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The new morality is both a behavioral phenom enon and an articulation of a contemporary ethic. Behaviorally speaking, the new morality is a rejection of more traditional models of the moral life and a strong endorsement of new modes. As such, it exhibits elements common to any ethic: adherence to and advocacy of its values and rejection and denial of others. Proponents of the new morality as an ethic, on the other hand, not only have interpreted it to be a repudi ation of legalism, but have also considered it to be an ethic beyond objective obligation. By defining new morality pri marily in the categories of love, they have sought to relieve this "new" morality of all structured constraints. Although it is true that the new morality is more relaxed about older notions of right and wrong, it would be a serious mistake to assume, as have situational ethicists, that practical ethics, as expressed in the new morality, has eliminated the place and function of obli gation. Unfortunately, the debate in the churches over the new morality has misconstrued the rejection of accepted models of Christian behavior as the repudiation of all normative ethics. The serious task remaining is to find new and adequate expres sion for modern sensibilities within the context of Christian love.

It is asserted that the new morality is both a behavioral phenomenon & an expression of a contemporary ethic. It is a rejection of traditional moral models & a strong endorsement of new modes. As such it exhibits elements common to any ethic: adherence to & advocacy of its values & rejection & denial of others. By the end of the decade of the 1960's, there was evidence that the strong emphasis of the new morality upon personal discovery & self-authenticating experience did not necessarily sustain the capacity for wider soc awareness & responsibility. Yet, at the same time, those who most objected to authoritarian prescriptive ethics gave strident voice to soc wrongs & were not hesitant either to prescribe or to condemn. It is suggested that the distaste for obligation & norms arose because these normative positions represented models & life styles both inadequate & unattractive to the moral sensibilities of today. If this conclusion is tenable then the move has not been away from any normative position whatsoever, but from one normative model to another. The transition from one ethical model of responsible life to another & the coexistence of several models side by side requires the development of moral dialogue between the groups. This will lead to new moral insights in a changing society which will then find structural & hence normative expression. The new morality has made quite clear that any new ethic must affirm the basic right of all people to a more abundant life here & now. The serious task remaining is to find new & adequate expression for modern sensibilities within the context of Christian love. Modified HA.