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Does the Communist Party help strengthen China's legal reforms?
In: The China review: an interdisciplinary journal on greater China, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 45-71
ISSN: 1680-2012
World Affairs Online
Reaching Migrants in Survey Research: The Use of the Global Positioning System to Reduce Coverage Bias in China
In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1047-1987
The Political Consequences of Economic Shocks: Implications for Political Behavior in Russia
In: Problems of post-communism, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 221-240
ISSN: 1557-783X
Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China
In: American political science review, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 706-722
ISSN: 1537-5943
We argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation. Promotion-seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues. The greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal, the more intense political competition is, resulting in higher taxation; however, too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability. Using a panel dataset of all Chinese county-level jurisdictions from 1999–2006, we find strong evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of county-level jurisdictions within a prefecture—our proxy for the intensity of political competition—and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions. The results are robust to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence.
Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China
In: American political science review, Band 108, Heft 3
ISSN: 1537-5943
We argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation. Promotion-seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues. The greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal, the more intense political competition is, resulting in higher taxation; however, too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability. Using a panel dataset of all Chinese county-level jurisdictions from 1999-2006, we find strong evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of county-level jurisdictions within a prefecture-our proxy for the intensity of political competition-and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions. The results are robust to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence. Adapted from the source document.
Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China
In: American Political Science Review (Forthcoming)
SSRN
The Political Hierarchy of Censorship: An Analysis of Keyword Blocking of CCP Officials' Names on Sina Weibo Before and After the 2012 National Congress (S)election
In: Eleventh Chinese Internet Research Conference, 2013, Forthcoming
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
Crisis Management in an Authoritarian Regime: Media Effects During the Sichuan Earthquake
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
Reaching Migrants in Survey Research: The Use of the Global Positioning System to Reduce Coverage Bias in China
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1476-4989
List-based samples are often biased because of coverage errors. The problem is especially acute in societies where the level of internal migration is high and where record keeping on the population is not reliable. We propose a solution based on spatial sampling that overcomes the inability to reach migrants in traditional area samples based on household lists. A comparison between a traditional study and our sample of Beijing demonstrates that coverage bias is greatly reduced. The successful incorporation of mobile urban residents has important substantive effects, in both univariate and multivariate analyses of public opinion data.
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 51, Heft 8, S. 1074-1105
ISSN: 1552-3829
Political selection is central to the survival of all regimes. This article evaluates the relative importance of performance and political connection for the advancement of local politicians under authoritarianism. We hypothesize that in a large-scale multilevel polity, economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at lower administrative levels of government than at higher ones, even after controlling for political connections. This dualist strategy allows the ruling elites to achieve economic performance while minimizing the advancement of potentially disloyal challengers. Thus, balancing between loyalty and competence among subordinates enhances regime survival. Our empirical evidence draws on a comprehensive panel dataset of provincial, prefectural, and county-level Communist party secretaries and government executives appointed between 1999 and 2007. We find consistent evidence for our argument under various model specifications. We also explore the heterogeneous effects of performance on promotion given the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) age ineligibility rule for cadre promotion and jurisdiction characteristics.
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder
In: Forthcoming at Comparative Political Studies
SSRN
Elections in rural China competition without parties
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 43, Heft 6, S. 763-790
ISSN: 0010-4140
World Affairs Online
Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 43, Heft 6, S. 763-790
ISSN: 1552-3829
Village elections in China present scholars with the case of a single-party regime that allows voters to reject candidates regularly. Using a micro survey of 698 voters in 30 rural election districts, the authors demonstrate that when some candidates can lose, voters participate. A comparison of models of voter turnout and running for office further demonstrates that even when competition is structured to the benefit of party members, the perception of competition as choice between candidates is sufficient to engage voters and increase their perception that the electoral process is fair. These findings hold regardless of a respondent's age, gender, membership in the Communist Party and Youth League, and general knowledge level and access to media. Village wealth and geographical isolation also do not demonstrate a strong substantive impact. One theoretical implication of these findings is that contested elections in authoritarian regimes may simultaneously strengthen demand for accountability and loyalty to the regime.