From 1947–1972, the Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) program transformed Canada's High Arctic. This article focuses on Canada's aspirations to "Canadianize" the joint program from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. Both Canada and the United States questioned the extent and form of American involvement in the JAWS program intermittently over 25 years of joint operations. Was Canadianization of these remote weather stations necessary or practical? This article concludes that, in retrospect, the conventional, dominant narrative that emphasizes the ongoing American threat to Canada's Arctic sovereignty seems misplaced with respect to the JAWS story.
This article critically interrogates the assumptions and critiques levelled at the Canadian Rangers by two ardent media critics: Robert Smol and Scott Gilmore. Situating the Canadian Rangers in the Canadian Armed Forces' Arctic Operational Picture, it argues that the Rangers are an appropriate and operationally valued component of a Canadian military posture designed to address Northern risks across the defence-security-safety mission spectrum. Rather than seeing the Rangers as a sideline to the "serious" military show that Smol and Gilmore would like to see play out in the North, their proven ability to operate in difficult and austere environmental conditions – often reflecting applied Indigenous knowledge of their homelands – and to maintain interoperability with mission partners to address practical security challenges is highly valuable. By serving as the "Eyes, Ears, and Voice" of the CAF in their communities, the Rangers embody federal approaches to collaboration and partnership predicated on ideas that Northerners are best placed to make decisions in areas that impact them.
In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 22-29
Scholars typically cast the Oka crisis of August-October 1990 as an example of government aggression against Native Warriors valiantly trying to defend their traditional land from development. When a violent clash between the protestors and the Quebec provincial police led to tragedy, the Canadian Forces were called in to manage a complex internal security operation. This article critically analyzes the CF's involvement during Operation SALON in historical context, and concludes that the military's professionalism, rooted in rigorous training and strong leadership, helps to explain why and how the CF succeeded in "carrying the burden of peace" and restored order without further loss of life. Furthermore, it recounts how, under intense national and international scrutiny, the military won the "media war" for the hearts and minds of most Canadians through its successful media and communications strategy.
This is the first systematic account of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS), a collaborative science program between Canada and the United States that created a distinctive state presence in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago from 1946-1972. These five meteorological stations, constructed at Eureka, Resolute, Isachsen, Mould Bay, and Alert, became remote hubs for science and sovereignty, revealing the possibilities and limits of modernity in the High Arctic. Drawing on extensive archival evidence, unpublished personal memoirs, and interviews with former JAWS personnel, this book systematically analyzes the diplomatic, scientific, social, environmental, and civil-military dimensions of this binational program. From the corridors of power in Washington and Ottawa to everyday life at the small outposts, The Joint Arctic Weather Stations explores delicate statecraft, changing scientific practices, as well as the distinctive station cultures that emerged as humans coped with isolation in polar environments.
Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Artic: An Introduction /Wilfrid Greaves and P. Whitney Lackenbauer --In Search of Polar Sovereignty, 1900-1959 /Peter Kikkert --The Gentlemen's Agreement: Sovereignty, Defence, and Canadian-American Diplomacy in the Arctic /Adam Lajeunesse --Arctic Security and Sovereignty through a Media Lens: From a Pile of Frozen Rocks to the Bottom of the Sea /Mathieu Landriault --Understanding Arctic Security: A Defence of Traditional Security Analysis /Rob Huebert --National Security and the High North: Post-Cold War Arctic Security Policy in Norway /Wilfrid Greaves --Russia and Arctic Security: Inward-Looking Realities /Alexander Sergunin --Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Security and Safety in the Arctic /P. Whitney Lackenbauer --One Arctic? Northern Security in Canada and Norway /Andreas Østhagen --Understanding the Recent History of Energy Security in the Arctic /Petra Dolata --Human Insecurities of Marginalized Peoples in the Arctic: The Cost of Arctic and Nordic Exceptionalism /Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv --Addressing Inequalities in the Arctic: Food Security in Nunavut /Natalia Loukacheva --The Trasformative Power of "Security" Talk /Frank Sejersen --Afterword: Sovereign Futures in an Insecure Arctic /Wilfrid Greaves.
