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This paper studies the business-cycle dynamics of secondary markets for physical capital and their effects on the macroeconomy. In the data, both capital reallocation and the price of used capital are procyclical. To rationalize these facts, I propose a model with endogenous partial irreversibility, where used investment goods are imperfect substitutes for new ones because of firm-level capital specificity. Equilibrium dynamics in the market for used capital induce countercyclical dispersion of marginal products of capital, propagate movements in aggregate TFP, and provide a microfoundation for state-dependent nonconvex capital adjustment costs. (JEL E22, E23, E32, G31)

We characterize efficiency in an equilibrium model of investment and capital reallocation with heterogeneous firms facing collateral constraints. The model features two types of pecuniary externalities: collateral externalities, because the resale price of capital affects collateral constraints, and distributive externalities, because buyers of old capital are more financially constrained than sellers, consistent with empirical evidence. We prove that the stationary equilibrium price of old capital is inefficiently high because the distributive externality exceeds the collateral externality, by a factor of two when we calibrate the model. New investment reduces the future price of old capital, providing a rationale for new-investment subsidies. (JEL D21, D24, D25, D62, E22, G31, G32)

Abstract
We propose a theory of optimal fiscal policy with 'Limited-Time Commitment'. In our framework, successive governments have commitment only over finite, overlapping horizons. We first show that key results in the 'Full Commitment' literature can often be sustained with a single period of commitment. We then solve a calibrated model in which 'Limited-Time Commitment' fails to implement the 'Full Commitment' policy, and find that one year (three years) of commitment recovers one-third (two-thirds) of the welfare losses relative to 'No Commitment'. Finally, we investigate the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in response to shocks.

We consider models where the Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy under Full Commitment (FC) is time-inconsistent and define a new notion of optimal policy, Limited-Time Commitment (LTC). Successive one-period lived governments can commit to future plans over a finite horizon. We provide a sufficient condition on the mapping from finite policy sequences to allocations, such that LTC and FC lead to the same outcomes. We then show that this condition is verified in several existing models, allowing FC Ramsey plans to be supported with a finite commitment horizon (often a single period). We relate the required degree of commitment to the economic environment: in economies without capital, the minimum degree of commitment required is given by the government debt maturity; in economies with capital and government balanced-budget constraints, the required commitment is given by the horizon over which the budget has to be balanced. Finally, we solve numerically for the LTC equilibrium of an economy where the equivalence result fails and show that a single year of commitment to capital taxes provides substantial welfare gains relative to the No-Commitment time-consistent policy.

Abstract
We study the role of new-product quality for the dynamics of durable-good expenditures around the Great Recession. We assemble a rich dataset on US new-car markets during 2004–12, combining data on transaction prices with detailed information about vehicles' technical characteristics. During the recession, a reallocation of expenditures away from high-quality new models accounts for a significant decline in the dispersion of expenditures. In turn, car manufacturers introduced new models of lower quality. The drop in new-model quality persistently depressed the technology embodied in vehicles, and likely contributed to the slow recovery of expenditures.