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AbstractObjectiveWe empirically investigate age and ability as potentially important drivers of individual misconduct in team contests.MethodsWe estimate fixed effects regression models using data from top‐level soccer. In addition, we carry out a comprehensive sensitivity analysis.ResultsOur estimates indicate a significant positive association between a player's age, on the one hand, and his (relative) ability, on the other, with the propensity to misbehave.ConclusionOur results are consistent with social learning theory, in the sense that the high‐status group of players may have learned that the consequences of misbehavior are small and manageable. Furthermore, we demonstrate that misbehavior is costly to both the players and their teams.

AbstractThis study analyses whether the decision to work while sick can be linked to workload fluctuations. Drawing on data collected from professional football, we exploit the dynamics of a season and use additional (national and international) cup games conducted in the second half of a season as a source of exogenous variation. We find robust evidence that players are 6.3 percentage points more likely to return from injuries earlier than expected when their teams are exposed to a high workload. The effect is driven by players who are more important to their teams and those who are less vulnerable to injuries. Finally, we find that presenteeism comes at the cost of an early comeback significantly shortening the time until the next injury by approximately 16 days.

ObjectiveIn this article, we analyze whether firms with market power—measured by their market share—fill top management positions differently than firms with no market power. Market power gives firms the opportunity to share rents with their employees. If these firms or their owners also have a taste for discrimination, they may share their rents in a discriminatory way. Using data from top‐level collegiate athletics, we assess the effect of market power—measured by market share—on the relative employment and wages of female coaches.MethodsTo account for the potential endogeneity of market power and unobserved productivity of female coaches, we exploit the effect of an institutionalized cartel, that is, the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), on a college's athletic department market share. By exploiting particular organizational characteristics of the BCS as an exogenous shock, we establish a causal link between market power and female employment.ResultsOur results show that an increase in the market share has a negative effect on females relative to males among coaches.ConclusionWe interpret this as evidence for Becker's (1957) theory on employer discrimination.

AbstractSocial distancing is important to slow the community spread of infectious disease, but it creates enormous economic and social cost. Thus, it is important to quantify the benefits of different measures. We study the ban of mass gatherings, an intervention with comparably low cost. We exploit exogenous variation in the number of National Basketball Association and National Hockey League games, which arises due to the leagues' predetermined schedules, and the sudden suspension of the 2019–2020 seasons. We find that, among clusters of counties that are adjacent to sports venues, each additional mass gathering increased the cumulative number of COVID‐19 deaths by 10.3%.

We study the effect of the size of the welfare state on family outcomes in OECD member countries. Exploiting exogenous variation in public social spending, due to varying degrees of political fractionalization (i.e. the number of relevant parties involved in the legislative process), we show that an expansion in the welfare state increases the fertility, marriage, and divorce rates with a quantitatively stronger effect on the marriage rate. We conclude that the welfare state supports family formation. Nevertheless, we also find that the welfare state decouples marriage and fertility, and therefore, alters the organization of the family.

We study the effect of the size of the welfare state on family outcomes in OECD member countries. Exploiting exogenous variation in public social spending, due to varying degrees of political fractionalization (i.e. the number of relevant parties involved in the legislative process), we show that an expansion in the welfare state increases the fertility, marriage, and divorce rates with a quantitatively stronger effect on the marriage rate. We conclude that the welfare state supports family formation. Nevertheless, we also find that the welfare state decouples marriage and fertility, and therefore, alters the organization of the family.