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The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

Approval voting : an Experiment On April 21, 2002, the day of the first round of the French Presidential elections, we conducted a relatively large scale test of approval voting "live" - in parallel with the official vote. The essential idea of approval voting is this: instead of voting for a single candidate electors may vote for ("give their approval to") as many candidates as they wish. Voters at six voting bureaus were invited to participate immediately after having cast their official ballots. This paper describes the experiment and presents the principal results. The file of the complete results is available for research purposes and may be obtained from the authors. ; Le 21 avril 2002, en marge du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle française, nous avons organisé une expérience de grande échelle visant à tester le vote par assentiment. Le principe de ce mode de scrutin est le suivant : au lieu de voter pour un seul candidat, chaque électeur peut voter pour (" donner son assentiment à " ou " approuver ") autant de candidats qu'il le souhaite. Les électeurs de six bureaux de vote ont été invités à expérimenter ce mode de scrutin, qui constitue une alternative au mode de scrutin actuel. Nous décrivons ici cette expérience, et présentons ses principaux résultats. Le fichier complet de tous les résultats est disponible auprès des auteurs, qui le tiennent à disposition des chercheurs souhaitant l'exploiter.

Approval voting : an Experiment On April 21, 2002, the day of the first round of the French Presidential elections, we conducted a relatively large scale test of approval voting "live" - in parallel with the official vote. The essential idea of approval voting is this: instead of voting for a single candidate electors may vote for ("give their approval to") as many candidates as they wish. Voters at six voting bureaus were invited to participate immediately after having cast their official ballots. This paper describes the experiment and presents the principal results. The file of the complete results is available for research purposes and may be obtained from the authors. ; Le 21 avril 2002, en marge du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle française, nous avons organisé une expérience de grande échelle visant à tester le vote par assentiment. Le principe de ce mode de scrutin est le suivant : au lieu de voter pour un seul candidat, chaque électeur peut voter pour (" donner son assentiment à " ou " approuver ") autant de candidats qu'il le souhaite. Les électeurs de six bureaux de vote ont été invités à expérimenter ce mode de scrutin, qui constitue une alternative au mode de scrutin actuel. Nous décrivons ici cette expérience, et présentons ses principaux résultats. Le fichier complet de tous les résultats est disponible auprès des auteurs, qui le tiennent à disposition des chercheurs souhaitant l'exploiter.

Approval voting : an Experiment On April 21, 2002, the day of the first round of the French Presidential elections, we conducted a relatively large scale test of approval voting "live" - in parallel with the official vote. The essential idea of approval voting is this: instead of voting for a single candidate electors may vote for ("give their approval to") as many candidates as they wish. Voters at six voting bureaus were invited to participate immediately after having cast their official ballots. This paper describes the experiment and presents the principal results. The file of the complete results is available for research purposes and may be obtained from the authors. ; Le 21 avril 2002, en marge du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle française, nous avons organisé une expérience de grande échelle visant à tester le vote par assentiment. Le principe de ce mode de scrutin est le suivant : au lieu de voter pour un seul candidat, chaque électeur peut voter pour (" donner son assentiment à " ou " approuver ") autant de candidats qu'il le souhaite. Les électeurs de six bureaux de vote ont été invités à expérimenter ce mode de scrutin, qui constitue une alternative au mode de scrutin actuel. Nous décrivons ici cette expérience, et présentons ses principaux résultats. Le fichier complet de tous les résultats est disponible auprès des auteurs, qui le tiennent à disposition des chercheurs souhaitant l'exploiter.