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When elections bring about changes in the political party of the president, the shifts frequently involve a change in the philosophies that inform the approach to governing. In teaching constitutional law, administrative law, and health law, this author cautions students to consider the political content of agency actions underlying the judicial opinions studied. Examining the political and discretionary judgment government officials exercise may provide an explanation for the results or an analysis when the law does not seem to account for the agency action or court decision. This Article examines the opportunities available to an incoming administration to undo the work of its predecessor and the constraints the law imposes on the exercise of discretion. After surveying the increasing use of the Congressional Review Act to reverse the regulatory actions of a predecessor administration, Part I of the Article explores other administrative law tools available to halt or redirect regulatory actions with which an incoming administration disagrees. Part II examines some of the signature cases involving judicial review of agency action to illustrate the constraints courts may impose on changes in administrative policy. Parts III, IV, and V examine how courts have dealt with policy changes in federal health care programs and the potential impact of changes in the presidential approach to the appointment of administrative adjudicators. The Article closes with some reflections on how this author's experiences working in state and federal government have informed her view of government decision-making.

Historically, debates over the wisdom of expanding the reach of federal power have reflected the tension between competing notions: the idea that responsibilities for the business of government can be allocated neatly into fixed federal and state spheres, and the idea that the federal government, including the federal courts, must have the flexibility to expand its reach to respond to changing national problems and concerns. In recent years, Congress has enacted several statutes expanding the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts into areas previously the sole responsibility of the states. This article argues that three such expansions—the Violence Against Women Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992—fit within a traditional rationale for exercises of federal jurisdiction. In addition, this article suggests that, as a practical matter, these expansions do not signal an attempt to supplant state authority but, rather, are an effort to supplement state authority by invoking federal power and applying federal resources in strategic, limited ways. The wise allocation of federal resources in areas of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction depends on the selective exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion.