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In: The China review: an interdisciplinary journal on greater China, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 45-71
ISSN: 1680-2012
World Affairs Online
In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1047-1987
In: Problems of post-communism, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 221-240
ISSN: 1557-783X
In: American political science review, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 706-722
ISSN: 1537-5943
We argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation. Promotion-seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues. The greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal, the more intense political competition is, resulting in higher taxation; however, too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability. Using a panel dataset of all Chinese county-level jurisdictions from 1999–2006, we find strong evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of county-level jurisdictions within a prefecture—our proxy for the intensity of political competition—and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions. The results are robust to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence.
In: American political science review, Band 108, Heft 3
ISSN: 1537-5943
We argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation. Promotion-seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues. The greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal, the more intense political competition is, resulting in higher taxation; however, too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability. Using a panel dataset of all Chinese county-level jurisdictions from 1999-2006, we find strong evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of county-level jurisdictions within a prefecture-our proxy for the intensity of political competition-and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions. The results are robust to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence. Adapted from the source document.
In: American Political Science Review (Forthcoming)
SSRN
In: Eleventh Chinese Internet Research Conference, 2013, Forthcoming
SSRN
In: The China quarterly: an international journal for the study of China, Band 209, Heft 329, S. 225-228
ISSN: 0305-7410, 0009-4439
SSRN
Working paper
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1476-4989
List-based samples are often biased because of coverage errors. The problem is especially acute in societies where the level of internal migration is high and where record keeping on the population is not reliable. We propose a solution based on spatial sampling that overcomes the inability to reach migrants in traditional area samples based on household lists. A comparison between a traditional study and our sample of Beijing demonstrates that coverage bias is greatly reduced. The successful incorporation of mobile urban residents has important substantive effects, in both univariate and multivariate analyses of public opinion data.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 1, S. 182-194
ISSN: 0022-3816
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 1, S. 182-194
ISSN: 1468-2508