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AbstractThis paper highlights a link between measures for precolonial institutions and ethnic fractionalisation in postcolonial countries. A conceptual explanation is provided for why countries that were more politically centralised in precolonial times should be less ethnically fractionalised in current times. This result is confirmed for a sample of postcolonial countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. This is followed by a comparative case study in the South Pacific countries of Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Samoa. It is hoped that these results will lead to further empirical work focused at delving deeper into the link between these two measures to better understand what they are actually measuring, and why both are so closely related to economic development.

History offers many examples of dictatorswho worsened their behavior significantly over time (like Zimbabwe's Mugabe) as well as dictators who displayed remarkable improvements (like Rawlings of Ghana).We show that such mutations can result from rational behavior when the dictator's flow use of repression is complementary to his stock of wrongdoings: past wrongdoings then perpetuate further wrongdoings and the dictator can unintentionally get trapped in a repressive steady state where he himself suffers from ex-post regret. This then begs the question why such a dictator would ever choose to do wrong in the first place. We show that this can be explained from the dictator's uncertainty over his degree of impunity in relation to wrongdoing, which induces him to experiment along this dimension. This produces a setting where any individual rising to power can end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant. Since derailment is accidental and accompanied by ex-post regret, increasing accountability can be in the interest of both the public and the dictator.

History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior significantly over time (like Zimbabwe's Mugabe) as well as dictators who displayed remarkable improvements (like Rawlings of Ghana). The authors show that such mutations can result from rational behavior when the dictator's flow use of repression is complementary to his stock of wrongdoings: past wrongdoings then perpetuate further wrongdoings and the dictator can unintentionally get trapped in a repressive steady state where he himself suffers from ex-post regret. This then begs the question why such a dictator would ever choose to do wrong in the first place. The authors show that this can be explained from the dictator's uncertainty over his degree of impunity in relation to wrongdoing, which induces him to experiment along this dimension. This produces a setting where any individual rising to power can end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant. Since derailment is accidental and accompanied by ex-post regret, increasing accountability can be in the interest of both the public and the dictator.

History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behaviour significantly over time (like Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe) as well as dictators who displayed remarkable improvements (like Jerry Rawlings of Ghana). We show that such mutations can result from rational behaviour when the dictator's flow use of repression is complementary to his accumulated stock of wrongdoings. Interacting this complementarity with uncertainty over the dictator's degree of impunity in relation to wrongdoing (such that the dictator becomes inclined to experiment along this dimension), produces an environment in which any individual rising to power can end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant. Our model shows that dictators are more likely to derail with higher levels of divertible funds available, for example stemming from fungible aid inflows or from the exploitation of natural resources. It furthermore suggests that derailment is accidental and that such leaders suffer from ex-post regret. Consequently, increasing accountability can be in the interest of both the public and the dictator. ; Shaun Larcom: Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, 6-21 Silver Street, Cambridge CB39EP, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 20 3073 8320. E-mail: stl25@cam.ac.uk. Corresponding author. Mare Sarr: School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. Tel.: +27 21 650 2982. Email: mare.sarr@uct.ac.za. Tim Willems: Nuffi eld College, and Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom. Also a member of the Centre for Macroeconomics. Tel.: +44 75 076 729 84. E-mail: tim.willems@economics.ox.ac.uk.

AbstractWe measure the extent that a prevailing law can affect moral and social norms. We use variations in facemask fines in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, as it presents us with many features of a natural experiment. Our analysis provides two important findings. First, we find that the legal status of a behaviour, that is whether the behaviour is illegal or not, is important in influencing stated compliance and moral and social norms. In contrast we find no evidence that a variation in penalties has any effect on stated compliance or moral or social norms. We consider these results are important for law makers and society, as both moral and social norms are known to be important drivers of social change, and our results show that legality influences both—thus highlighting an endogenous relationship between the law—and moral and social norms.

© 2017 The Authors. Energy is one of the cornerstones essential for human life, along with other services such as water and food. Understanding how the different services in the energy-water-food (EWF) nexus interact and are perceived by different actors is key to achieving sustainability. In this paper, we derive a model of the EWF nexus using fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM). Data were collected in a two-step approach from workshops with researchers and stakeholders involved in the three focal sectors. Four FCMs were developed; one for each of the EWF sectors, and one for the interactions that create the nexus between EWF. The FCM represents the combined views of the groups who participated in the workshops, the importance and limitations of which is discussed. To demonstrate its effectiveness, the aggregated FCM was applied to predict the impacts on the EWF nexus of four scenarios under which the United Kingdom would depart from the European Union (i.e. Brexit). The FCM indicated that energy-related concepts had the largest influence on the EWF nexus and that EWF demand will decrease most under a 'hard-Brexit' scenario. The demand for energy was shown to decline relatively less than other services and was strongly associated with gross domestic product (GDP), whereas UK population size had a stronger effect on water and food demand. Overall, we found a threefold change across all concepts in scenarios without freedom of movement, contribution to the EU budget, and increased policy devolution to the UK.