Suchergebnisse

In the event of large swings in world food prices, countries often intervene to dampen the impact of international food price spikes on domestic prices and to lessen the burden of adjustment on vulnerable population groups. While individual countries can succeed at insulating their domestic markets from short-term fluctuations in global food prices, the collective intervention of many countries may exacerbate the volatility of world prices. Insulating policies introduced during the 2010-11 food price spike may have accounted for 40 percent of the increase in the world price of wheat and one-quarter of the increase in the world price of maize. Combined with government policy responses, the 2010-11 food price spike tipped 8.3 million people (nearly 1 percent of the world's poor) into poverty.

In the event of large swings in world food prices, countries often intervene to dampen the impact of international food price spikes on domestic prices and lessen the burden of adjustment on vulnerable population groups. Although individual countries can succeed in insulating their domestic markets from short-term fluctuations in global food prices, the collective intervention of many countries exacerbates the volatility of world prices. Insulating policies introduced during the 2010-11 food price spike accounted for 40 percent of the increase in the world price of wheat and 25 percent of the increase in the world price of maize. Combined with government policy responses, the 2010-11 food price spike increased global poverty by 1 percent or 8.3 million people. ; IFPRI4; CRP2; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry ; MTID; PIM ; PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

This paper uses a global general equilibrium simulation model to quantify the effects of lifting economic sanctions on Iran with and without strategic responses. Iran benefits the most, with average per capita welfare gains ranging from close to 3 percent, in the case when Iran's crude oil exports to the European Union recover to half their pre-embargo level, to 6.5 percent, in the best case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, successful domestic reforms that enable a strong supply response, and increased market access for Iranian exports in developed markets. Iran could achieve benefits close to the upper range if Gulf Cooperation Council oil exporters limit their crude oil exports to support the oil price. If they do nothing, however, the price of oil will decline by 13 percent in the case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, leaving net oil importers better off and net oil exporters worse off.

This paper explores the economic impacts of two related tracks of China's expected transformation—economic slowdown and rebalancing away from investment toward consumption—and estimates the spillovers for the rest of the world, with a special focus on Sub-Saharan African countries. The paper finds that an average annual slowdown of gross domestic product in China of 1 percent over 2016–30 is expected to result in a decline of gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1.1 percent and globally by 0.6 percent relative to the past trends scenario by 2030. However, if China's transformation also entails substantial rebalancing, the negative income effects of the economic slowdown could be offset by the positive changes brought along by rebalancing through higher overall imports by China and positive terms of trade effects for its trading partners. If global supply responds positively to the shifts in relative prices and the new sources of consumer demand from China, a substantial rebalancing in China could have an overall favorable impact on the global economy. Economic growth could turn positive and higher on average, by 6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5.5 percent globally, as compared with the past trends scenario. Finally, rebalancing reduces the prevalence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with the isolated negative effects of China's slowdown, which slightly increase the incidence of poverty. Overall, China's slowdown and rebalancing combined are estimated to increase gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa by 4.7 percent by 2030 and reduce poverty, but the extent of this varies by country.

If trade tensions between the United States and certain trading partners escalate into a full-blown trade war, what should developing countries do? Using a global, general-equilibrium model, this paper first simulates the effects of an increase in U.S. tariffs on imports from all regions to about 30 percent (the average non-Most Favored Nation tariff currently applied to imports from Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Korea) and retaliation in kind by major trading partners—the European Union, China, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. The paper then considers four possible responses by developing countries to this trade war: (i) join the trade war; (ii) do nothing; (iii) pursue regional trade agreements (RTAs) with all regions outside the United States; and (iv) option (iii) and unilaterally liberalize tariffs on imports from the United States. The results show that joining the trade war is the worst option for developing countries (twice as bad as doing nothing), while forming RTAs with non-U.S. regions and liberalizing tariffs on U.S. imports ("turning the other cheek") is the best. The reason is that a trade war between the United States and its major trading partners creates opportunities for developing countries to increase their exports to these markets. Liberalizing tariffs increases developing countries' competitiveness, enabling them to capitalize on these opportunities.

There is increasing evidence suggesting that climate change will negatively impact agricultural production in South Asia. Decreased domestic production may make South Asian countries more dependent on imports. The extent to which South Asia will need to increase its imports as a result of climate change will presumably depend on the degree to which the latter will affect domestic output. The effects of climate change on agriculture may well differ substantially for individual South Asian countries and indeed for regions within a given country which can be approximated by food production units. This calls for an analysis of climate change effects on trade flows under alternative trade policy regimes both for agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. The specific objectives of the paper include the following: analyze the extent to which agricultural production in South Asia and elsewhere in the world may be affected by different scenarios regarding climate change; analyze the extent to which changes in domestic production in South Asia resulting from climate change will lead to increased demand for imports by South Asian countries; analyze the effects of increased import demand in South Asia and changing exportable surpluses elsewhere on world market prices of major agricultural commodities consumed in South Asia; to the extent that South Asian governments allow transmission of changes in world market prices to domestic prices, analyze the potential welfare effects of changes in the latter; analyze if, and to what extent, worldwide trade liberalization and implementation of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) will dampen the effects of climate change on domestic agricultural prices in South Asia. In this context, the report is organized as follows: chapter one gives introduction. Chapter two describes the methodology used - with particular attention to how different models and modeling techniques are linked to produce an as accurate as possible assessment based on state-of-the-art knowledge. Chapter three provides an up-to-date analysis of trade flows and policies, and production patterns for key food products in South Asia to explain the context in which climate change is taking place. Chapter four describes the climate change scenarios and illustrates their consequences for crop yields at a global level and for South Asia - and in particular shows the vulnerability of the region to these changes. Baseline design, simulations, and results are discussed in chapter five. The final chapter six provides a short summary, discusses the limitations of the analysis, and derives suggestions and guidelines for future research.