This comparative article reveals how the general focus of Canadian and Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic have shifted from a Cold War fixation on hard defence to accommodate soft security issues over the last three decades. Both countries now pay greater attention to threats and challenges stemming from climate change, security, and safety risks associated with resource development and increasingly accessible sea routes. Although concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes continues to frame some media discussions in both countries, most strategic analysts and academics have moved away from this line of argument. Instead, military functions now include assertion of Canadian and Russian sovereignty over their respective internal waters, as well as protection of resources in their exclusive economic zones and on and in extended continental shelves; protection of economic interests in the North, including mineral and bio-resources; prevention of potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and state infrastructure; and dual-use functions, such as search and rescue operations, surveillance of air and maritime spaces, support to safe navigation, and mitigation of natural and human-made catastrophes. The authors argue that analysts should parse two forms of military modernization in the Arctic: one of capability development related to the global strategic balance, where the Arctic serves as a bastion or a thoroughfare; and a second intended to address emerging non-traditional security challenges. They contend that these modernization programs do not inherently upset the Arctic military balance and need not provoke a regional arms race.
Key issues related to Canada's security and defence agenda, which involve critical and essential infrastructure development, must be considered in the development and implementation of a Canadian Northern Corridor (CNC).
Canada's northern and Arctic security and defence agenda is related to several key policy domains that are relevant from a CNC perspective. These include infrastructure development, climate change, Indigenous sovereignty and natural resource development.
A CNC will gain international attention and be internationally recognized as a strategy for Canada to assert its sovereignty over its Arctic territory, including the internationally disputed Northwest Passage.
The CNC advocates for the inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities. Thus, Indigenous Peoples will also carry a significant role in the monitoring and surveillance of accessibility within and to the North, improved through enhanced infrastructure development.
Canada's investments in Arctic defence infrastructure are modest comparedto those of its Russian and American neighbours. A CNC, potentially adding strategically important infrastructure in the Canadian North, will directly tie into the discourse of Arctic security and power relations.
In addition to natural disasters, the Canadian North is at significant risk of human-made disasters that pose serious prospective challenges for northerners and for federal and territorial governments. The CNC will likely foster the development of surveillance and monitoring assets.
The CNC rights-of-way could trigger security concerns regarding the impactof foreign investment as a security threat, especially if natural resource development is coupled with the development of strategic transportation hubs, such as ports along the coast of the Arctic Ocean.
CNC transportation infrastructure would also become a part of Canada's defence strategy as it forms a potential key asset in the defence and safeguarding of Canada's northern and Arctic regions.
Future research should identify the role of dual-use infrastructure (infrastructure that satisfies both military and civilian purposes) in the CNC context and also examine to what extent security and defence stakeholders should be involved in the CNC's planning and implementation.
Key Messages Key issues related to Canada's security and defence agenda, which involve critical and essential infrastructure development, must be considered in the development and implementation of a Canadian Northern Corridor (CNC). Canada's northern and Arctic security and defence agenda is related to several key policy domains that are relevant from a CNC perspective. These include infrastructure development, climate change, Indigenous sovereignty and natural resource development. A CNC will gain international attention and be internationally recognized as a strategy for Canada to assert its sovereignty over its Arctic territory, including the internationally disputed Northwest Passage. The CNC advocates for the inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities. Thus, Indigenous Peoples will also carry a significant role in the monitoring and surveillance of accessibility within and to the North, improved through enhanced infrastructure development. Canada's investments in Arctic defence infrastructure are modest comparedto those of its Russian and American neighbours. A CNC, potentially adding strategically important infrastructure in the Canadian North, will directly tie into the discourse of Arctic security and power relations. In addition to natural disasters, the Canadian North is at significant risk of human-made disasters that pose serious prospective challenges for northerners and for federal and territorial governments. The CNC will likely foster the development of surveillance and monitoring assets. The CNC rights-of-way could trigger security concerns regarding the impactof foreign investment as a security threat, especially if natural resource development is coupled with the development of strategic transportation hubs, such as ports along the coast of the Arctic Ocean. CNC transportation infrastructure would also become a part of Canada's defence strategy as it forms a potential key asset in the defence and safeguarding of Canada's northern and Arctic regions. Future research should identify the role of dual-use infrastructure (infrastructure that satisfies both military and civilian purposes) in the CNC context and also examine to what extent security and defence stakeholders should be involved in the CNC's planning and implementation.