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Abstract
This paper studies how organizations seek to promote cooperation between their members when individual contributions to an organization's output are imperfectly observable. It considers an overlapping-generations game in which members with conflicting interests expend effort in pursuing activities outside the organization, in addition to the effort they devote to increasing the organization's output. We show that cooperation is easier to enforce when organizations link rewards and punishments to effort in outside activities. In the best public perfect equilibrium, effort in outside activities is distorted in order to signal a member's willingness to cooperate inside the organization.

This paper presents a dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies. The driving force of the model is the intergenerational conflict over the allocation of the public budget. Successive generations of voters choose fiscal policies through repeated elections. The political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations, since it expands future pension possibilities. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy. The equilibrium can reproduce qualitative and quantitative features of intergenerational fiscal policies in modern economies.

Over the past century, all OECD countries have been characterized by a dramatic increase in economic conditions, life expectancy and edu- cational attainment. This paper provides a positive theory that explains how an economy might evolve when the longevity of its citizens both influences and is influenced by the process of economic development. We propose a three periods OLG model where agents, during their lifetime, cover di¤erent economic roles characterized by di¤erent incentive schemes and time horizon. Agents' decisions embrace two dimensions: the private choice about education and the public one upon innovation policy. The theory focuses on the crucial role played by heterogeneous interests in determining innovation policies, which are one of the keys to the growth process: the economy can be discontinuously innovation-oriented due to the di¤erent incentives of individuals and di¤erent schemes of political aggregation of preferences. The model produces multiple development regimes associated with di¤erent predictions about life expectancy evolu- tion, educational investment dynamics, and technology adoption policies. Transitions between these regimes depend on initial conditions and parameter values.

Over the past century, all OECD countries have been characterized by a dramatic increase in economic conditions, life expectancy and educational attainment. This paper provides a positive theory that explains how an economy might evolve when the longevity of its citizens both influences and is influenced by the process of economic development. We propose a three periods OLG model where agents, during their lifetime, cover different economic roles characterized by different incentive schemes and time horizon. Agents' decisions embrace two dimensions: the private choice about education and the public one upon innovation policy. The theory focuses on the crucial role played by heterogeneous interests in determining innovation policies, which are one of the keys to the growth process: the economy can be discontinuously innovation-oriented due to the different incentives of individuals and different schemes of political aggregation of preferences. The model produces multiple development regimes associated with different predictions about life expectancy evolution, educational investment dynamics, and technology adoption policies. Transitions between these regimes depend on initial conditions and parameter values.

Over the past century, all OECD countries have been characterized by a dramatic increase in economic conditions, life expectancy and edu- cational attainment. This paper provides a positive theory that explains how an economy might evolve when the longevity of its citizens both influences and is influenced by the process of economic development. We propose a three periods OLG model where agents, during their lifetime, cover di¤erent economic roles characterized by di¤erent incentive schemes and time horizon. Agents' decisions embrace two dimensions: the private choice about education and the public one upon innovation policy. The theory focuses on the crucial role played by heterogeneous interests in determining innovation policies, which are one of the keys to the growth process: the economy can be discontinuously innovation-oriented due to the di¤erent incentives of individuals and di¤erent schemes of political aggregation of preferences. The model produces multiple development regimes associated with di¤erent predictions about life expectancy evolu- tion, educational investment dynamics, and technology adoption policies. Transitions between these regimes depend on initial conditions and parameter values.

This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, i.e., the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient for folk theorems to be relevant. Relative to the first best, the best equilibrium requires countries to overinvest in technologies that are green, i.e., strategic substitutes for polluting, but to underinvest in adaptation and brown technologies, i.e., strategic complements to polluting. Under uncertainty, strategic investments reduce the need for a long and costly punishment phase or the probability that it will be triggered. Technological transfers and spillovers might discourage investments but can be necessary to motivate compliance when countries are heterogeneous.

We examine the link between the political participation of the young and fiscal policies in the U.S. We generate exogenous variation in participation using the passage of preregistration laws, which allow the young to register before being eligible to vote. After documenting that preregistration promotes youth enfranchisement, we show that preregistration shifts state government spending toward higher education, the type of spending for which the young have the strongest preference. A 1% increase in youth voter turnout generates a 0:77% increase in higher education spending. The results collectively suggest political responsiveness to the needs of the newly enfranchised constituency.

We examine the link between the political participation of the young and fiscal policies in the United States. We generate exogenous variation in participation using the passage of preregistration laws, which allow the young to register before being eligible to vote. After documenting that preregistration promotes youth enfranchisement, we show that preregistration shifts state government spending toward higher education, the type of spending for which the young have the strongest preference. A 1 percent increase in youth voter turnout generates a 0.77 percent increase in higher education spending. The results collectively suggest political responsiveness to the needs of the newly enfranchised constituency.