In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization: the international journal of public health = Bulletin de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, Band 84, Heft 8, S. 597-602
Ongoing mutations in the funding of university research lead to the intensification of the reflexions on the increasing interdependence linking the universities to the governments. Through the years, these linkages of interdependence have generated a sort of social contract that was initially implicit, but has become increasingly more and more explicit, including increasing number of provisions governing the linkages prevailing between the universities and the governments. The paper demonstrates that the provisions of this social contract have been gradually revised under the pressures of changes that gradually occurred concerning the views of the government policy makers and the needs and practices of university research. The examination of these changes incites the author to conclude that the social contract relating the universities to the governments will become more and more compelling. The last part of the paper proposes to consider these constraints in a positive manner in attempting to figure out opportunities opened for future funding of university research. Specific lines of lobbying actions are suggested to improve the marketing of university research. ; Les mutations en cours dans le financement de la recherche universitaire contribuent à intensifier la réflexion sur l'interdépendance croissante qui existe entre les universités et le gouvernement. Au fil du temps, ces liens d'interdépendance ont fini par faire émerger une sorte de contrat social, d'abord implicite, puis progressivement, de plus en plus explicite, contenant des clauses de plus en plus nombreuses et de plus en plus détaillées pour régir les liens d'interdépendance qui existent entre les universités et le gouvernement. L'article démontre que les clauses de ce contrat social ont été révisées progressivement sous la pression de changements graduels qui sont survenus tant du côté de la recherche universitaire que du côté gouvernemental. L'examen de ces changements amène l'auteur à conclure que le contrat social qui lie les universités au gouvernement sera de plus en plus contraignant. La dernière partie de l'article propose de considérer ces contraintes de façon positive en tentant de voir les opportunités qui s'en dégagent pour l'avenir du financement de la recherche universitaire en suggérant un certain nombre d'actions concrètes s'adressant tant aux chercheurs qu'aux gestionnaires des universités.
INVESTIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GENERALLY DEAL WITH VALUES, IDEOLOGIES OR STRATEGIES OF PARTY LEADERS. THEORETICAL STUDIES PREDICT THAT, IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE INFORMATION IS IMPERFECT AND COSTLY, POLITICIANS HAVE INCENTIVES TO FORMULATE INTERVENTIONS, THE BENEFITS OF WHICH ARE CONCENTRATED WHILE THEIR COSTS ARE DIFFUSED. THE AUTHORS ELABORATE A THEORY OF SUPPLY OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION WHICH PREDICTS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVENTIONS THAT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF VOTES AS WELL AS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIONS THAT LEAD TO VOTE LOSSES. THE PREDICTIONS OF THIS THEORY ARE TESTED BY USING THE PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE OFFICIAL PROGRAMMES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF QUEBEC DURING THE 1960-1981 PERIOD. THE TWO BASIC FINDINGS ARE THAT (1) THE PREDICTION RELATIVE TO THE ANTI-CONSUMER AND ANTI-TAXPAYER BIAS OF THE POLITICAL MARKET IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS, AND THAT (2) THE PARTY LEADERS PREFER TO FINANCE THE COST OF THEIR PROPOSALS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION THROUGH THE MODE OF FISCAL ILLUSION INSTEAD OF HOPING FOR INATTENTION ON THE PART OF CONSUMERS AND TAXPAYERS.
Cybernetic analysis is part of the sytems approach & has been used by several authors to study governmental policies or public decisions. It is used differently here. Regulation by feedback is considered complex rather than simple; positive feedback seems neither exceptional nor pathological, & great emphasis is placed on power relations in the phenomena of regulation by feedback through which government policies are formed. The presentation of different subsystems of the cybernetic model & of different types of regulation by feedback are illustrated by examples touching on the adjustment of electoral boundaries. The first results of research bearing on the sector of social affairs & on that of energy serve to underline characteristics of the cybernetic analysis of government policies: (1) the key role it gives regulation by feedback, (2) its particular attention to the unxpected consequences of action, & (3) its insistence on the phenomena of communication as essential to action. 7 Figures. HA.