Monopole als Handlungsinstrumente der öffentlichen Hand
In: Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht v.740
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In: Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht v.740
In: Ursachen und Konsequenzen der Finanzkrise, S. 29-48
In: Juristische Reihe TENEA
In: www.jurawelt.com 83
In: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge 170
In: Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht Band 740
Der Autor versucht, den nur auf den ersten Blick eng begrenzten Monopolbegriff unter Berücksichtigung der modernen Entwicklung zu konturieren und zugleich die Einflußmöglichkeiten der öffentlichen Hand auf privatwirtschaftliche Techniken der Aufgabenerfüllung zu hinterfragen: -- In weit stärkerem Maße als bislang angenommen existieren Ausschließlichkeitsstellungen der öffentlichen Hand oder mit Billigung der öffentlichen Hand. Insbesondere im Bereich der staatlichen Wirtschaftslenkung und der Wahrnehmung staatlicher Aufgaben unter Einbeziehung Privater scheinen Monopole auf, die nicht zwingend alleine oder ausschließlich von der öffentlichen Hand gehalten werden. So lassen sich auch staatlicherseits angeregte, gebilligte oder beeinflußte Monopolisierungen im Bereich der Wirtschaft - zu denken ist etwa an "freiwillige Selbstbeschränkungsabkommen" - als intendierte Monopole der öffentlichen Hand charakterisieren. -- Abschließend wird das Verhältnis der Grundrechte zu den Monopolen erörtert und die Frage der Grundrechtsfähigkeit eines Monopols der öffentlichen Hand diskutiert.
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 170-186
ISSN: 1545-8504
Exponential growth effects play a major role in many household finance decisions. A systematic bias in dealing with exponential growth can lead to poor savings and debt decisions. In this paper, we extend previous research on the exponential growth bias in the savings and debt domains and provide a first experimental link between these two important fields of consumer financial decision making. We develop a measure for the exponential growth bias that naturally extends over different domains and parameter settings, and we explore the ramifications of being acquainted with the basic formula of exponential savings growth. Specifically, we analyze whether such formula knowledge helps only in calculating simple compound interest scenarios with a pocket calculator or if it provides benefits that go beyond this narrow field of application. We observe that—even without a pocket calculator—individuals who know the compound interest formula provide less biased estimates for problems from the savings domain and also for slightly more complicated debt amortization problems that also build on exponential growth effects. We conclude that being acquainted with the compound interest formula provides some intuitive grasp of exponential effects that can be helpful in a broader range of household finance decisions. At the same time, we observe that too much dependence on a calculator can have adverse effects: when equipped with a pocket calculator, a number of participants, both aware and unaware of the compound savings formula, provided persistently insensible answers greater than the initial loan balance in the debt domain.
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Working paper
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 67, Heft 3-4, S. 810-819
Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of commitment decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest in a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and commitment to analyze how each individual variable contributes to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find that the period of commitment exerts a substantial impact and the feedback frequency a far less pronounced impact. There is a strong interaction between both variables. The results have significant implications for real world intertemporal decision making.
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In: Management Science, accepted for publication
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Working paper
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 261-280
ISSN: 1545-8504
Previous research shows that individuals make systematic errors when judging exponential growth, which has harmful effects for their financial well-being. This study analyzes how far individuals are aware of their errors and how these errors are shaped by arithmetic and conceptual problems. Whereas arithmetic problems could be overcome using computational assistance like a pocket calculator, this is not the case for conceptual problems, a term we use to subsume other error drivers like a general misunderstanding of exponential growth or overwhelming task complexity. In an incentivized experiment, we find that participants strongly overestimate the accuracy of their intuitive judgment. At the same time, their willingness to pay for arithmetic assistance is too high on average, often much above the actual benefits a calculator provides. Using a multitier system of task complexity we can show that the willingness to pay for arithmetic assistance is hardly related to its benefits, indicating that participants do not really understand how the interplay of arithmetic and conceptual problems shape their errors in exponential growth tasks. Our findings are relevant for policymaking and financial advisory practice and can help to design effective approaches to mitigate the detrimental effects of misperceived exponential growth.
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Working paper
In: Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien: ZEuS, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 115-162
ISSN: 1435-439X
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 57-74
ISSN: 1545-8504
This paper reports the results of an experiment on the revealed preference for skewness in a comparison of continuous return distributions. We find that revealed preferences are highly sensitive to the way asset risks are communicated. Whereas probability density functions lead to a pronounced preference for left-skewed distributions, the opposite is true for cumulative distribution functions. Systematic misperceptions of the variance cannot explain the sensitivity of preferences to the presentation format. Part of the preference for positive skewness when risks are communicated through probability density functions is due to a systematic misestimation of the expected return. We also find that self-reported risk aversion, a measure of risk attitude commonly used in practice, is a valuable predictor of skewness preferences. Individuals that judge themselves as more risk averse show a stronger preference for right skewness.