Suchergebnisse

Le système politique saoudien se fonde sur un partenariat conclu au xviii e siècle entre princes et oulémas partisans de l'islam dit wahhabite. De son maintien dépend la légitimité religieuse de la famille régnante. Or, dans la seconde moitié du xx e siècle, des tensions sans précédent se sont fait jour entre princes et oulémas, émanant notamment d'une nouvelle génération de clercs contestataires. Ces tensions fragilisent le pouvoir de la famille régnante, en dépit des efforts de cette dernière pour dépolitiser l'islam saoudien.

The Arab Spring has had little visible impact on Saudi Arabia, except in the EasternProvince, where relatively large Shia protests were met with deadly repression.However, it would be a mistake to think that the revolutionary events taking place in theArab world did not spur debate in the remaining segments of Saudi society. SunniIslamists were at the forefront of the debate, as they saw 'comrades' of the sameideological orientation participating in revolutions and seizing power throughout theregion. Most of them agreed that Saudi Arabia needed change, although they wouldquickly disagree on the nature and the extent of it. Still, a significant rapprochementtook place in 2011 and 2012 between Islamists of all backgrounds and non-Islamistpolitical activists around the issue of political reform and the fate of political prisoners.Yet this was short-lived. By 2012, fundamental disagreements on social issues werepulling Islamists and liberals apart, as had been the case since the 1990s. Politicaldissent remained, but on a smaller scale. This did not stop the Saudi government fromtaking drastic measures against the Kingdom's Islamists, especially after the summer of2013.

The Arab Spring has had little visible impact on Saudi Arabia, except in the EasternProvince, where relatively large Shia protests were met with deadly repression.However, it would be a mistake to think that the revolutionary events taking place in theArab world did not spur debate in the remaining segments of Saudi society. SunniIslamists were at the forefront of the debate, as they saw 'comrades' of the sameideological orientation participating in revolutions and seizing power throughout theregion. Most of them agreed that Saudi Arabia needed change, although they wouldquickly disagree on the nature and the extent of it. Still, a significant rapprochementtook place in 2011 and 2012 between Islamists of all backgrounds and non-Islamistpolitical activists around the issue of political reform and the fate of political prisoners.Yet this was short-lived. By 2012, fundamental disagreements on social issues werepulling Islamists and liberals apart, as had been the case since the 1990s. Politicaldissent remained, but on a smaller scale. This did not stop the Saudi government fromtaking drastic measures against the Kingdom's Islamists, especially after the summer of2013.

The rise of political Salafism has reshaped the Egyptian political scene. Though the Muslim Brotherhood still occupies the dominant position, it has lost its hegemony over Islamist politics. The relationship between Salafis and the Brotherhood has evolved since the revolution, from discrete cooperation to fierce competition. The final outcome of this competition remains uncertain. It could end up pushing the Salafis to a more intransigent stance intended to distinguish them from the "responsible" and "pragmatic" Brotherhood. Alternatively, it could convince the Salafis to fully embrace a more pragmatic politics themselves. This question is also closely related to that of the relationship between the Nour Party and its parent movement, the Salafi Da'wa. To what extent will the party manage to assert its political independence? For the moment, it is significant that the Nour Party and other established Salafi groups have seemed more inclined to follow a gradual and pragmatic path rather than to bend to the pressure of their own idealists, as the backing of moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh indicates. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which the Salafi leadership will be able to impose this shift on the movement's constituency. The defeat of Abul Futuh in the first round of presidential elections, arguably because a significant proportion of Salafis' were reluctant to back a "liberal" candidate, illustrates the difficulties ahead for the leadership, should the latter decide to continue on the same path. How should we make sense of the Salafi breakthrough? And now that they represent the second strongest force in parliament, what lies ahead for their movement?

The rise of political Salafism has reshaped the Egyptian political scene. Though the Muslim Brotherhood still occupies the dominant position, it has lost its hegemony over Islamist politics. The relationship between Salafis and the Brotherhood has evolved since the revolution, from discrete cooperation to fierce competition. The final outcome of this competition remains uncertain. It could end up pushing the Salafis to a more intransigent stance intended to distinguish them from the "responsible" and "pragmatic" Brotherhood. Alternatively, it could convince the Salafis to fully embrace a more pragmatic politics themselves. This question is also closely related to that of the relationship between the Nour Party and its parent movement, the Salafi Da'wa. To what extent will the party manage to assert its political independence? For the moment, it is significant that the Nour Party and other established Salafi groups have seemed more inclined to follow a gradual and pragmatic path rather than to bend to the pressure of their own idealists, as the backing of moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh indicates. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which the Salafi leadership will be able to impose this shift on the movement's constituency. The defeat of Abul Futuh in the first round of presidential elections, arguably because a significant proportion of Salafis' were reluctant to back a "liberal" candidate, illustrates the difficulties ahead for the leadership, should the latter decide to continue on the same path. How should we make sense of the Salafi breakthrough? And now that they represent the second strongest force in parliament, what lies ahead for their movement?

Abstract:
When protests started spreading throughout the Arab world in January 2011, numerous observers argued that Saudi Arabia's turn would soon come. There was some truth to those expectations, as February and early March 2011 witnessed an unusual degree of protest activity by the Kingdom's standards. And yet, by mid-March, the regime had regained complete control of the situation. Who were the activists who challenged the regime and what did they want? And how did the regime manage to silence their protests? Does this episode mean that revolution is impossible in Saudi Arabia?

The last few years in Saudi Arabia have witnessed the rise of a new trend made up of former Islamists and liberals, Sunnis and Shi'ites, calling for democratic change within an Islamic framework through a revision of the official Wahhabi religious doctrine. These intellectuals have
managed to gain visibility on the local scene, notably through a series of manifestos and petitions, and their project has even received support from among the Royal Family. Indeed, the government has since then taken a number of preliminary steps towards political and religious reform. But
does this mean that Saudi Arabia is about to enter the era of Post-Wahhabism?