Suchergebnisse

Over the past decade, DR Congo and South Africa have attracted global attention for high rates of sexual and gender-based violence. Why is it that courts in eastern DR Congo have offered a robust judicial response, prioritizing gender crimes despite considerable logistical challenges, whilst courts in South Africa, home to a far stronger legal infrastructure and human rights record, have failed to provide justice to victims of similar crimes? Lake shows that state fragility in DR Congo has created openings for human rights NGOs to influence legal processes in ways that have proved impossible in countries like South Africa, where the state is stronger. Yet exploiting opportunities presented by state fragility to pursue narrow human rights goals invites a host of new challenges. Strong NGOs and Weak States documents the promises and pitfalls of human rights and rule of law advocacy undertaken by NGOs in strong and weak states alike.

Over the past decade, DR Congo and South Africa have attracted global attention for high rates of sexual and gender-based violence. Why is it that courts in eastern DR Congo have offered a robust judicial response, prioritizing gender crimes despite considerable logistical challenges, whilst courts in South Africa, home to a far stronger legal infrastructure and human rights record, have failed to provide justice to victims of similar crimes? Lake shows that state fragility in DR Congo has created openings for human rights NGOs to influence legal processes in ways that have proved impossible in countries like South Africa, where the state is stronger. Yet exploiting opportunities presented by state fragility to pursue narrow human rights goals invites a host of new challenges. Strong NGOs and Weak States documents the promises and pitfalls of human rights and rule of law advocacy undertaken by NGOs in strong and weak states alike

In environments of seemingly intractable conflict, how should we understand the role of state capacity building and security-sector reform in transitions to peace? Prevailing wisdom suggests that a strong state security apparatus mitigates cyclical violence and aids in transitions to predictable, rule-governed behavior. Yet growing attention to police brutality in institutionalized democracies calls this assumption into question. Drawing on a multiyear study of war making and state making in eastern DR Congo, this article interrogates logics of police capacity building, analyzing how and why reform efforts intended to bolster the state's monopoly on violence frequently fail to curb the unrest they seek to disrupt. I argue that enhancing the coercive capacity of the police can entrench a wartime political order that makes peace more elusive; when police deploy the image of the state toward destabilizing ends they reinforce the institutions of everyday war, undermining the stability a monopoly on violence is intended to build.

ABSTRACTThe diversity of political spaces, availability of cheap labor, ease of access to powerful figures, and safety net of a foreign passport attract researchers to the developing world. However, environments of extreme state weakness and ongoing conflict permit research behavior that would be frowned on in the global north. We suggest that weak regulatory authority in conflict-affected states offers foreign academics opportunities that are not available when states have greater reach or capacity. Qualitative researchers may find requests to interview victims or perpetrators of wartime violence granted with ease. Experimenters can coerce under-resourced NGOs to pursue interventions at odds with their organizational mandates. We posit that conflict contexts can constitute permissive environments in which researchers can engage in conduct that would be considered deeply problematic at home. Because studying political violence can require firsthand research on aspects of political life not easily observed elsewhere, this article offers a set of guidelines to foster more ethical and responsible research practices.

AbstractDespite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. Scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to rational accounts emphasizing the individualized benefits corruption can offer. Using a case study of the Service Standing Orders in Kenya's National Police Service however, we build on the work of Persson et al.'s analysis to show how corrupt practices on the part of street‐level agents are reinforced within organizational hierarchies, through institutionalized—rather than personalized—incentives and obligations. As a result, policy innovations that do not explicitly identify the countervailing incentives created through internal command structures are likely to miss potentially fruitful avenues for institutional reform.