Suchergebnisse

This paper examines the role that low‐skilled immigration plays in determining pension benefits of the host population. With an overlapping‐generations model which allows identifying which groups of native population are in favour or against immigration, we find that despite immigrants having low average productivity, an open borders policy would be implemented since most of current domestic cohorts gain from immigration. Only younger workers might be against immigration since they will coincide with immigrants in their retirement periods. Moreover, we show how a larger immigrant quota would increase the probability of a Pareto improvement for the current domestic population.

This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, first, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. The results suggest that governments attempting to postpone the legal retirement age should increase the degree of intra-generational redistribution of the pension system in order to make the reform aimed at more easily achievable. More importantly, the most productive individuals could support some degree of redistribution to that aim.

This article examines the role played by the low‐skilled immigrant labour force in countries aiming to reform their public pension systems by postponing the pensionable age. With an overlapping‐generations model in continuous time and a fully redistributive pension system, the results of this article suggest that immigration could imply a delay in the pensionable retirement age. Further, we find that the preference for a delay in retirement age increases with the labour productivity of both immigrants and native population.

Abstract
This paper examines the role played by the low-skilled immigrant labor force in countries aiming to reform their public pensions systems by postponing the pensionable age. With an overlapping-generations model in continuous time and a fully redistributive pension scheme, the arrival of immigrants affects the retirement benefits of the host population in a different manner according to whether they share or not pension benefits. Our results suggest that governments attempting to delay the legal retirement age should take into account the effect of immigration on the optimal retirement age of native individuals.

En este trabajo se llevó a cabo la clasificación de patrones correspondientes a dos tareas mentales, obtenidos mediante un sistema BCI (Brain Computer Interface). Para ello se utilizó el paradigma neuronal de los Mapas Autorganizativos de Kohonen (SOM, por Self-Organizing Maps). Los patrones utilizados en cada clasificador se obtuvieron mediante la aplicación de la Transformada Rápida de Fourier a las señales EEG directamente proporcionadas por el sistema BCI. En una primera fase, las capturas de los patrones se realizaron a lo largo de ocho segundos, pero una red SOM es implementada y entrenada de manera independiente para cada segundo. La SOM con el mejor rendimiento se usó en la segunda fase (fase de trabajo), para clasificar todos los segundos. Los resultados obtenidos en las pruebas de validación proporcionan un porcentaje de error entre 3.75%, (para los segundos 5° y 6°), y 11.25% para el 8°. Estos errores son menores o similares a los resultados obtenidos en otros trabajos de referencia.Palabras claves: Interfaz Cerebro Computadora BCI, Mapas Autorganizativos de Kohonen, Fast Fourier Transform FFT, electroencefalograma EEG, Clasificación de tareas mentales.

This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility. (JEL J31, J33, J41)