Belgium developed a rather extensive nuclear research and development (R&D) programme quite early due to the ready supply of uranium from the former colony of Congo and its contribution to the Manhattan project. Belgium, once had the national ambition of developing a full nuclear fuel cycle. Nuclear power provides 52% of the national electricity supply in Belgium in 2014. Belgium's seven reactors – four in the Flemish municipality of Doel, three in the Walloon municipality of Tihange – became operational between 1975 and 1985. The history of the Belgian nuclear programme is for a large part one of 'fait accompli' politics and has been characterized by a general lack of transparent decision making (Laes et al. 2007).
This paper reviews and analyzes the challenges of energy transition governance towards a low-carbon society as a political achievement. The main research question is how specific "transition governance approaches" (as advocated by transition theory) can be embedded/anchored in the policy-making logics and practices. We analyze three country cases, known for their path-breaking efforts in the area: Germany (due to its pioneering role in the development and diffusion of renewable energy technologies), the Netherlands (due to its pioneering role in launching the transition management framework), and the United Kingdom (due to its pioneering role in adopting a long-term legislative commitment to a low-carbon future). The paper identifies best governance practices and remaining challenges in the following areas: (i) connecting long-term visions with short- and mid-term action; (ii) innovation (technological as well as social); (iii) integration (of multiple objectives and policy areas and levels); (iv) societal engagement; and (v) learning/reflexivity.
This paper uses 19 criteria to assess whether nuclear fission power can be a part of sustainable development. This yes or no qualitative evaluation is due prior to ongoing marketability assessment and promotion of nuclear power by, for example, the IAEA, the IEA and the UK government. The criteria are classified into five groups. 'Planet' results demonstrate that the incompatibility of nuclear expansion with electricity efficiency and full renewable power deployment largely overshadows the carbon-free steam generation of nuclear fission. 'Prosperity' analyses show that including rolled-off costs and risks would raise bills to heights difficult to quantify due to doubts, long-term invisibility and irreversibility. 'Risks' may be catastrophic and are not insurable, while weaponry proliferation adds a further dimension. 'People' analyses reveal that some nuclear power is affordable for present generations when many costs remain unpaid; however, developing countries cannot afford the capital costs and technology intensity, and catastrophes wreak havoc on national economies, singling out exposed communities losing their habitats. 'Politics' assessments demonstrate that nuclear technocracy dominates the scene in many countries; the technocrats heavily influence policy-makers, the media, and celebrities speaking out in favor of nuclear. We identify the need for an independent global agency and for independent national nuclear regulatory institutions to safeguard the public interest.
Purpose - This paper analyses the justification of technological choices and options in the context of nuclear energy policy. We argue that "society" increasingly demands a justification with regard to the level of uncertainty and inequality a certain technological choice induces. We aim to demonstrate that policy makers in fact do address these issues, but depending on how they define the problem, this is done in a more explicit (overt) or implicit (covert) way. Design/methodology/approach - First, the changing context with regard to the justification of technological choices is briefly sketched. We draw the attention to the link between the way a certain (energy) policy problem is defined, and the way the framework for political decision-making is set up in response to the problem. In order to clarify this observation, we make use of a scheme derived from policy sciences, mapping out policy problems in two dimensions: the (lack of) certainty concerning the kinds of knowledge a problem may require, and the (lack of) consensus on relevant values (i.e. "the common good", "basic rights", etc.). Each type of policy problem requires a distinct solution strategy. A so-called Type III-error occurs when the wrong problem is solved by employing a strategy which does not apply to the problem at hand. In that case, political theory predicts strategic behavior in order to actively suppress or blur value differences. The Belgian decision to phase out nuclear power is used as a case study to illustrate some of the theoretical implications of the scheme. Findings - Several Type III-errors could be demonstrated in the case of the Belgian phase out. In this case, social learning was severely hampered by different methodological approaches; lack of data; different perceptions of relevant time scales; different framing of the problem; institutional barriers; lack of communication; strategic use of scientific assessments by different stakeholders; and insufficient knowledge of scientific assessments. Originality/value - The paper aims to broaden the debate on energy policy outside the boundaries of institutional decision-making. We conclude with some practical recommendations for future energy policy, regarding problem structuring, defining possible options, goal and strategy formulation and monitoring of choices.
The residential sector is one of the EU's priority sectors where carbon mitigation needs to be realised. In this paper, we carry out a review of the effectiveness of individual policies or policy packages in terms of the uptake of these carbon mitigation measures and/or energy savings realised as a result. The focus lies on the existing residential building stock. The literature reviewed in this paper covers panel data studies, applied behavioural research, and situated approaches. Most of the reviewed quantitative studies find that financial incentives and subsidies have a positive impact on the probability of energy efficiency improvements being undertaken. However, when evaluating the energy efficiency improvements or CO 2 reductions induced by the incentives and therefore their effectiveness, the presence of free riding turns out to be a problem. Energy and CO 2 taxation should play a larger role in encouraging people to save energy and reduce CO 2 emissions, since the reviewed studies indicate that people are responsive to savings in energy costs and expected price increases in the future. The evidence on the relative impact of regulation vs. financial incentives is inconclusive. For information policies the quantitative evidence is still limited. The reviewed panel data studies find no or a negative impact. This finding however does not necessarily imply that information policies are useless, as panel data do not allow for a detailed analysis of different types of informational approaches. Situated accounts provide further necessary qualitative findings on best practices for energy savings by households.
