Suchergebnisse

Philippe Dulbecco and Bertrand Laporte. — The financing of international trade security for developing countries : An approach in terms of « global public good » The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security, more specifically for developing countries. It characterises security using a global public good framework, before studying the conditions of financing the supply of the global public good security. A critical analysis of the various sources and instruments for financing allows the authors to propose different financing scenarios, based on specific allocations of responsibilities among the actors involved in security. The article concludes by considering the role of international institutions as managers of the financing and implementation of security in international trade.

Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable, countries need to capture a 'fair' share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the third raw materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining sector by a factor of 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable natural resource sector earned by African governments only grew by a factor of 1.15. The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African governments. But what do we really know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa? The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa and note their limits for the knowledge of the actual mineral rent sharing.

Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable, countries need to capture a 'fair' share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the third raw materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining sector by a factor of 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable natural resource sector earned by African governments only grew by a factor of 1.15. The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African governments. But what do we really know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa? The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa and note their limits for the knowledge of the actual mineral rent sharing.

Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable, countries need to capture a 'fair' share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the third raw materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining sector by a factor of 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable natural resource sector earned by African governments only grew by a factor of 1.15. The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African governments. But what do we really know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa? The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa and note their limits for the knowledge of the actual mineral rent sharing.

Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable, countries need to capture a 'fair' share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the third raw materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining sector by a factor of 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable natural resource sector earned by African governments only grew by a factor of 1.15. The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African governments. But what do we really know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa? The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa and note their limits for the knowledge of the actual mineral rent sharing.

Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable, countries need to capture a 'fair' share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the third raw materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining sector by a factor of 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable natural resource sector earned by African governments only grew by a factor of 1.15. The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African governments. But what do we really know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa? The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa and note their limits for the knowledge of the actual mineral rent sharing.

AbstractCustoms authorities in developing countries are often reluctant to forget systematic inspections for fear of risking revenue loss. Such physical inspections however, impede rather than facilitate trade. Control selectivity is therefore a key issue in customs administration reform. This paper shows how a sophisticated risk management method can facilitate trade by automatically and rationally selecting transactions, with the end result of actually enhancing revenue performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.