Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability
In: American journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 801
ISSN: 1540-5907
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In: American journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 801
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 801-832
ISSN: 0092-5853
World Affairs Online
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 69
ISSN: 0738-8942
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 33, Heft 1, S. 67-83
ISSN: 1552-8766
The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma is a reasonable model for nuclear crises (usually represented by "Chicken"), and for the arms race. This article addresses the existence of credible deterrence strategies that promote cooperation as a dynamically stable steady state. Decisions made repeatedly in time are the selection by each side of a level of hostility. Assessment of the resulting situation is represented by a utility function for each player. As the game proceeds, players are concerned with the current situation as well as with the future consequences of their present decisions. Thus each side must formulate intentions and expectations of each other's future behavior and use them to infer their own present optimal decisions. A formal concept of deterrence strategy is introduced: It promises the other side retaliation in kind to prevent any gain from aggressive play, and it inflicts increasing losses as a result of escalation. If one side adopts such a deterrence strategy, the other side cannot do better than acting similarly, and when both sides adopt it, they both enjoy optimal decision rules that confirm intentions and expectations. The resulting dynamical system endows cooperation with asymptotic stability provided the threats of retaliation contain a fair mix of firmness and restraint.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 33, Heft 1, S. 67
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: Defence & peace economics, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 1-33
ISSN: 1476-8267
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 511-536
ISSN: 1469-2112
Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. This article shows that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. Instead, the rivals stand firm on extreme bargaining positions, fighting it out in the hope that the other side will give in, until much of the war has been fought. Despite ongoing resolution of uncertainty by virtue of time passing, the rivals choose not to try to narrow their differences by negotiating. Adapted from the source document.
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 511-536
ISSN: 0007-1234
Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's . - type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends . - with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. This article shows that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. Instead, the rivals stand firm on extreme . - bargaining positions, fighting it out in the hope that the other side will give in, until much of the war . - has been fought. Despite ongoing resolution of uncertainty by virtue of time passing, the rivals choose not to try to narrow their differences by negotiating (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 511-536
ISSN: 1469-2112
Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. This article shows that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. Instead, the rivals stand firm on extreme bargaining positions, fighting it out in the hope that the other side will give in, until much of the war has been fought. Despite ongoing resolution of uncertainty by virtue of time passing, the rivals choose not to try to narrow their differences by negotiating.
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 28, Heft 5, S. 497-521
ISSN: 1549-9219
Our goal in this article is to examine the strategic interaction between terror groups, hosts, and the United States in order to better understand the parameters of the interaction and the elements of a winning strategy. We adopt a game theoretic approach assuming that each player has a well defined goal and accounts for the anticipated behavior of the others to develop strategy. The game that we develop is a repeated game in which the host and the US must decide whether to fight a terrorist organization whose membership and resources will grow indefinitely if left unchecked. Our model predicts circumstances in which a host will begin to push back against the terrorists in anticipation of a future involvement of the US. It also predicts circumstances in which the terrorist organization's hatred of the US prompts attacks that seal its fate and early demise.
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 28, Heft 5, S. 497-522
ISSN: 0738-8942
In: Peace economics, peace science and public policy, Band 16, Heft 1
ISSN: 1554-8597
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 1051-1073
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 347-382
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 347-382
ISSN: 0305-0629