Suchergebnisse

Many books on government in China either simply describe the political institutions or else focus, critically, on the weaknesses of the system, such as corruption or the absence of Western-style democracy. This book, on the other hand, takes a more balanced, more positive view. This view is based on a study of China's institutions for coping with critical crises in governance since 1978. It argues that, although the party-state is determined to preserve itself, China's governance model has changed for the better in many respects in recent years. These changes, discussed fully in the book, include better management of leadership succession, better crisis management, improved social welfare, the management of society through treating different social groups differently depending on their potential to rival the party-state, and a variety of limited, intra-party and grassroots democracy. This book applies to the Chinese model the term "pragmatic authoritarianism". It explains the thinking which lies behind China's governance model and the changes to it, and assesses how the governance model is likely to develop. It compares recent developments with changes and fatal threats in China's governance over a long historical period, and concludes that the regime can be expected to survive for the foreseeable future

Offers a systemic analysis of the foreign policy of China. This title demonstrates how domestic factors have profoundly shaped China's foreign policy, from the late Mao's era to the reform era, presenting its argument through an analysis of major cases of Chinese foreign policy.

In 2022, highly restrictive measures were imposed in China to contain the less deadly Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 virus or the COVID-19 virus. This study argues that these measures stemmed from a move away from pragmatic authoritarianism and towards totalitarianism since 2013 and that the lockdown of scores of cities such as Shanghai in 2022 carried quintessential features of totalitarianism. Revived totalitarianism in China has helped explain the longest and likely the most comprehensive strict epidemic control among all nations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The politics and the end of zero-COVID policy in China in 2022 are analysed.

This article discusses the state and public reactions on the internet to the death of Dr Li Wenliang, the whistle-blower who warned of the COVID-19 outbreak in China. Contrary to findings in existing literature, this study argues that the society–state interaction over the internet is far more dynamic and complex, and that autocratic states have the capability and resilience to manage and even control the internet. While the internet could help rally waves of public outpourings and protests, the state, in response, broadcast its tactical concessions to ease widespread public anger. However, the state has been able to portray its overall highly effective control of the epidemic, thereby claiming political credits and legitimacy for governance.

For over a decade China has been the predominant carbon emitter in the global economy. It is thus imperative for us to understand the factors behind its climate change policy in the past decades. In the article, the author surveys the evolution of China's climate change policy during 1990-2021 and applies theories from international relations and international political economy to explain it. It is found that (neo-)realism/nationalism and liberalism, two main theories in the field, offer only a partial explanation of China's climate policy. The most effective theory is domestic sources. In particular, leadership power consolidation and a concern with economic growth seem to dictate China's climate policy. The findings point to the analytical utility of domestic political economy in accounting for climate stances of nation-states. Policy suggestions for external parties to interact with China on climate change are proposed.

The existing literature suggests that China's rationale for the belt and road initiative was to stimulate infrastructural investment abroad and thus economic growth at home, foster economic ties with Eurasia, and counter the US pivot to Asia. Employing a domestic political economy perspective, this article suggests that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed to address China's three following vulnerabilities that could derail its economic growth and threaten its political regime—industrial surplus capacity, massive imports of energy through maritime transport instead of safer land routes, and under-development of the western region. Addressing these vulnerabilities helps to sustain China's economic model characterised by heavy reliance on investment and exports, protection of state firms, and massive energy input. Post-2012 data suggest that the BRI has partially mitigated these three vulnerabilities. (J Con-temp China / GIGA)

The existing literature suggests that China launched the belt and road initiative (BRI) in order to stimulate economic growth through infrastructural investment abroad, foster closer economic ties with Eurasia, and counter the US pivot to Asia. In this article, the BRI is interpreted in a deeper context through an analysis of its role in sustaining the economic and political regime in China and in reducing vulnerabilities in domestic political economy. These vulnerabilities include surplus industrial capacity, heavy reliance on energy imports, and under-development of the western region. Post-2012 data suggest that the BRI has partially instead of fully enabled China to ease surplus industrial capacity, secure energy importing routes (especially imports through pipelines), and enhance the economic profile of China's western region.

Statistical tests are conducted on two explanations of soft power. One is Joseph Nye's argument that political values, foreign policy, and cultural appeals shape soft power, and the other is the positive peace argument which suggests the significant effect of the Global Peace Index (GPI) on soft power. Two measures of soft power are employed-the favorability of major powers in global public opinion polls and the Soft Power 30 index. The latter gauges the magnitude of soft power. When the former measure which indicates the positiveness of soft power is adopted, the three soft power resources provide less explanatory power than per capita GDP and especially the GPI. When the Soft Power 30 index is used, only foreign policy independent of the US contributes positively to soft power. The GPI and non-soft-power related cultural exports (NSPCE) take on a negative role because a number of nations in the index achieved very high rankings with a relatively poor GPI or small NSPCE.

This article evaluates China's model of development, especially its main component, i.e. its model of governance. It suggests that China's model of development is marked by an imbalance between fast opening of the economy and the society and sluggish opening of the political system. The Chinese society has become much more open, reflected in the Chinese growing awareness of their legal rights. The Chinese economy has become highly internationalized and open, but much of Chinese politics is closed. China's governance is marked by pro-growth authoritarianism. The Chinese state is effective in opening up the economy, promoting reform, and generating economic growth, but offers weak protection of people's rights and ineffectual mitigation of social grievances. These imbalances help produce social protests. Viable solutions are discussed. (J Contemp China/GIGA)