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This paper examines the impact of electoral cycles and the introduction of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) policy upon the holding of small-scale mining property rights in Guyana. Mining is both the major cause of deforestation and the main economic activity in the country. A simple model of the incentives to hold mining property rights is developed and tested using a unique data-set of small-scale mining property rights data. Econometric techniques are used to test the findings of the model, concluding that the number of mining rights issued fall after election years, with the number rescinded rising. The introduction of REDD+ in Guyana also seems to have increased the number of mining claims being relinquished, and reduce the number being issued. The findings highlight the importance of political economy events in the evolution of small-scale mining activity, and show some evidence that the introduction of a REDD+ framework in Guyana has impacted the main driver of deforestation, despite the absence of specific policy targeting the sector.

This article examines the political and performative function of the deforestation 'reference level' within Guyana's Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) agreement with Norway. It argues that the establishment of, and continual negotiations around, the reference level rate illustrate how the Guyana-Norway REDD+ agreement was always more about ensuring the programme's 'success' than materially reducing deforestation in Guyana. By setting the 'reference level' at 0.275% per year in 2010, far above Guyana's historical rate of 0.02%, Guyana's successful performance in terms of 'avoiding deforestation' against this inflated level was all but guaranteed – even as 'business as usual' forest use continued on the ground. The fact that the reference level was high moreover allowed Norway to claim that it had 'contributed' (through its REDD+ payments) to higher 'avoided emissions', even though there was never a clear relationship between its payments and Guyana's deforestation rate throughout the programme. The 'performative' nature of the programme was meanwhile confirmed in 2019, when Norway disbursed the entire remaining balance from the US$250 million originally pledged to Guyana, despite the fact that Guyana had infringed the adjusted reference level 'floor' of 0.056% in several years of the programme. The article concludes that if meaningful solutions for 'avoiding deforestation' are to be developed, especially in the context of a new centrality for offsetting within the global 'net zero' agenda, 'success' must mean more than achieving results on paper and resources must be committed that are commensurate with the scale of the stated policy challenge.

In recent decades, Guyana's gold-rich interior has been the location of numerous, mostly low-latent, conflicts. In each case, groups of Afro and Indo-Guyanese originating from the country's coastal cities and towns - popularly referred to as 'Coast Landers' - have clashed with indigenous Amerindians over control of remote parcels of land containing gold deposits. Each appears to have a valid argument in support of its position: the former contend that they are legally entitled to work these lands, having obtained the requisite permits from the central government to mine for gold, whilst the latter maintain that such decisions constitute a breach of their human rights, and draw attention to key legislation in support of their case. This article broadens understanding of the dynamics of these conflicts by reflecting more critically on the arguments presented by both parties. Drawing heavily on research conducted in Mahdia-Campbelltown, one location where frictions between Coast Lander mining groups and Amerindians are particularly serious, it is argued that these disputes are not about control of gold riches as is popularly believed but rather a product of deeply-rooted ethnic tensions between these parties.

National-level strategies for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD), financed by international transfers, have begun to emerge. A three-sector model is developed to explore the economy-wide effects of two policies implemented by a government participating in REDD that differ in how they bring together incentives and benefit sharing: an incentive payment scheme where these are intrinsically linked and taxes where they are separated. Two sectors utilise forest as an input to production, one in which forest is substitutable for labour, producing a carbon externality, and one in which forest and labour are complements and where forest is used sustainably. Two important effects determine model outcomes. First, the government factors in general equilibrium effects when determining the efficient payment level. This implies that the level of international transfers is not fully passed through to the forest-using sectors. Second, even though the sustainable sector receives no incentive payment it can increase in size through the effect of REDD payments on markets. With political influence, where incentives and benefit sharing are linked the forest-using sectors may lobby for lower payment rates for themselves in order to create a larger international transfer. Where there is a separation between incentives and benefit-sharing this effect disappears. The findings indicate that REDD may be less cost-effective than envisioned at the international level.

National-level strategies for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD), financed by international transfers, have begun to emerge. A three-sector model is developed to explore the economy-wide effects of two policies implemented by a government participating in REDD that differ in how they bring together incentives and benefit sharing: an incentive payment scheme where these are intrinsically linked and taxes where they are separated. Two sectors utilise forest as an input to production, one in which forest is substitutable for labour, producing a carbon externality, and one in which forest and labour are complements and where forest is used sustainably. Two important effects determine model outcomes. First, the government factors in general equilibrium effects when determining the efficient payment level. This implies that the level of international transfers is not fully passed through to the forest-using sectors. Second, even though the sustainable sector receives no incentive payment it can increase in size through the effect of REDD payments on markets. With political influence, where incentives and benefit sharing are linked the forest-using sectors may lobby for lower payment rates for themselves in order to create a larger international transfer. Where there is a separation between incentives and benefit-sharing this effect disappears. The findings indicate that REDD may be less cost-effective than envisioned at the international level.

Increasing net-zero commitments by individuals, companies and governments have been accompanied by the growth of the voluntary offset market, including Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Technologies, notably blockchain, are starting to enter the REDD+ space and may have the potential to address issues such as additionality, permanence, leakage and property and community rights. In this Perspective, we first examine voluntary markets and the role forest carbon offsets have played within them, highlighting the evolution of REDD+ and the issues that have hindered its development. We then examine the potential of blockchain to address each of the issues, using the literature and emerging experience from the use of blockchain in the forestry space. We find that the technology may have the potential to improve verifiability, reduce transaction costs and, to a lesser degree, aid in addressing additionality and permanence concerns. However, greater learning from the emerging use of blockchain in pilot projects is needed to fully assess and maximize its potential.

Purpose
The use of socio-economic scenarios in small island developing states (SIDS) when assessing, and planning for, the impacts of global changes on national socioeconomic and environmental systems is still in its infancy. The research conducts a cross-scale foresight scenario exercise to produce regional scenarios and national storylines for Caribbean islands that are of "partial" consistency to the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) and representative concentration pathways (RCPs) and shows how future socioeconomic and climatic changes can be applied to inform natural resource management decisions.


Design/methodology/approach
To develop the scenarios, the study uses a three-staged linking process using mixed methods to "triangulate" each technique to compensate for weaknesses of one method by introducing a complementary method at each stage. A participatory-expert stepwise approach with feedback loops is used and complemented with a climate sensitive tourism water demand model.


Findings
Four regional exploratory socio-economic scenarios were constructed that are partially consistent with global scenarios. In addition, national storylines for four island states were developed based on the regional scenarios. Using RCP 4.5 hotel water demand in Barbados is estimated under three of the regional scenarios based on compatibility. The results indicate there is a 17% difference between the highest and lowest estimated water demand, indicating the effect of varying socio-economic conditions on water demand.


Originality/value
The paper contributes to the literature by presenting regional socio-economic scenarios, specifically for SIDS, that are partially consistent with both global climatic RCPs and SSPs using a cross-scale approach. The scenarios are then used to demonstrate how future socio-economic pathways impact on freshwater demand.