic welfare or gross domestic product. There may be sectoral gains in value-added in the United States, but they are small and to the detriment of other sectors. Although losses for China are relatively small, potential losses for the Mexican economy are significant. There are also potential free riders of these trade wars, particularly in Central America. Finally, the way in which trade retaliations are designed matters greatly. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; CRP2; C Improving markets and trade ; MTID; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

This report studies the current condition of competition in the European Union's fertilizer market, and its impact on fertilizers prices. A review of literature shows that prices of fertilizers in Western European countries increased by 123% between 1970 and 2002, while prices in other countries like Brazil decreased by 65%; it also shows that increased concentration is correlated with higher prices or, alternatively, more competition is associated with lower prices. Economic theory suggests that an elimination of European customs and anti-dumping ("import duties") on fertilizers will lead to a loss for European fertilizer producers, a gain for European farmers, a loss of public revenues, and a decrease of the degree of concentration in the sector. Based on a partial equilibrium model calibrated on recent data characterizing the world and EU fertilizer markets, this report evaluates the potential impact of an elimination of import duties on the conditions of competition in the EU market, including the impact on concentration and fertilizer prices, and an estimation of the overall net welfare effect associated with an elimination of import duties; this includes an assessment of the consumer surplus for EU agricultural producers and a potential for the additional job creation in EU agriculture. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; C Improving markets and trade ; MTID

IFPRI3; CRP2 ; MTID; PIM ; PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

In 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a highly ambitious program of multilateral liberalization. Eight years later, concluding the negotiations is uncertain, though an opportunity still exists. Since 2001, many proposals on market access have been brought to the negotiating table by the E.U., the United States, and the G-20. Because it is politically and economically acceptable to many parties, the final December 2008 package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula to reduce agricultural market access tariffs has increased, but flexibilities added to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The December 2008 package would reduce these average tariffs by 25 percent, a reduction very close to the one implied by the Harbinson and Girard proposals of 2003. This has to be compared with the 73 percent reduction in world agricultural protection by the very ambitious 2005 U.S. proposal. The 2005 G-20 and E.U. proposals were intermediate outcomes. The December 2008 package implies a reduction of agricultural protection by 6 percentage points in high-income countries and 0.5 percentage points in middle-income countries. If the U.S. proposal had been applied, these figures would have been 12.4 and 4.7, respectively. Different scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroding preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP2 ; MTID

"We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments' objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain." --from authors' abstract ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP2 ; MTID